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INTRODUCTION 
In many areas of the law, the notion of context is more important than ever. 
The realists and their successors tirelessly have pointed out how older, more 
"conceptualistic" or "formalistic" modes of legal thinking and interpretation 
obscure the richer reality to which law should respond. Property is one of the 
main battlegrounds in this struggle. The conventional wisdom that emerged 
over the course of the twentieth century holds that we should concern ourselves 
with entitlements-arbitrary bundles of rights, privileges, and the like-and 
whether we attach the label "property" to any given bundle is a choice that is 
likewise arbitrary.1 As long as these choices are arbitrary, entitlements can be 
designed at will, to any degree of specificity, to further the policymaker's ends. 
No longer can the owner of Blackacre claim with much force that ownership 
entails the right to use the resource without interference. As long as the 
ownership of Blackacre is a bundle of sticks, any given right-say the right to 
exclude others from a beach-can just as easily be assimilated to anyone's 
bundle as to the owner's. Thus, the idea that a property right is a right to a 
thing that avails against the world has been replaced with the idea that a 
property right is only one possible entitlement plucked from a wide range of 
equally privileged results. 
At first blush, the similarity between a system of entitlements and a 
language seems to lend further support to this (post) realist position. As is 
well-known, the relation between words and the things they refer to is arbitrary, 
the result of conventions that could easily have been different. "Book" could 
just as easily refer to what "plant" refers to, and vice versa. Nor is how we 
carve up conceptual space into word meanings completely determined by 
nature, as can be seen in the cross-linguistic variety of systems of color terms.2 
Moreover, work in the field of linguistic pragmatics-the study of how 
messages are communicated by using language-has demonstrated the central 
role of context in the interpretation of utterances. Just as with the bundle-of- 
rights view of property, bringing in the richness of context has allowed 
linguists to appreciate language systems' high degree of flexibility. And, as we 
will see, scholars of linguistic pragmatics and legal realists both define 
1. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS 
XXII 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman, eds., 1980) (discussing how property 
rights can be broken down into their constituent parts); Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and 
the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044, 1086 (1984) ("[P]roperty is simply a label 
for whatever 'bundle of sticks' the individual has been granted."); Joan Williams, The 
Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 297 (1998) ("Labeling something as property 
does not predetermine what rights an owner does or does not have in it."); see also 
RESTATEMENT OF PROP. ?? 1-4 (1936) (defining particular terms for different kinds of legal 
relations). 
2. Languages split up the spectrum differently, but basic color terms do exhibit some 
universal features. See BRENT BERLIN & PAUL KAY, BASIC COLOR TERMS: THEIR 
UNIVERSALITY AND EVOLUTION 7-10 (1969). 
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themselves in opposition to what they perceive as rigid and overly simplistic 
"formalism." 
The broadly realist program of paying attention to social context focuses 
on the benefits of nuance in important ways. For example, splitting up an 
entitlement into finer bundles can allow specialization, interalization of 
externalities, and direct assertion of community goals to a greater degree than 
coarser-grained property rights. The realist program concerns itself with the 
benefits of detail to and by decisionmakers; and, to the extent realists consider 
costs, they consider the supply-side costs of writing down rules to delineate the 
sticks in the bundle, describing the contextual factors relevant to a judgment, 
and so on. At the same time, realism professes to be concerned with the 
audience for legally relevant communication. Most often, this takes the form of 
regarding judges as audiences for communications by various other actors such 
as contracting parties, legislatures, administrative agencies, or other judges.3 
And part of this court-centric tendency in realism focuses on clearing away 
obstacles, such as legal formalism, that stand in the way of clear, honest 
communication by and to judges. 
I will argue that this view of property is not wrong but that it tells only one 
side of a more complex story, and that an investigation of the communicative 
aspect of property will lead to a more complete view. This Article considers 
the relationship between context and form, taking into account that the benefits 
and costs of communication vary with the nature of the audience. Relatively 
context-sensitive realism and relatively acontextual formalism can be seen as 
points along a spectrum of methods of striking a tradeoff between 
communicating a lot to a few or a little to many. 
This informational tradeoff points to an unacknowledged tension lurking in 
the realist project of coupling nuanced decisionmaking with concern for the 
audience: Not all audiences-especially large and heterogeneous audiences- 
can process nuanced messages at reasonable cost. The realists and their 
successors argue that many features traditionally associated with formalism- 
from literalistic interpretation to standardization of property under the numerus 
clausus principle-are nothing more than archaic relics.4 Controversy has 
centered on how far, if at all, the benefits of certainty in the law mitigate the 
3. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN 
JUSTICE 165-85 (1949) (analyzing how judges come to their decisions); KARL N. 
LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 221-22 (1962) (describing 
model of context-sensitive judicial decisionmaking); see also, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, 
RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 18-19 (1984) (arguing that legal realism provided a way 
for lawyers to intuit their way to justice in the context of the New Deal); William Twining, 
Talk about Realism, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 329, 347-51 (1985) (evaluating extent to which 
realists have a distinctive theory of adjudication). 
4. Under the numerus clausus principle, property rights must conform to a fixed menu 
of standard forms, in contrast to the far greater degree of customization allowed in the law of 
contract. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property. The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000). 
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inevitable incorrect results in some cases-much less the promotion of 
unattractive and outmoded values.5 But, some of these "formalistic" devices 
reflect the need to limit the cost of processing messages about legal relations 
that are broadcast to wide audiences. If everyone in the world is expected to 
respect an owner's right to Blackacre, the content of that right cannot be too 
complicated or idiosyncratic without placing a large burden on many third 
parties. On the other hand, when two parties are deep within an ongoing 
relationship, their contractual language can be given substantial deference in all 
its idiosyncrasies. This even extends to a court's enforcing such idiosyncrasies 
as long as a court's efforts are likely to achieve accuracy at reasonable cost. 
Various situations fall between these extremes, and the law will accordingly 
adopt interpretive methods of an intermediate sort. 
This Article will argue that much of the structure of property and related 
law stems from compromises inherent in a system of communication. In both 
law and linguistics, the less-studied side of communication relates to the 
audience. Only recently have linguists become sensitive to the differing 
impacts of addressees, nonadressee participants, and overhearers on speakers' 
choice of language style. This adjustment of speaker style according to the 
nature of the audience is called "audience design,"6 and I will argue that a 
similar adaptation to audiences occurs in the law. In law, it is often overlooked 
that information must be processed by those under a duty to respect rights and 
by those wishing to acquire rights, as well as by those expected to enforce 
rights. Once the full range of these different audiences and their costs of 
processing information about rights enter the picture, it is not clear that the 
detailed picking out of each stick in the bundle is always a good idea. 
Because audiences of different types have different abilities to process 
messages, the nature of the audience has implications for the amount and form 
of the information communicated. When choosing a mode of communication, 
the aim is to maximize the net benefits of communication, that is, the excess of 
the benefits of communication over the costs of production and processing. 
"Processing costs," in the broad sense in which I use the term, include the costs 
incurred by a cognitive agent in receiving information from a message.7 Given 
finite resources, one can communicate a lot to a few or a little to many. 
5. See generally Symposium, Formalism Revisited, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1999). 
6. The term originated in Allan Bell, Language Style as Audience Design, 13 
LANGUAGE SOC'Y 145 (1984). See infra Part II.B. 
7. Processing can be thought of as converting information into a digital form 
appropriate to the agent's purposes. See KEITH DEVLIN, LOGIC AND INFORMATION 16-19 
(1991) (noting the costs and benefits involved in the process of cognition); FRED I. DRETSKE, 
KNOWLEDGE AND THE FLOW OF INFORMATION 141-42 (1981) (discussing sensation and 
cognition). This conversion can be broken down into functions such as filtering for 
relevancy, accrediting or assessing credibility, decoding, and assimilating. See, e.g., Yochai 
Benkler, Communications Infrastructure Regulation and the Distribution of Control Over 
Content, 22 TELECOMM. POL'Y 183, 186-87 (1998). 
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To be more precise, we need to specify what, from the point of view of 
processing costs, it means to communicate a lot-and what the relevant 
characteristics of the audience are. Linguistic semantics is concerned with how 
various expressions convey information through the conventions of a language. 
To get a handle on this difficult topic, semantics has traditionally (and 
fruitfully) borrowed from the study of logic.8 Both semantics and logic have in 
turn focused on certain limited but convenient symbolic systems. However, 
some limitations of this approach have become apparent. One such limitation 
is that the traditional tools have been so useful that they can disguise the fact 
that symbols are not the only way to represent information. Recently, a number 
of mathematicians, philosophers, linguists, and computer scientists have sought 
to model information independent of representational modes (such as 
symbols).9 Representations of all kinds-symbols, diagrams, and even 
situations in the world-carry information. A first step toward capturing this 
larger picture is to measure the amount and distribution of information in 
situations. 
For this task, information theory, as developed by Claude Shannon and 
others from the mid-twentieth century on, is a well-developed tool, and I will 
borrow its definition of the amount of information.10 Information theorists 
concern themselves with the amount of information, and the maximum average 
flow of information through a given channel-something highly relevant to the 
early theorists' focus on applications to telecommunications.11 This 
8. On modeling English using the tools of logic, see, for example, GENNARO 
CHIERCHIA & SALLY MCCONNELL-GINET, MEANING AND GRAMMAR: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
SEMANTICS (2d ed. 2000); DAVID R. DOWTY, ROBERT E. WALL & STANLEY PETERS, 
INTRODUCTION TO MONTAGUE SEMANTICS (1981); BARBARA H. PARTEE, ALICE TER MEULEN 
& ROBERT E. WALL, MATHEMATICAL METHODS IN LINGUISTICS 317-429 (1990). 
9. See, e.g., JON BARWISE & JERRY SELIGMAN, INFORMATION FLOW: THE LOGIC OF 
DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS (1997) (developing a mathematical framework for how one medium 
can carry information about another and applying the framework to problems in philosophy 
and computer science); DEVLIN, supra note 7, at 1-13 (discussing the use of logic in 
understanding information); DRETSKE, supra note 7, at 3-26 (explaining measurement of the 
amount of information communicated); SUN-JOO SHIN, THE LOGICAL STATUS OF DIAGRAMS 
(1994) (analyzing the use of diagrams in logic to represent information); Jon Barwise & John 
Etchemendy, Heterogeneous Logic, in DIAGRAMMATIC REASONING: COGNITIVE AND 
COMPUTATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 211 (Janice Glasgow, N. Hari Narayanan & B. 
Chandrasekaran eds., 1995) (noting that one must use multiple modes of representation, not 
search for a universal one); John Perry & David Israel, What is Information?, in 
INFORMATION, LANGUAGE, AND COGNITION 1 (Philip P. Hanson ed., 1990) (developing a 
philosophical account of information within situation theory). 
10. See infra Part II.A. 
11. In communication theory, information content is measured by the minimum 
number of bits needed to uniquely specify a fact. In using this approach, we are following 
communication theory in concentrating on the amount of information rather than on the 
content of the message. See C.E. Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication (pts. 
1 & 2), 27 BELL SYS. TECHNICAL J. 379 (1948), 27 BELL SYS. TECHNICAL J. 623 (1948) 
(developing a theory of information based on quantity), reprinted as CLAUDE E. SHANNON & 
WARREN WEAVER, THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION (1949); see also 
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quantitative study of information has given us the useful notion of "bits" of 
information. Thus, if a coin toss can be heads or tails, this can be captured with 
one binary choice (say "1" for heads and "0" for tails), and is one bit of 
information. Tossing three coins results in eight possibilities, but can be 
expressed by three binary digits (hence the name "bits" for the amount of 
information the binary digits represent); so, if the three coin tosses are heads, 
tails, and heads, respectively, this can be represented by "101". Here, three 
binary digits are used to represent one of eight possibilities, the maximum 
(three bits of information) of which three binary digits are capable. The more 
improbable the message, the more information it contains, and the longer the 
shortest corresponding description in a given, explicit language must be. Thus, 
to take another trivial example, the string ababab contains less information than 
the string abbaba. Notice that, given a language of description, the shortest 
fully explicit description that captures ababab would be shorter (something like 
"ab x 3") than the similar description for abbaba.12 
As we will see, a legal message that conforms to an expected general 
pattern-say a fence around Blackacre, a claim to an approved estate, or a title 
document in proper recorded form-contains less information than a more 
idiosyncratic legal claim. In what follows, the key variable will be what I call 
information intensiveness, the amount of information (as just defined) per unit 
of delineation cost. Consider a hypothetical pair of claims between neighbors 
over the use of Blackacre, which happen to involve similar levels of delineation 
cost-an easement and a bilateral contract. The deed granting the easement 
will typically be more spelled out and will have to conform to the limited menu 
of easements allowed by property law.13 The easement is an in rem right, 
which can be enforced against interference by third parties, who will sometimes 
have to process the information spelled out by the easement-granting deed. 
The contract, by contrast, can contain more information, and can even use 
language idiosyncratic to the two parties. This is because, generally speaking, 
this contract is not relevant to anyone other than the parties (and perhaps their 
R.V.L. Hartley, Transmission of Information, 7 BELL SYS. TECHNICAL J. 535 (1928) 
(developing notion of "amount of information"). However, traditional communication 
theory, concerned as it is with the engineering problem of channel capacity, uses 
"information" in the sense of average information generated at a source (entropy), whereas 
we will sometimes be using the notion as applied to individual messages. See DRETSKE, 
supra note 7, at 3-26 (adapting information theory to individual messages). 
12. This corresponds to the fact that ababab has more order because it is ab three times 
and the fact that the later parts of the sequence are less surprising than the later parts of the 
sequence abbaba. 
13. Easements have been subdivided into affirmative and negative, see 2 AMERICAN 
LAW OF PROPERTY ?? 8.5, .11-.12 (A. James Casner ed., 1952); 4 POWELL ON REAL 
PROPERTY ? 34.02[2][c] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2000); 7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY 
? 60.02 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994), and into appurtenant and in gross, see 2 AMERICAN 
LAW OF PROPERTY, supra, ?? 8.6, 8.9; 4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra, ? 34.02[2][d]; 7 
THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra, ? 60.02(f). 
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successors if it runs with the land).14 The contract is more information 
intensive, but need only be processed by a limited audience. In general, the 
greater information associated with information intensiveness will require more 
costly processing, which is central to our concerns. As this hypothetical 
example suggests, the level of information intensiveness of a given claim can 
be expected to vary with the size and nature of the audience. 
On the audience side, factors directly or indirectly relevant to processing 
include the audience's size, background knowledge, heterogeneity, and 
definiteness. I will call a blend of these factors the extensiveness of the 
audience. Often these factors go together, but they can sometimes point in 
different directions. Thus, large audiences are often more heterogeneous than 
small ones. As we will see, these aspects of the audience can likewise be 
rendered measurable by a focus on (1) the density and multiplexity of the 
network shared by speaker and audience, and (2) the closeness of the audience 
physically and psychologically.15 As audience size increases, the marginal 
benefits of intensive communication are likely to decrease and the marginal 
costs are likely to increase. Thus, to minimize the sum of communication 
costs, any communication system faces a tradeoff between information 
intensiveness on the one hand and information extensiveness on the other. 
I will argue that law and its institutional context widely reflect this tradeoff 
between the intensiveness and extensiveness of communicated information. In 
particular, this tradeoff helps explain differences between various modalities of 
rights. As we will see, rights and other legal relations that are directed at wider 
and more heterogeneous audiences tend to be less information intensive than 
similar rights holding between those in a personal relationship. Rights availing 
against the "rest of the world"-the so-called in rem rights-are simply an 
extreme case of communication between the holder of the right and a broad and 
heterogeneous audience of dutyholders.16 This tradeoff between the 
intensiveness and extensiveness of information is inherent in any system of 
communication. Therefore, the tradeoff should turn up both in law and in 
natural language. Thus, the first part of the argument will be that law and 
language both reflect the benefits and costs of information intensiveness and 
14. Covenants that run with the land are subject to limitations, which can be seen as an 
application of the numerus clausus principle in property law. See Merrill & Smith, supra 
note 4, at 16-17. Recently, the American Law Institute has adopted a more contractarian 
approach to servitudes than the traditional approach. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: 
SERVITUDES Introductory Note to ch. 4 at 494 (2000); see also id. ? 4.1-.13, (setting up 
framework for servitudes using intent-based interpretive method and default rather than 
mandatory rules). 
15. See infra Part II.B-C. 
16. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating 
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002) (setting out framework, with spectrum 
running from exclusive access to governance of use). For a discussion of the in personamlin 
rem distinction and references to the literature, see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, 
The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 780-89 (2001). 
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audience extensiveness. However, I will further argue that the particular 
devices by which the law shapes communication to reflect the tradeoff between 
intensiveness and extensiveness of information are very much like devices 
mediating similar tradeoffs in natural language, and for similar reasons. 
Indeed, because more is at stake-potential legal liability, at least-many 
devices that speakers of a natural language use voluntarily to accommodate 
their audiences are adopted as mandatory rules in the law. Legal intervention, 
as it turns out, occurs where the communicators of legally relevant information 
cannot be counted on to internalize the costs imposed on wider audiences. 
One set of such devices that mediate this informational tradeoff can be 
viewed as "formal" or "formalist," and I will be providing a partial functional 
explanation for these devices as limiting information intensiveness where 
communication is directed to larger and more impersonal audiences. Because 
the words "formal" and "formalism" have been used many ways, a word on 
what is meant by these terms here is in order. I will focus on formalism as the 
opposite of contextuality. That is, an expression is formal to the extent that its 
meaning is invariant under changes in context.17 One of the virtues of this 
definition, besides its explicitness, is that it captures what is common among a 
wide variety of types of formalism. Thus, mathematical expressions are 
deemed formal because their interpretations vary little depending on context, 
whereas the meanings of expressions in everyday language often are deemed 
informal because they vary a lot by context. For example, "You're out" can 
mean one thing in a baseball game, another in poker, and another on the 
doorstep. But even within these domains, variance with respect to changes in 
context itself can vary: Much mathematical writing, especially for other 
mathematicians, is more abbreviated and relies on context for interpretation, 
while everyday speech also varies in its level of formality. This correlation 
between levels of formalism and the nature of the audience will be crucial in 
what follows. 
Under this approach, different types of formalism correspond to different 
types of context. As we will see, conversational English is informal because it 
requires much background knowledge about context. Thus, to understand "It's 
cold in here" as a request to close the window requires a knowledge of many 
things, including the purposes of conversation, the nature of windows, and so 
on. Formalism, thus, does not "inhere" in expressions. Rather, expressions are 
formal to the extent that their interpretations do not vary by context. In a 
communicative system, expressions do not exist in isolation, but are coupled 
with interpretive rules. Sometimes, dependence on context (antiformalism) is a 
matter of the meaning of individual words: Expressions containing words like 
"here" and "this" require some anchor to context, and pronouns like "it" and 
"they" vary in their reference according to context. These words cause 
17. See Francis Heylighen, Advantages and Limitations of Formal Expression, 4 
FOUNDS. SCI. 25, 49-53 (1999). 
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expressions that contain them to be less formal than expressions containing 
adverbial phrases ("It's cold in Chicago") or nouns ("John," "Mary"). Further, 
the rules applying to sentences or larger units of discourse can more or less 
cause meaning to vary by context, and so contribute to an expression's lack of 
formalism. Thus, a literal interpretive method would not allow the inference 
from "It's cold in here" to "Please close the window," but a more contextual 
one (typical of face-to-face conversation) would allow it. Finally, modes of 
communication (styles) can be termed formal based on the average formalism 
of their expressions. And, at the level of whole languages, systems of such 
expressions and the rules interpreting them can be termed formal or informal 
according to the general level of formalism (degree of invariance of 
interpretation under different contexts) of the average or typical expression 
within them. Thus, a computer language or the language of first-order logic is 
more formal than everyday English. 
This approach will highlight how formalism is not an all-or-nothing affair 
in either language or law, but is rather a matter of degree-what I call 
"differential formalism."18 To be termed "formal" an expression need not be 
one hundred percent invariant in interpretation with changes in context. Rather 
it should be near the end of a spectrum of such variability. Interestingly, such 
variability is not random. In legal (as in everyday) communication, formalism 
can be expected to vary in strength according to the nature of the audience. 
More extensive audiences usually call for more formality in communication. 
Part I of this Article starts with a particularly dramatic illustration of legal 
communication with extensive audiences drawn from possession and related 
law. In making a possessory claim, one is asserting a right against the rest of 
the world, and the claim must be communicated with the widest audience 
possible. Not everyone in the world, though, will always interact with the asset 
in question. Sometimes, only a small well-defined and homogeneous group 
will likely come into conflict with the possessor. Courts' decisions seem to 
reflect a concern with the processing burden on the "audience" of dutyholders, 
who must process rights in order to respect them; and this burden and concern 
vary according to the nature of the audience. Where assets are in general 
circulation and the audience is extensive, the law tends to force communication 
into a simplified, information-unintensive mode. Required background 
knowledge is kept to a minimum and piggybacks on everyday conventions. 
Part II draws an extended analogy between law and natural language and 
presents a simple model of the tradeoff between information intensiveness and 
information extensiveness, in situations in which speakers sometimes do not 
internalize the full costs of an audience's processing of information. In 
everyday, face-to-face communication, processing costs are usually 
internalized, because otherwise the audience will not understand what the 
speaker wants to communicate. As for wider audiences, they usually can 
18. See infra Part III. 
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ignore messages they do not want to deal with. Examples in which significant 
externalized processing costs exist (but may not be internalized by the speaker) 
include spam e-mail, junk faxing, and possibly the use of certain difficult-to- 
interpret marks in the hospital context, such as directions for surgeons as to 
which limb to operate on. Likewise, in a legal context, someone 
communicating a claim to a set of dutyholders may cause processing costs for 
third parties without internalizing the costs. Thus, in the example of the 
easement versus the contract, an idiosyncratic easement enforceable against 
third-party interference can cause third parties-such as potential purchasers of 
this and other property, and potential violators-to be on the lookout for 
idiosyncratic rights.19 
I offer a simple model of this tradeoff and explain how this exterality 
arises. The Article catalogs costs that are most likely to be externalized and 
relates them to certain types of audiences, such as tortfeasors and other market 
participants, who are not in a direct relationship with the creators of rights and 
who often do not share the same background knowledge. Here, the law relies 
on a variety of devices to prevent extemalization of third-party information 
costs. Strikingly, these devices bear a close resemblance to those used in 
natural language on a nonmandatory basis to mediate the similar tradeoff 
between information intensiveness and extensiveness of the audience that 
occurs in that context. I do not claim that the amount of third-party processing 
costs avoided is the optimal one, but I do argue that there are mechanisms by 
which these devices have made their way into legal doctrine. 
Part III applies this theory to several areas of property and related law. 
First, I argue that the adoption of recording acts and their features reflect all of 
the devices identified as limiting the burdens of processing on third parties. 
Second, I show that the correlation between extensiveness of the audience and 
mandated unintensiveness of legally significant communication holds in a 
variety of areas beyond land law, including patent law, copyright law, and 
innovative forms of intellectual property such as that suggested by the approach 
19. It might be thought that, at least in the case of dividing rights, third parties will not 
care about the way the rights are divided. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, 
Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of 
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373 (2002). But Hansmann and Kraakman's own example of 
artists' rights shows that this does not follow. Consider a legal system in which an artist can 
sell a work subject to a right to control the display, where the right is enforceable in 
damages. As Hansmann and Kraakman note, the level of damages will depend on features 
of the artist, such as the nature of her other work. If so, then "carving out" the artist's right 
from the package of full ownership rights will have a variable effect on outsiders according 
to the features of the artist. Potential violators will have some incentive to know about 
particularly easily injured artists, something which under the alternative regime of a numerus 
clausus forbidding artists' rights would not be the case. Similarly, in the easement example 
in the text, if the damages or the ease of getting an injunction depended on features of the 
rightholder, then idiosyncratic easements could raise more third-party information costs than 
would a fixed menu of easements. 
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of the Supreme Court in International News Service v. Associated Press.20 
Finally, I show that this correlation holds within contract law itself-an area of 
the law known for its free customizability. In a dramatic example of 
differential formalism, courts use more formalistic methods of contractual 
interpretation precisely where third-party information cost exteralities are 
most likely. These contexts include security interests, real estate, third-party 
beneficiaries, and offers. In particular, identifying the informational tradeoff 
and the processing-cost externality provides for an explanation of why the law 
often adopts differential formalism: The degree of formalism in courts' 
reasoning and interpretation is related to the size of otherwise unintemalized 
third-party processing costs. 
I. AUDIENCES IN POSSESSION AND RELATED LAW 
The law adopts a number of different modes of communication. These 
modes will turn out to fit a pattern based on their costs and benefits: The law 
allows more information to be communicated to small audiences and limits the 
processing demands on wider, more anonymous audiences. In this Part, I 
introduce this informational tradeoff. To do so, I examine the law of 
possession and issues relating to the scope of ownership. I begin with some 
classics of possession law, the fox and whaling cases, which show a tendency 
towards simplification where third parties need to process information about 
claims. I then turn to the related law of manure, which varies greatly according 
to the nature of the audience. In these areas, courts' decisions reflect the 
informational tradeoff by keeping conventions simple and general for the most 
widespread and anonymous audiences-the audiences who are most likely to 
lack background knowledge. 
The area of property that has been most extensively analyzed as involving 
communication with varying audiences is the law of possession. A brief look 
at possession will illustrate the informational implications of audiences of 
different natures and sizes. The law of possession shows a tendency towards 
simple solutions when large and heterogeneous groups of people must respect 
rights. 
This tendency is most dramatic in those ordinary situations least likely to 
result in litigation. The law of possession rests, for the most part, on everyday 
knowledge about what constitutes a thing and whether the thing is likely to be 
owned or not. Property rights are good against the world, and the use of a thing 
as a focal point for the right allows those in a right-duty relationship of 
potential conflict to interact in an anonymous, informationally unintensive, 
fashion.21 If the law of possession piggybacks on nonlegal knowledge about 
20. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
21. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 116 
(1977) ("[M]ost of the time Layman negotiates his way through the complex web of property 
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things and people's relationships to them, then the communication of those 
legal rules will come at a lower cost. Furthermore, in both law and norms, we 
might expect less fine-grained solutions than a pure efficiency (or fairness) 
solution would dictate if there were no communication costs.22 For example, 
the norm of "fencing in" prevails uniformly in Shasta County regardless of 
whether the legal rule is fencing in or fencing out, and regardless of whether 
farmers outnumber ranchers or vice versa.23 Land provides a convenient low- 
cost anchor for a wide variety of exclusion rights, and assimilating the conflict 
over cattle trespass to the package of in rem rights in land is a low-cost 
solution. 
The law of trespass itself, with its formalistic, bright-line ad coelum rule 
also economizes on communication costs to the extent that it accords with 
widespread nonlegal knowledge about boundaries and does not require 
extensive knowledge about individual use conflicts.24 Thus, in many resource 
conflicts, the benefits of multiple use do not extend to the entire world. 
Instead, the owner and (possibly) a small group of others have a special 
advantage to use (or preserve) the resource through specialization, planning, 
and investing. Thus, as between the owner and the vast majority of others, an 
exclusionary strategy of "keep off' achieves most of the attainable benefit at 
low cost.25 
relationships that structures his social universe without even perceiving the need for expert 
guidance."); J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 30 (1997) ("Norms in rem 
establish the general, impersonal practices upon which modem societies largely depend. 
They allow strangers to interact with each other in a rule-governed way, though their 
dealings are not personal in any significant respect. Grasping this point is absolutely vital to 
grasping legally recognized practices like property."); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 42-43 (1988) (noting that, if rules governing the allocation of resources 
were based only on utility or prosperity instead of property, and if society was at all 
complex, "then citizens would have great difficulty following the rules. Everyone would 
need to become a legal expert ... ."). 
22. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and 
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 388-91 (2001). 
23. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 
52-53, 72-76 (1991); see Merrill & Smith, supra note 22, at 388-92. 
24. The full statement of the maxim is cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad 
inferos (he who owns the soil owns also to the sky and to the depths). The maxim is 
routinely followed in resolving issues about ownership of air rights, building encroachments, 
overhanging tree limbs, mineral rights, and so forth, and is subject to certain limited 
exceptions for airplane overflights, for example. See Brown v. United States, 73 F.3d 1100, 
1103-04 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that the usual rule does not apply in the case of military 
overflights); Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property 
Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 26-35 (1985). 
25. See Smith, supra note 16 (setting out theory based on different cost structures 
along spectrum from rules of exclusive access to governance of use). Cheung divides the 
rules into three classes-exclusion, regulation, and transferable property rights-which 
Carol Rose has extended and used to explain the evolution of pollution control regimes. 
Steven N.S. Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive 
Resource, 13 J.L. & ECON. 49, 64 (1970); Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental 
1116 [Vol. 55:1105 
THE LANGUAGE OF PROPERTY 
In most ordinary possession situations, an unintensive message is 
communicated to the widest possible audience. The interactions between in 
rem rightholders and dutyholders are mediated by a simply defined thing; thus, 
the rightholders and dutyholders need not possess any information about each 
other. For example, I know not to take a car parked on the street without 
knowing anything about its owner (other than it is not me).26 These everyday 
situations are usually uncontroversial, and are even hard to notice because 
chaos in such a basic social institution used by everyone all the time would be 
extremely costly. 
As with most case law, the law of possession tends to focus on marginal 
cases, but, here too, we can discern the effects of the tradeoff between 
communicating intensively and reaching an extensive audience. As Carol Rose 
has pointed out, possession requires a kind of communication: By means of a 
claim, the possessor communicates with the audience of potentially interested 
parties.27 Furthermore, courts deciding possession cases have to choose whose 
set of symbols-and, correspondingly, which audience-counts. Rose 
illustrates this point using the famous case of Pierson v. Post.28 Post, the 
plaintiff at trial, had long been chasing a fox with hounds upon an unpossessed 
beach when Pierson suddenly appeared and bagged the fox.29 The question is 
what act is required in order to take possession of a wild animal. The majority, 
after much citing of authorities, decided on the "certain control" test, while the 
dissent argued for the "hot pursuit" test. The case is usually seen as a tradeoff 
between the need to encourage fox hunting effort and the need for clarity in the 
rule.30 The ability of saucy intruders to snatch the fox is thought to lessen the 
incentive to chase after foxes (although this is an empirical question, especially 
if the hunting is recreational). On the other hand, control of the fox might be an 
easier standard for a court to apply than pursuit: What counts as hot pursuit? 
Rose points out that the question can be framed as one of communication: 
Whose symbols count31-only those of the community of fox hunters or those 
of nonhunters as well? As Rose notes, the latter is certainly a wider audience, 
but even under the majority's "certain control" test, "the definition of first 
Controls. Management Strategiesfor Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 9-36. 
26. See, e.g., PENNER, supra, note 21, at 29 ("'Things', then, whether physical things or 
states of affairs such as bodily security, mediate between rights in rem and duties in rem, 
blocking any content which has to do with the specific individuality of particular persons 
from entering the right-duty relation."). 
27. Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 78-80 
(1985). 
28. 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
29. Id. at 175. 
30. For a recent example of a law-and-economics analysis focusing on these factors of 
fox-hunting incentives and enforcement costs, see Dhammika Dharmapala & Rohan 
Pitchford, An Economic Analysis of "Riding to Hounds ". Pierson v. Post Revisited, 18 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 39 (2002). 
31. Rose, supra note 27, at 85. 
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possession depended on a particular audience and its chosen symbolic context; 
some audiences win, others lose."32 Also, one aspect of the choice of symbol 
is whose notion of proper use counts, where proper use can be regarded as 
important for notice; here, the communicative or consent theory and the labor 
or reward theory tend to converge.33 As we will see, a major strand in the 
theory of meaning is based on the idea that people will figure out intent by 
ascribing rational behavior to a communicative partner.34 
But this type of communication requires background knowledge, and 
resolution of the question of which audience will process acts of possession, 
and at what cost, depends on what background knowledge we can assume. The 
choice of whose symbols count implicates information intensiveness and the 
nature of the audience. One way to frame the question is to note that a rule that 
control is required for possession is appropriate for a wide audience and for a 
wide range of cases. It can apply to many resources without relying much on 
detailed information about those resources; and, because of its lack of detail, 
the rule is correspondingly easy to communicate to the world. These two 
reasons-lack of detail and ease of broadcasting-are related in the sense that 
having one general norm rather than many specific ones reduces what someone 
who interprets the acts of possession needs to know.35 
Now consider Pierson v. Post again. The certain-control rule is naturally 
addressed to a larger and more anonymous audience, whereas the hot-pursuit 
rule, with its greater detail, is more appropriate to a small group. The small 
group has more at stake, and processing more detail is both easier and more 
worthwhile for them than for the average member of a general audience. 
Interestingly, Livingston's dissent, after advocating arbitration by a panel of 
sportsmen, argued that the result in an arbitration would have "properly 
disposed" of the fox and would have been consistent with usage and custom 
"well-known to every votary of Diana."36 In other words, Livingston not only 
believed that hunters would reach the correct result but that hunters generally 
would already know it, thus solving the information problem. To this narrower 
audience might be contrasted the wide audience implicit in the majority's 
approach. Both majority and dissent characterized the sources cited in the 
majority opinion-from Pufendorf to Grotius to Barbeyrac to Blackstone-as 
writers on "general principles of law" or "general law."37 The goal for the 
majority, then, was not just to achieve certainty, but to achieve it at a low cost 
to a wide audience, not all of whom are concerned with foxes. Although one 
could imagine very particularized brightline rules-such as the one cited (quite 
possibly ironically) by the dissent that pursuit with large dogs and hounds will 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 78-82. 
34. See infra Part II.A.1-2. 
35. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 22, at 388-92. 
36. 3 Cai. R. at 180. 
37. Id. at 177, 181. 
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give possession but not pursuit with beagles only38-such rules do impose a 
large processing burden on nonhunters. Thus, particularized brightline rules 
would not impose high administrative costs on courts but would be costly for 
individuals in the world attempting to process them. 
In other words, the constraint here may be on the processor's or receiver's 
end, rather than on the limited powers of a court to create a detailed rule. It is 
true, as Richard Epstein argues, that courts, as compared to zoning boards, can 
only do so much to make rules of possession precise.39 But this is partly 
because the audience for a zoning decision is narrower and a zoning board may 
be able to reach its audience at lower cost. Possession, however, relates to how 
we define objects for purposes of ownership, which involves the widest set of 
anonymous interactions among the most heterogeneous audience that the law 
addresses. What is needed is a determinate rule that will not lead to multiple 
interpretations, even by those without detailed background knowledge. The 
occupancy or certain-control test does achieve these goals, as long as the 
certain control is apparent to the relevant audience, which, in the case of 
possession, is prototypically the entire world. 
Another favorite of possession law makes even more explicit the 
audience's burden in terms of the amount and variety of information it can 
process. In Ghen v. Rich, one Ellis found a fin-back whale washed up on the 
beach, which had been shot by the plaintiff with a marked bomb-lance 
seventeen miles away.40 This particular type of whale swam fast, and so was 
best shot with a bomb-lance, which would cause it to sink to the bottom, and 
then rise to the surface a few days later. Under a local custom, those fin-back 
whales that floated to shore should be reported to Provincetown, the port for 
fin-back whalers, and the owner would come and remove the whale and pay the 
finder a small fee. Instead, Ellis advertised the whale for sale at an auction and 
sold it to the defendant. The court noted cases in which the rule for possession 
of whales differed, and Robert Ellickson has shown that these various rules 
make sense according to the different nature of various types of whale.41 In 
this case, however, Ellickson notes that the rule giving the whale to the one 
who kills it and a small fee to the finder accords with the opportunity cost of 
labor and economizes on supervision costs.42 Crucial to the emergence of the 
norm was that the community was close-knit enough that off-shore whalers 
38. Id. at 182. 
39. See Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221, 
1222-23 (1979) (arguing that, because of courts' modest remedial powers, their "definition 
of rights is therefore apt to be made along certain 'natural lines'; there will be broad general 
propositions that can apply to all against all, and there will be no reference to the numbers or 
formulas ... that can be generated by direct administrative controls, such as zoning."). 
40. 8 F. 159, 159-60 (D. Mass. 1881). 
41. Id. at 160-61; Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms. 
Evidencefrom the Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 88-94 (1989). 
42. Ellickson, supra note 41, at 93. 
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could influence beachcombers who were not directly connected to the whaling 
industry.43 One aspect of this interaction is communication: Those likely to 
find whales on the shore must reasonably be expected to know of the rule. 
This, in turn, requires that the problem be important enough or the group 
affected small enough that the advantages of a separate, special rule outweigh 
the convenience of lumping this situation into larger norms of possession that 
require "certain control."44 The court addressed this problem directly, noting 
that the rule was of limited application, could "affect but a few persons,"45 and 
was "'not... open to the objection that it is likely to disturb the general 
understanding of mankind by the interposition of an arbitrary exception."'46 
Indeed it is a theme in possession cases, and whale cases in particular, that 
the "general" common law is at least a strong default-if not immutable- 
because of the informational problem involved in processing by a wide 
audience. The common law was regarded as "general" and of wide 
applicability, and its very wideness was one of its principal advantages. As 
Justice Story, sitting as Circuit Justice for the United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit, observed in The Reeside: 
I own myself no friend to the almost indiscriminate habit of late years, of 
setting up particular usages or customs in almost all kinds of business and 
trade, to control, vary, or annul the general liabilities of parties under the 
common law, as well as under the commercial law. It has long appeared to 
me, that there is no small danger in admitting such loose and inconclusive 
usages and customs, often unknown to particular parties, and always liable to 
great misunderstandings and misinterpretations and abuses, to outweight [sic] 
the well-known and well-settled principles of law.47 
It is not just that the common law has gravitated to clear rules, but that it 
provides a very few rules of general application that can be easily used by a 
general audience. 
At first blush, the whaling cases seem to belie the preference for generality 
in the common law of possession, but, unlike with other possession cases, the 
customs invoked in the whaling cases are directed to a highly focused and 
specialized audience (whalers and those in whaling communities). For 
example, Story's defense of general rules was quoted but seemingly not 
followed in another famous whaling case, Swift v. Gifford.48 In that case, the 
court held that, as between two ships claiming the same whale, the one that put 
the first harpoon into the whale would get the whale, even if another ship killed 
43. Id. at 93-94. 
44. Again, contrast Shasta County, where the audience is wider and the norm is less 
fine-grained. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
45. Glen, 8 F. at 162. 
46. Id. (quoting Swift v. Gifford, 23 F. Cas. 558, 559-60 (D. Mass. 1872) (No. 
13,696)). 
47. 20 F. Cas. 458, 459 (C.C.D. Mass. 1837) (No. 11,657). 
48. Swift, 23 F. Cas. at 559. 
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the whale first.49 This result accorded with the prevailing custom among 
whalers, but not necessarily with the general law of possession. Noting the 
lack of resonance of Story's defense of general rules in whaling cases, Epstein 
argues that the problem is a tradeoff between ease of administration and 
efficiency of the rule. To this we can add that all the cases also reflect a 
tradeoff between the intensiveness and extensiveness of information. Thus, in 
Swift, after quoting Story and noting that many similar remarks have been made 
by eminent judges, Judge Lowell observes: 
Principles of law differ in their importance as well as in their origin; and while 
some of them represent great rules of policy, and are beyond the reach of 
convention, others may be changed by parties who choose to contract upon a 
different footing; and some of them may be varied by usage, which, if general 
and long established, is equivalent to a contract.50 
In modem terms, the common law supplies rules ranging from default to 
mandatory,51 and one factor pushing in the direction of mandatoriness is the 
nature and scope of the informational demand made upon dutyholders. A norm 
for a group such as whalers would not implicate a wide audience, and the 
intensity of the whalers' focus on the problem of whales would call for "greater 
precision" as among themselves.52 In an industry-internal case (whaler versus 
whaler), custom was easiest to use: The group had a large stake and much 
background knowledge.53 We expect both that the general rule will be a 
somewhat sticky default and that exceptions will be made, if at all, where the 
audience is less extensive. It would be very surprising to see an information- 
intensive rule being adopted for extensive audiences and simpler rules being 
imposed on smaller, more expert audiences.54 
49. Id. at 559-60. 
50. Id. at 559. 
51. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 120-24 (1989). 
52. Swift, 23 F. Cas. at 559-60. 
53. Interestingly, Epstein argues that International News Service v. Associated Press, 
248 U.S. 215 (1918), was rightly decided as long as the Court was correct about the custom 
in the news business to respect rights to hot news. Richard A. Epstein, International News 
Service v. Associated Press: Custom and Law as Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 VA. 
L. REV. 85 (1992). Epstein takes Story in The Reeside to be making a point about 
administrative ease, which should give way as long as the court can understand the custom at 
reasonable cost. Id. There is, however, an informational dimension to INS, which Tom 
Merrill and I have argued was the motivation behind Judge Learned Hand's attempt to cabin 
INS in the case of Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929); new forms 
of property are not for courts to create. Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 19-20. The INS 
case raises concerns not just about administrability; the case would also be troubling to the 
extent that a special rule for hot news would either place duties on people outside the news 
business or undermine the expectation that the general common law rules would retain their 
generality elsewhere. See also infra notes 250-51. 
54. Thus, the prediction is of the trend, not of the exact level of information 
intensiveness. Nor does a failure to make an exception for every audience that might count 
as "expert" count as a counterexample. Thus, the general rules of possession sometimes 
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As mentioned earlier, one reason a small group that shares background 
information will tend to have a detailed rule is that its members have a lot at 
stake. According to the well-known Demsetz hypothesis, we should expect the 
emergence of more property rights as resource values rise and so more is at 
stake.55 Demsetz's classic example was the emergence of family property in 
beaver-hunting territories among the Montagnes in eastern Canada with the 
advent of the fur trade.56 Ellickson narrows this hypothesis in arguing that 
close-knit groups will reach efficient norms.57 Close-knit groups have a variety 
of advantages including low-cost communication, homogeneity of knowledge, 
opportunity to monitor, and so on.58 If we focus on the processing component 
of communication, a close-knit group has advantages in the Demsetzian 
creation of detailed rules. From a processing point of view, a very specific rule 
presents a high processing load on a small group. However, the load can be 
tailored to the background knowledge that the members of the group share or, 
conversely, they can develop the background knowledge necessary to support 
the specific rule. Thus, information intensiveness will increase with a group's 
small size and close-knit nature, as well as with the amount at stake. 
This same concern with the intensiveness versus extensiveness of 
information surfaces not only in possession cases but also in those that deal in a 
related way with the same resources. Consider the many cases that deal with 
possession of manure and related matters. The possession aspect comes up in 
the famous case of Haslem v. Lockwood.59 In that case, the plaintiff had 
scraped up manure from the roads, where it was a nuisance, and into piles on 
the side of the roadway. He left the piles there in the evening intending to 
remove them the following day, but the next morning the defendant carted off 
the manure. The court held that gathering up the manure into piles gave the 
plaintiff a reasonable time to remove it and that the plaintiff was therefore the 
owner of the manure.60 Again, exercising labor to increase value is taken as a 
hold even in the face of fishing custom, although even here one might worry about 
nonexperts blundering in. See Young v. Hichens, 115 Eng. Rep. 228 (Q.B. 1844) (holding 
that partial encircling without actual capture gives no rights of possession). Furthermore, in 
some more specialized contexts, the law gives tort rights against certain activities, in the 
nature of unfair competition, rather than ownership of an asset. For examples on the edge of 
property law, see id.; Keeble v. Hickeringill, 91 Eng. Rep. 659 (K.B. 1707) (holding that 
plaintiff did not have ownership of ducks, did have a right against malicious interference 
with access to ducks, and would have no right against competing duck decoy). 
55. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 
350 (1967) (Papers & Proc.). 
56. Id. at 351-53. For a discussion of the controversy surrounding the origins of 
beaver-hunting territories and an interpretation of this as an example of a "semicommons," 
see Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 131, 143 (2000). 
57. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1320-21 (1993). 
58. ELLICKSON, supra note 23, at 177-82. 
59. 37 Conn. 500 (1871). 
60. Id. at 507. 
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communicative act about the intent to appropriate.61 So far, this is just another 
possession case. But the lawyers and the court were both aware that a large 
jurisprudence of manure had by then developed. This was because manure was 
both a valuable asset in an agricultural society and did not exactly fit the 
existing common law categories of incidents to real estate. It was not a fixture, 
because it was not attached to the land (especially when in piles); and it was not 
an "emblement," a crop produced through the tenant's labor. This ambiguous 
status of rights to manure as an incident to property in land prompted leading 
writers of an earlier era to devote a chapter to manure (in between the chapters 
on fixtures and emblements).62 
In this law of manure, too, there seems to be a sensitivity to the 
informational demands of the rules. For the most general audience, a very 
general rule applied. There is a background common law rule of long vintage 
to the effect that manure is a chattel-personal as opposed to real property-a 
distinction that once mattered even more than it does today.63 In cases like 
Haslem, the general rules for possession of personal property apply to manure. 
Courts also applied this general common law rule that manure in a heap is 
personal property when deciding whether manure would come into the hands of 
the executor as personalty of an estate or would go with the land directly to the 
heir.64 Here it is difficult to say that there is reliance on the rules, but the 
context is one in which the parties, especially the executor, cannot be presumed 
to know of special agricultural rules regarding manure. Sticking to the general 
common law rule imposes less of an informational burden on such parties. 
This rule that manure is personal property came to be subject to several 
exceptions in more specialized contexts. In numerous nineteenth-century 
cases, American courts fairly consistently held that, absent an agreement to the 
contrary, a tenant under an agricultural lease would be under a duty to use good 
husbandry and to use the manure as fertilizer on the leased land.65 No such 
61. See Rose, supra note 27, at 78-82 (discussing possession cases from point of view 
of labor and communication theories). 
62. 1 JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, SELECT CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON THE LAW OF 
PROPERTY 641 (1888); 2 H. TIFFANY, TIFFANY ON REAL PROPERTY ?? 627-629 (3d ed. 1939). 
63. Carver v. Pierce, 82 Eng. Rep. 534, 539 (K.B. 1647) (holding that an action for 
slander would lie for uttering, "Thou art a thief, for thou hast stollen my dung" because 
manure is a chattel, making it theft to take it) (also called Yearworth v. Pierce, 31 Aleyn 
(K.B. 1647)); 2 TIFFANY, supra note 62, ? 629; SAMUEL TOLLER, THE LAW OF EXECUTORS 
AND ADMINISTRATORS *150 (7th ed. 1838); 11 CHARLES VINER, GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF 
LAW AND EQUITY 175, ? 32 (2d ed. 1791). 
64. Pinkham v. Gear, 3 N.H. 484 (1826); 2 TIFFANY, supra note 62, ? 629. But see Fay 
v. Muzzey, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 53 (1859). For a contemporaneous exposition of the rule 
about personalty versus realty going to the executor and the heir, respectively, see JOSEPH R. 
SWAN, A MANUAL FOR EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE 
ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS 23-44 (1843). 
65. See, e.g., Lassell v. Reed, 6 Me. 222 (1829); Daniels v. Pond, 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 
367 (1838); Hill v. De Rochemont, 48 N.H. 87 (1868); Middlebrook v. Corwin, 15 Wend. 
169 (N.Y. 1836); Lewis v. Jones, 17 Pa. 262 (1851). But see 2 KENT'S COMMENTARIES 346, 
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duty applied to other nonmanure personal property on the land. This rule of 
good husbandry was, in turn, fine-tuned to include only manure produced from 
animals grazing on the land (as opposed to that produced by animals eating 
feed brought in from outside).66 The good-husbandry rule in all its detail was 
addressed to a very experienced audience who could be expected either to be 
already following it or to be able to learn of it at lower cost than the average 
member of the public. 
Interestingly, in cases that fall somewhere in between the relatively intense 
personal relationship of landlord and tenant and the relatively less personal or 
consensual relation of executor and heir, we find an intermediate approach to 
the manure problem.67 Most courts went beyond the landlord-tenant context 
and held that in a sale of agricultural land, the default was that the manure 
would go with the land despite its status as personalty.68 Likewise, most, but 
not all, courts held that a mortgagee lending to an agricultural landowner could 
not seize manure on the land.69 Mortgagees probably could be presumed to 
know about agriculture, but less so than a tenant farmer. Thus, in these cases of 
semispecialized audiences, courts were somewhat more willing, but still 
reluctant, to apply the specialized good-husbandry exception to the manure-as- 
personalty rule. 
Generally, in manure cases, what seems to have been a custom became a 
default rule. This is a familiar story; but, interestingly, the exceptions to this 
expansion of the special rule occur in situations where the informational burden 
of a special rule for manure would be cast upon a wider and less expert 
audience. Two aspects of the case law point to the importance of the 
informational tradeoff. First, as already noted, there seems to be a tendency to 
apply the rule more consistently and confidently in the most personal contexts 
347 (12th ed. 1884). The major exception is North Carolina, which may have applied the 
rule that the tenant could remove manure at the end of the term simply because no evidence 
was presented of a contrary custom. See Smithwick v. Ellison, 24 N.C. (2 Ired.) 326 (1842); 
see also 2 KENT'S COMMENTARIES, supra, at 347. For the English approach, see Needham v. 
Allison, 24 N.H. 355 (1852). 
66. See, e.g., Needham, 24 N.H. 355 (holding that if the manure came from animals 
housed on the land but not grazing on it, then the rule was held not to apply and the manure 
was the tenant's personal property). 
67. Generally, the law seems to adopt intermediate types of intervention-between 
defaults and mandatory standardized rules-in situations that present intermediate levels of 
information cost. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16. 
68. See, e.g., Kittredge v. Woods, 3 N.H. 503 (1826); Goodrich v. Jones, 2 Hill 142 
(N.Y. 1841). One often-cited case, Ruckman v. Outwater, 28 N.J. 581 (1860), held that in a 
sale manure would be treated as personalty and not pass with the land to the grantee, thus 
applying the general common law rule. The court believed that a buyer could contract 
around the rule. This begs the question of what the default should be, but note that, in the 
sale context, it is somewhat less easy to assume that the buyer would treat the manure as 
belonging to the land and it is less clear than in a lease whether the buyer's purpose is even 
agricultural. 
69. See, e.g., Perry v. Carr, 44 N.H. 118 (1862); Sawyer v. Twiss, 26 N.H. 345 (1853). 
But see Staples v. Emery, 7 Me. 201 (1831). 
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where both parties share agricultural background knowledge. Second, the 
courts clearly believed that the custom of using the manure on the farm was 
efficient but shied away from applying this rule everywhere it made sense (at 
least to the courts). To modem eyes, the courts seem very preoccupied with 
formal rules that seem to make little sense. However, as in the whaling cases, 
the courts erred on the side of generality, which meant presenting wider 
audiences with an easier processing task. 
One key issue in possession and related cases is the ease of communication 
and cost of processing by the relevant audience. If the interaction over a given 
resource involves enough people who are outside the most interested group 
(e.g., nonhunters versus hunters) and who do not have much of a stake in the 
relevant resources, then the processing load on those people is relevant. This 
can also give a partial justification for courts' heavy reliance on old writers and 
general common law rules: The use of such sources and rules that are 
concerned with the general possession problem will lead to less communication 
intensive rules that are, in turn, more appropriate for a larger, more anonymous 
audience. 
Thus, the ease with which courts applied the special good-husbandry rule 
in the landlord-tenant context but their increasing reluctance to apply the 
similar rule in less close-knit contexts does not reflect formalism across the 
board, but rather a differential degree of formalism that, in turn, reflects the 
informational problem. One may say that the courts of the day were too 
formalistic overall. However, the softening of formalism in more personal 
contexts makes sense from an informational point of view. 
As I will argue later, one facet of the choice of symbols and audiences is 
the tradeoff between the intensiveness and extensiveness of information. The 
larger and more diverse the target audience, the more courts will intervene to 
enforce a limit on the intensiveness of information carried by the set of 
symbols. As we have seen, this tradeoff looms large within the law of 
possession and incidents to real property; and, as we will see, it can be traced 
through the law more generally. 
II. AN INFORMATIONAL TRADEOFF IN LANGUAGE AND THE LAW 
The communication of legal relations is subject to a tradeoff between 
intensiveness and extensiveness of information: For the same cost, one can 
communicate a lot to a small, close-knit audience or a little to a large, 
anonymous audience. Natural language possesses certain features that reflect 
this tradeoff, features that also appear in the law. 
Because the stakes can be quite high in the law, the costs involved in the 
informational tradeoff sometimes require intervention, so that they may be 
more fully internalized by those sending messages about legal relations. The 
types of information that are communicated about the legal relation include the 
existence and reliability of a right, its scope and its type (e.g., claim, privilege, 
1125 Apr. 2003] 
STANFORD LA W REVIEW 
etc.), and the remedy for its violation. All dutyholders, including potential 
violators and purchasers, would be concered with some or all of this 
information. Prospective purchasers, in particular, will want to know what they 
need to do to acquire the rights that they desire and the probability that the 
present holder has the rights to transfer.70 
Law involves communication of information. This communication can be 
direct, as it sometimes is between lawmakers and those governed by law. 
However, as we will see, often this communication is indirect, as where 
lawyers and journalists mediate between legislatures, courts, and agencies on 
the one hand and between clients and the public on the other. At other times, 
the law sets up a framework within which people can make legally significant 
communications to each other. Thus, contract and property law specify how to 
promise or claim possession in a manner that will obligate others to respect 
such a claim. In all these cases, the law involves the transfer of information 
about legal relations. 
To be sure, communicating information is not all that the law-or 
language-does, and there are likely to be parallels between other aspects of 
legal communication and natural language, such as expressing solidarity and 
engaging in strategic ambiguity.71 But, the communication of information is 
sufficiently important that it merits its sometime status as a separate (but 
nonexclusive) focus of study in both law and linguistics. 
In this Part, I will begin with some background on certain aspects of 
communication. First, I will show that modes of meaning that are more 
conventionalized are less information intensive in this Article's terms. Next I 
will make more precise those features of audiences that are relevant to the cost 
of processing information. With this background, I then turn to a simple model 
of the informational tradeoff, between information intensiveness and the 
extensiveness of the audience. Processing costs are least likely to be 
internalized in the presence of extensive audiences. Finally, I turn to an 
inventory of some devices used in the law, which bear a striking similarity to 
analogous features of natural language and which serve to limit information 
intensiveness and associated third-party information costs. 
A. Information and Intensiveness 
I will be arguing that what I call information intensiveness varies according 
to the nature and extent of the audience. What we are ultimately interested in is 
a measure that correlates with the cost of processing the information in a 
message, legal or otherwise. At this point, we can draw on information theory 
70. This important aspect of processing communicated information has been called 
"accrediting" or "verification." See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 7, at 186-87; Hansmann & 
Kraakman, supra note 19, at 7-10. 
71. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
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to specify a measure of information-information intensiveness-that is both 
precise and likely to be a proxy for processing cost, particularly for more 
extensive audiences. 
This purely quantitative theory of information defines the amount of 
information in terms of the reduction of uncertainty or the number of 
possibilities eliminated. In particular, information can be thought of as 
reflecting a series of binary decisions between competing alternatives. 
Consider the common example of eight employees who can be partitioned into 
classes in the following way.72 First, four of the employees are tall and four 
are short. Second, four employees are highly paid (two of these are tall, and 
two short). And, finally, four (a tall and a short highly paid person, and a tall 
and a short low-paid person) are new employees and the rest are old employees. 
For each characteristic, let "1" and "0" denote the choices; "1" can denote tall, 
highly paid, and new, and "0" otherwise. Then, a sequence of three binary 
digits (bits) uniquely specifies each one of the employees. Thus, 011 specifies 
the (only) short, highly paid, new employee. Here, a sequence of three bits 
specifies the situation uniquely. The amount of information in bits is generally 
defined as what 2 (for binary choice here) must be raised to in order to get the 
number of possibilities selected from. And in the most efficient system, three 
binary digits is the minimum required to represent three bits. Hence, in this 
example, where there are eight possibilities and 23 = 8, three binary digits are 
necessary to identify each unique possibility.73 Equivalently, the amount of 
information contained in any situation is the length of the shortest ideal, fully 
explicit description in terms of bits, given the method of specifying classes 
(e.g., tall/short). In communication, we care both about what information is 
conveyed, which is the study of semantics, and about how much information is 
associated with different expressions, which is the application of information 
theory to language. 
For our purposes, information intensiveness denotes the amount of 
information, as defined above, per unit of delineation cost. Thus, in possession, 
an information intensive message is one in which the ratio of the amount of 
information to the cost of sending it is high. Thus, a particular rule about 
which dogs one may use to gain possession over running foxes may not involve 
much communicative effort, but it contains a lot of information relative to this 
low production cost, and so is intensive. A rule about foxes that applies to 
many other potentially owned objects has a low amount of information relative 
to the (fairly similar) production cost.74 On the theory developed in this 
72. See, e.g., DRETSKE, supra note 7, at 5-6. 
73. That is, 2" possibilities can be uniquely specified by n bits, and the information 
content (I) of a situation or source (s) is the logarithm to the base 2 of a number of the 
number of equally likely possibilities (n): I(s) = log2 n. This approach can easily be 
extended to accommodate possibilities of unequal probability. See DRETSKE, supra note 7, 
at 7; SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 11, at 32; Hartley, supra note 11. 
74. Even if we had a range of conventions, spanning from more widely and commonly 
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Article, messages with low information-to-production-cost ratios-low 
information intensiveness, in my terms-are expected for extensive audiences. 
This notion of information intensiveness has potentially wide applicability 
in law and language, but it acquires much of its interest because it can be 
applied to the semantics-pragmatics distinction. Roughly, pragmatic inference 
relies much more heavily on context, and in present terms, is more information 
intensive. For present purposes, this is important because I will argue that 
information intensiveness in the law is quite analogous to phenomena in the 
domain of linguistic pragmatics. 
1. Convention and semantic meaning. 
Crucial to communication in possession-and in law generally-are 
conventions. Both the analysis of possession and the analysis of natural 
language in terms of convention are important, because they help explain how, 
in the absence of agreement, these striking regularities in behavior could 
possibly come about in the first place. But in both law and language, not all 
meaning is conventional; rather, meaning varies in its reliance on convention 
and discourse context. Various authors in the Humean tradition have 
emphasized the conventional nature of property. It is tempting to regard 
mutual respect for property as resting on some kind of agreement, but in most 
situations it is not plausible that property is based on a current agreement or 
even that it can be traced back to some actual historical agreement. 
Normatively, consent-based theories of property have to rely on some form of 
hypothetical consent, but this does not solve a related but distinct explanatory 
problem: How do people who have not actually gotten together nevertheless 
have a coordinated, mutual respect for property? Subsidiary questions include: 
What objects can be property? What acts give rise to property in those things? 
David Hume and those following him look to convention to replace 
agreement. A convention is a regularity in behavior that is customary, 
expected, and self-enforcing, in the sense that everyone prefers to follow the 
pattern as long as most everyone is following it, and everyone is better off 
conforming as long as everyone else does.75 Conventions can arise because of 
used, general ones to rarer, less widely used, specific ones, a message relying on more 
specific conventions would have a higher surprisal value. The specific convention will be 
associated with higher average surprisal, and the channel will convey more information. See 
FRED ATTNEAVE, APPLICATIONS OF INFORMATION THEORY TO PSYCHOLOGY: A SUMMARY OF 
BASIC CONCEPTS, METHODS, AND RESULTS 6 (1959); DRETSKE, supra note 7, at 10. Average 
information at a source Shannon also called entropy. SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 11, 
at 42-57. 
75. See, e.g., DAVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 78-79 (1969) 
(presenting a model that uses a number of variables to gauge degrees of conventionality); H. 
Peyton Young, The Economics of Convention, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 105, 105 (1996) (defining 
convention as something to which "[e]veryone conforms, everyone expects others to 
conform, and everyone has good reason to conform because conforming is in each person's 
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prior agreement, precedent, or salience. In the problems of social institutions 
like possession (and language), prior agreement and precedence are less likely 
to be important than salience. Salience is psychological prominence, and 
experimental studies show that people are good at coordinating by converging 
on prominent solutions.76 In one notable experiment by Thomas Schelling, 
when asked where they would go if they had to meet someone in New York 
City tomorrow but could not communicate in the meantime, more than half of 
the respondents said Grand Central Station and almost all said they would go at 
noon.77 This result is striking in light of the huge number of other possible 
combinations of place and time, which would lead one to expect very low 
convergence. 
The notion of salience may not be easy to pin down; but, for our purposes, 
what is important is that salience works better when players are more 
homogeneous in their knowledge, and convention can be more detailed if 
salience can draw on a larger fund of common knowledge.78 Hume offers the 
suggestion that people proceed by gravitating towards solutions that suggest 
themselves based on prominence-salience, in modem terminology. 79 Which 
particular solution (convention) will be adopted depends less on reason and 
public interest than on the imagination. Certain associations of ideas are 
constant enough across people to form the basis of coordination.80 Thus, in 
possession, the nearness relation can be used by extension to form an 
expectation of who will be owner of a thing: Often the nearest actor will be 
considered to possess the thing. Robert Sugden, using the notion of salience, 
gives a game-theoretic interpretation of Hume's account.81 For Sugden, as for 
Lewis, a convention is a self-enforcing regularity in behavior.82 Given a 
best interest when everyone else plans to conform"). 
76. For a discussion and summary of the literature, including the disagreement among 
theorists over the extent to which the emergence of focal points can be the product of fully 
rational reasoning, see Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 
VA. L. REV. 1649, 1659-63 (2000). 
77. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 55-56 (1963). 
78. See, e.g., id. at 97; Judith Mehta, Chris Starmer & Robert Sugden, The Nature of 
Salience: An Experimental Investigation of Pure Coordination Games, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 
658 (1994); Robert Sugden, A Theory of Focal Points, 105 ECON. J. 533 (1995). 
79. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 504 n.1 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 2d 
ed. 1978) ("There are, no doubt, motives of public interest for most of the rules, which 
determine property; but still I suspect, that these rules are principally fix'd by the 
imagination."). 
80. Id. ("The conventions that are best able to spread are those that are most 
general ... and most fertile .... The idea that disputes are settled in favour of possessors 
seems to be particularly fertile and general."). 
81. ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION AND WELFARE 87- 
103 (1986). 
82. Id. at 31-33. Although it will not concern us, Sugden's definition of convention 
requires that it be a stable equilibrium, not necessarily of a coordination game, and that there 
are other stable equilibria. Id. at 32. Lewis requires a coordination equilibrium (which by 
definition requires at least two stable equilibria), and also requires that everyone is happier if 
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situation in which people could fight or defer when in conflict over a resource, 
the convention of fighting when one is in possession (e.g., occupying a 
territory) and deferring when one is intruding and challenged by an occupant, 
has a high degree of salience.83 Thus, this notion of salience can be traced back 
through Schelling to Hume, who argued that certain solutions to what we 
would call coordination problems have more prominence than others.84 To 
Hume, that a current possessor will, on average, value the thing possessed more 
than will nonpossessors reinforces the salience of this solution.85 
Interestingly, very similar questions arise in the case of natural language. 
On one level, language appears to work as if everyone had gotten together and 
agreed on a method of communication. However, language is not plausibly 
based on an actual agreement. Instead, acoustic pulses (and later graphic 
marks) are associated with meanings by way of conventions. David Lewis 
analyzes meaning in natural language as based on convention; and others have 
shown how little common knowledge is required to get the system off the 
ground.86 
Strictly semantic meaning is meaning based on linguistic conventions. A 
word such as "book" is associated by the semantic conventions of the English 
language with its meaning, which might be identified with or modeled by the 
set of all books. The study of semantics usually involves the study of the 
conventional meaning of words and how they systematically contribute to the 
meaning of larger units, up to the sentence level. However, what people call 
"meaning" is not exhausted by semantic meaning; meaning comes in less 
conventionalized forms, which also play a key role in both law and language as 
communication systems. 
(nearly) everyone follows the regularity. LEWIS, supra note 75, at 58; SUGDEN, supra note 
81, at 33. 
83. Id. at 92-97. 
84. HUME, supra note 80, at 503-04 (claiming that because we tend to prefer that which 
we already possess, "men wou'd easily acquiesce in this expedient, that every one continue 
to enjoy what he is at present possess 'd of'); SCHELLING, supra note 78, at 54-58. 
85. HUME, supra note 80, at 503 ("What has long lain under our eye, and has often 
been employ'd to our advantage, that we are always the most unwilling to part with; but can 
easily live without possessions, which we never have enjoy'd, and are not accustom'd to."). 
Although Hume emphasizes the psychological element over utility, he does note that the 
benefits of such a convention also argue for its salience: Efficient solutions have some 
salience because they are efficient, as long as the participants know this. 
86. See LEWIS, supra note 75, at 3 (introducing his book as an attempt to "explain[] 
what you must have had in mind when you said that language... is governed by 
conventions"); BRIAN SKYRMS, EVOLUTION OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 80-104 (1996) 
(examining "The Evolution of Meaning" from the earliest stages of communication). 
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2. Nonconventional or pragmatic meaning and principles of 
conversation. 
Participants in more personal contexts with a great deal of background 
knowledge will tend to rely less on systematic, conventional, or semantic 
meaning. To make this more precise, we can use notions introduced by Paul 
Grice that have developed into a major subfield of linguistic pragmatics. 
Pragmatics embraces the study of the structure of conversation and is often 
based on some version of Grice's Cooperative Principle: "Make your 
conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, 
by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are 
engaged."87 As many have noted, the Gricean approach explains conversation 
as the interaction of rational agents cooperating to maximize the gains from 
information exchange.88 Language (and law) are not solely aimed at (or shaped 
by) the transmission of information, and for other types of communication, 
other, more complex goals must be introduced.89 Moreover, Gricean notions 
must be used with care in the legal context, because Grice assumed cooperative 
communication, whereas much of law involves a notably higher degree of 
conflict. Nonetheless, the role of background knowledge in facilitating short, 
easily produced messages that leave much implicit is one of the most important 
implications of the Gricean approach and has proven very fruitful.90 
More can be communicated than what is explicitly said, and this can occur 
by means of conversational implicature. To take a well-known example, it is 
very common to say something like, "It's cold," in order to get someone 
standing near an open window to close it, rather than to say something like, "I 
hereby request that you, being closer to the window than I, please close the 
window." Of course, in addressing someone who had never seen a window 
before, the longer version might be more effective. 
87. PAUL GRICE, Logic and Conversation, in STUDIES IN THE WAYS OF WORDS 22, 26 
(1989). 
88. See, e.g., Jay David Atlas & Stephen C. Levinson, It-Clefts, Informativeness, and 
Logical Form: Radical Pragmatics (Revised Standard Version), in RADICAL PRAGMATICS 1
(Peter Cole ed., 1981); Richard Craswell, Do Trade Customs Exist?, in THE 
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL AW 132 (Jody S. Kraus 
& Steven D. Walt eds., 2000) [hereinafter JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS] (noting that "the 
Cooperative Principle itself... could be thought of as a commitment to maximizing the 
expected value of the parties' conversations, just as economists speak of maximizing the 
expected value of a transaction"). 
89. Grice himself noted that the effective exchange of information is not the only 
purpose of talk exchange but is a special and primary purpose of talk (and talk exchange); 
further maxims of an aesthetic, social, or moral character would be necessary to capture other aspects of talk. See GRICE, supra note 87, at 28. Grice's purpose was not to explain all 
of conversation this way but to show that this approach could handle aspects of language that 
previously defied rigorous analysis. 
90. See, e.g., STEPHEN C. LEVINSON, PRESUMPTIVE MEANINGS: THE THEORY OF 
GENERALIZED CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE (2000) (exemplifying recent development of 
Gricean theory). 
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Whether or not to use more explicit semantic meaning or more implicit 
pragmatic meaning can be thought of, in this Article's terms, as reflecting the 
informational tradeoff between intensiveness and extensiveness. The shorter 
message is cheaper to produce; but, depending on the nature of the audience, 
the shorter message could be either cheaper or more costly to process. The 
greater the common knowledge between speaker and hearer, the more likely the 
short version is to be cheaper overall. Consider one of Grice's famous 
examples, in which Person A says, "I am out of petrol," and Person B responds, 
"There is a garage round the corer."91 Here, the relevant background 
knowledge is that Person A is out of gas and looking for a gas station; because 
of this knowledge and the requirement under the Cooperative Principle that B's 
response be relevant, B is "implicating" that the gas station is open.92 Person B 
need not add to the length of the utterance by stating so explicitly. Generally, 
the amount of information that can be recovered from a signal depends in part 
on the information that the recipient already has.93 For example, if A knows 
that someone lives in Illinois, but B does not know, then the message that the 
person lives in Springfield tells A, but not B, where the person lives.94 The 
information carried by a signal often exceeds the conventional meaning of the 
signal, and will tend to do so with greater information intensiveness the greater 
the background knowledge shared by sender and receiver. 
Also relevant to information intensiveness is that such a pragmatic 
implicature is defeasible, unlike a semantic or logical implication. In natural 
language, some inferences are defeasible, and some are not.95 For example, if 
one says "It's cold here" then the inference "It is not warm here" is a logical 
implication and is nondefeasible. Logical entailments are not cancelable; as 
long as words like "here" are not changing referent in midstream, denying the 
implication contradicts the original statement in the same manner as would 
one's following the statement, "It's cold here," with "But it is warm here." By 
contrast, a defeasible inference is provisional and cancelable. The inference 
from "It's cold here" to "Please close the window" is cancelable; there is no 
contradiction in saying, "It's cold here, but please don't close the window; I 
like the cold."96 Such pragmatic inferences are typically (for some, 
91. GRICE, supra note 87, at 32. 
92. Id. 
93. See DRETSKE, supra note 7, at 43 ("What one learns, or can learn, from a signal. .. 
and hence the information carried by that signal, depends in part on what one already knows 
about the alternative possibilities."). 
94. Id. (illustrating this point using Madison and Wisconsin). 
95. In semantics, a distinction is often made between implications that depend only on 
linguistic meaning and those that require further nonlinguistic (and defeasible) premises. 
Entailments and Grice's conventionalized implicatures belong to the first group while 
Grice's conversational implicatures (examples of which I discuss in the text) belong to the 
second. See generally CHIERCHIA & MCCONNELL-GINET, supra note 8, at 25-27 (discussing 
implicature and defeasibility). 
96. This is an example of explicit cancelability. Contextual cancelabilty arises when 
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definitionally) said to be defeasible; they are only provisional and can be 
canceled without contradiction. Similarly, in Grice's gas station example, 
where A says, "I am out of petrol," and B says, "There is a garage round the 
corer," B implicates that the garage is open (because of the background 
knowledge that A is looking for gas and the conversational principle that B's 
response should be relevant). But, if B then adds, "But it's closed," the 
implicature that the garage is open is canceled.97 There is no contradiction, as 
there would be if B said, "There is a garage round the comer but there is no 
garage there." According to Grice, cancelability is a test for pragmatic 
implicature, as opposed to strictly semantic meaning.98 
Along with defeasibility goes a large reliance on context. The reliance on 
context is far greater in pragmatic inferences, such as in the window and gas 
station examples, than in logical inferences, such as concluding that a room is 
not warm from the fact that it is cold.99 But, as we will see, there are times 
when a communicator may not fully internalize the costs of communication to a 
single, wide, anonymous audience, and this problem is only compounded when 
a heterogeneous audience (or multiple audiences) comes into play. 
B. Audience Design and Extensiveness 
Communication involves effort by both the sender and receiver of a 
message. For reasons to which we will return, linguists traditionally have paid 
little attention to explaining language in terms of the costs involved in its use. 
Relatedly, in many areas, linguists have been slower to pay attention to the 
impact of the audience on the nature of a communication than to features of the 
speaker. 100 
Sociolinguistics and pragmatics provide the audience-based factors that 
will be of most relevance to us. Sociolinguists have long recognized that 
speech varies along a style spectrum from formal to informal (sometimes 
misleadingly called "elaborated" versus "restricted"), and that formal style is 
"one can find situations in which the utterance of the form of words would simply not carry 
implicature." GRICE, supra note 87, at 44. 
97. Id.; see also supra note 95 and accompanying text. Note that someone might say, 
"There is a garage around the comer but it is closed" consistently with Grice's maxims: For 
example, if both speaker and hearer share the knowledge that gas stations are spread out, 
then, if a nearby one is closed, further search in the neighborhood is futile. 
98. GRICE, supra note 87, at 39. 
99. This is not to say that context is not important here: At least to determine the 
meaning of a word like "here," one would have to resort to context. Adverbs like "here" and 
pronouns are among words termed "indexicals." See, e.g., CHIERCHIA & MCCONNELL- 
GINET, supra note 8, at 263-80; M.J. CRESSWELL, LOGICS AND LANGUAGES 173-85 (1973); 
GEORGIA M. GREEN, PRAGMATICS AND NATURAL LANGUAGE UNDERSTANDING 17-35 (2d ed. 
1996). 
100. This is true of pragmatics and sociolinguistics, the areas that we will be most 
concerned with here. It may also be true even of areas such as phonetics (articulatory 
phonetics preceded acoustic phonetics). 
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characterized by more pausing, more editing, and greater explicitness-all 
features that increase production costs.101 Despite these costs, formal style is 
appropriate where other information channels (such as gesture) and background 
knowledge cannot be relied upon to fill out implicit parts of the message. 
To make these notions precise, we need to be able to measure audience 
characteristics on the one hand and style on the other. As for the former, one 
can borrow on network theory in anthropology to analyze a speaker's style: 
The level of density and multiplexity of the network in which the speaker tends 
to communicate can be shown to correlate with style features such as accent 
and word choice.102 
Even more strikingly, a given speaker's style can be shown to vary by 
audience. In his classic article on style as audience design, Allan Bell argues 
that speakers adjust to different types of audience members in predictable 
ways.103 He usefully classifies audience members into addressees, auditors, 
overhearers, and eavesdroppers. An addressee is a person to whom the familiar 
speech acts-assertions, promises, apologies, and so on-are directed. An 
auditor is like an addressee in that he is known to the speaker and has his 
participation approved ("ratified"), but he is not directly addressed. An 
overhearer is known but not ratified or addressed. An eavesdropper is not even 
known. Based on the definitions, one can conceive of the audience as 
becoming larger and more distant from the speaker-usually both physically 
and psychologically-as features are dropped and we move from addressee to 
auditor to overhearer to eavesdropper. Bell shows that speakers shift their style 
in terms of accent, word choice, and the like more for audience members 
falling closer to the speaker in this spectrum.104 Furthermore, if adjustment is 
made for any type of audience member, it is also made for any closer type.105 
Finally, given these patterns, the choice of code can also be seen as "creating" 
the audience in the sense that it designates who is an addressee or an auditor as 
opposed to an (unratified) overhearer. 
101. See, e.g., Paul Kay, Language Evolution and Speech Style, in SOCIOCULTURAL 
DIMENSIONS OF LANGUAGE CHANGE 21 (Ben G. Blount & Mary Sanches eds., 1977); see 
also Basil Bernstein, Elaborated and Restricted Codes: Their Social Origins and Some 
Consequences, 66 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 55 (1964). 
102. See, e.g., LESLEY MILROY, LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL NETWORKS 139-44 (1980); 
James Milroy & Lesley Milroy, Mechanisms of Change in Urban Dialects: The Role of 
Class, Social Network and Gender, in 1 THE SOCIOLINGUISTICS READER: MULTILINGUALISM 
AND VARIATION 179 (Peter Trudgill & Jenny Cheshire eds., 1998). 
103. Bell, supra note 6, at 145; Herbert H. Clark & Thomas B. Carlson, Hearers and 
Speech Acts, 58 LANGUAGE 332 (1982). 
104. Bell, supra note 103, at 158-61. 
105. Id. at 160. Although more adjustment seems to be made for closer participants, 
the scope of the adjustments we should expect is somewhat unclear. "Style" has proved a 
very elusive concept. Labov proposed that style be measured by attentiveness to speech, 
WILLIAM LABOV, SOCIOLINGUISTIC PATTERNS 208 (1972), but this has fallen out of favor. 
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In the following discussion, what will be most interesting are the hints in 
the literature that adjustment to more distant audience members takes the form 
of a lesser degree of information intensiveness (in my terms) and a greater 
degree of formalism. This requires a precise notion, not only of audience, but 
also of formal versus informal style. Jean-Marc Dewaele seems to be moving 
in this direction when he notices that two factors-implicitness versus 
explicitness on the one hand, and complexity on the other-seem to account for 
the variation in speech in a range of situations from informal to formal: 
The speaker who chooses a style near the implicit end of the continuum 
assumes that the interlocutor shares his knowledge of the world and of the 
context in which the exchange takes place.... In formal situations, speakers 
rely less on knowledge shared with the interlocutor and make fewer 
intertextual and contextual references. They seem to prefer exact, precise 
information: nouns and modifiers are repeated rather than being referred back 
to with pronouns. 106 
In more formal contexts, speech is more explicit than implicit. For example, 
formal speech includes proportionately more nouns, determiners, and 
prepositions than does informal speech. In informal speech, pronouns, adverbs, 
and verbs are proportionately more common, and pronouns and adverbs (at 
least the most common ones) are, on average, more spatio-temporally context- 
dependent than are the other word classes. The relative reliance on modifiers, 
nouns, and prepositions versus pronouns, verbs, and adverbs can be measured 
and accounts for a large part of intraspeaker variation.107 Formal speech calls 
forth the use of infrequently used nouns and other devices to avoid ambiguity. 
Informal speech, by contrast, is more elliptical and relies more on context and 
nonverbal communication, in part because miscommunication can be remedied 
quickly by feedback and restatement.108 In short, speech relies less on 
context-it is more formal-the more it is directed to audiences that share less 
background knowledge or are less personal. 
Crucially, formalism in language, and, I will argue, in law, is a matter of 
degree. Levels of features such as those identified by Dewaele can be 
measured. And, as we have already seen, formalism in a wide variety of areas 
can be identified with the degree of invariance of meaning under changes of 
106. Jean-Marc Dewaele, How to Measure Formality in Speech: A Model of 
Synchronic Variation, in APPROACHES TO SECOND LANGUAGE ACQUISITION (Kari Sajavaara 
& Courtney Fairweather eds., 1996) [hereinafter Dewaele, How to Measure]; see also Jean- 
Marc Dewaele, Style-Shifting in Oral Interlanguage: Quantification and Definition, in THE 
CURRENT STATE OF INTERLANGUAGE: STUDIES IN HONOR OF WILLIAM E. RUTHERFORD 241 
(Lynn Eubank, Larry Selinker & Michael Sharwood Smith eds., 1995); Heylighen, supra 
note 17, at 49-53. For an earlier forerunner of this approach that does not attempt to measure 
explicitness, see Joseph A. DeVito, Psychogrammatical Factors in Oral and Written 
Discourse by Skilled Communicators, 33 SPEECH MONOGRAPHS, Mar. 1966, at 73. 
107. Dewaele, How to Measure, supra note 106, at 123-25. 
108. Formal speech is more cognitively demanding (in other words, uses more 
complex syntax) but this means that it is more demanding per linguistic unit, which is 
compatible with the theory presented herein. 
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context.109 Thus, in the example above, "It's cold" is a less formal way of 
making the request for a closed window than "I hereby request that you, being 
closer to the window than I, please close the window." The former statement 
will vary more in interpretation across the range of possible contexts in which it 
could be uttered than will the latter, more formal statement. Further, while it is 
usually (some would say, always) possible to come up with a context that 
renders a statement ambiguous, it is an empirical proposition whether, given a 
statement, people will reach one interpretation or another, or how easily they 
will reach a given interpretation (e.g., in terms of reaction time).110 
In natural language, most of this adjustment to audience is spontaneous and 
does not involve organized enforcement. Studies of natural language typically 
assume that communication is a cooperative enterprise. Pragmatics has 
focused first and foremost on situations in which information is conveyed. 
Thus, it is natural to focus on two-party interactions and to assume that each 
person is trying to maximize the joint returns from the "exchange."1ll 
Communication that involves conflicting interests, such as deceptive speech, 
has received less attention.112 Correspondingly, Robert Cooter has identified 
two strands in the literature on bargaining.113 On the one hand, an optimistic 
view of contracting behavior, which Cooter associates with the Coasean 
tradition, emphasizes the tendency to reach bargains in the presence of potential 
gains from trade. On the other hand, a tradition Cooter associates with Hobbes 
sees exchange as rife with conflict over division of gains and consequent 
strategic behavior. 
What both the optimistic and pessimistic views of two-party exchanges 
tend to leave out is the influence of third parties. As already noted, there is 
evidence that speakers do make some effort to tailor their utterances to 
audiences. In particular, speakers are more explicit in more anonymous, 
communicative settings. Crucially, being explicit seems to come at some extra 
109. See Heylighen, supra note 106, at 26-28; see also supra notes 17-18 and 
accompanying text. 
110. Put differently, such contexts for interpretation will be more or less available, 
ranging from the almost automatic to the far-fetched. Under this probabilistic version of 
formalism, the degree of formalism is inversely proportional to the variance in 
interpretations one would get in an audience survey. 
111. See sources cited supra note 88. 
112. See, e.g., DARIUSZ GALASINjSKI, THE LANGUAGE OF DECEPTION: A DISCOURSE 
ANALYTICAL STUDY (2000); ROGER W. SHUY, THE LANGUAGE OF CONFESSION, 
INTERROGATION, AND DECEPTION 74-93 (1998). 
113. Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17-18 (1982) (noting that 
"[t]he bargaining version of the Coase Theorem takes an optimistic attitude toward the 
ability of people to solve this problem of distribution [of the stakes of an exchange]," in 
contrast to a "pessimistic approach," an (older) view associated with Thomas Hobbes, which 
"assumes that people cannot solve the distribution problem, even if there are no costs to 
bargaining"); see also R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 161-62 (1988) 
(arguing for implausibility of consistent failure to reach wealth-maximizing agreements 
where transaction costs are low). 
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cost to the speaker: Using words rather than relying on implicit background 
knowledge and body language requires more effort in the production of speech. 
This even extends to the phonetic level, where there is a tradeoff between clear 
articulation, which is costly to the speaker, and ease of understanding, which 
reflects audience processing costs. Where interaction is less face-to-face, the 
balance is typically struck in favor of more production cost and greater 
explicitness. In many interactions, the speaker's incentives to strike this 
balance are assumed to align with the overall welfare; speakers have as much 
interest in being understood as hearers have in understanding. But the question 
remains why speakers do not unilaterally place more of the cost of 
communication on hearers. Part of the explanation resides in the fact that most 
people are speakers and hearers, and a speaker who consistently imposes costs 
on hearers will find himself without conversational partners. 
Where the speaker is least likely to internalize the costs of processing is in 
widespread and anonymous interaction. Spam e-mail is a prominent example 
where audience costs of various sorts are not internalized by the speaker. If the 
spam attracts buyers and bothers or offends people who would not buy anyway, 
the speaker imposes costs on those bothered.114 Telemarketing and junk faxing 
are similar examples, where the costs to noncustomers are not fully internalized 
by the advertiser.115 Indeed, a theme in the regulation of telemarketing and 
junk faxing is that, when the ratio of cost to the advertiser to the cost to the 
receiver is low, intervention is more likely.116 For example, in the absence of 
technological fixes or regulation, fax machines could be rendered largely 
useless by junk faxing."l7 In our terms, the size of the exterality from 
information extensiveness is large relative to the benefits, and the overall stakes 
are large. How much the government can intervene raises First Amendment 
114. I will be emphasizing the need to process the information. In the case of spam, 
one has to read enough to know that the e-mail is not important. Other possible costs to 
widespread audiences include offense or aesthetic aversion. 
115. See, e.g., Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C.A. ? 227 (West 
2003) (regulating practices used in telephone solicitation based on nuisance-type 
justification); Jennifer L. Radner, Phone, Fax, and Frustration. Electronic Commercial 
Speech and Nuisance Law, 42 EMORY L.J. 359, 379 (1993) (noting that, with junk phone 
calls and junk faxes, "[t]he manner, or medium, of advertising is annoying and costly to the 
receiver, who must expend time, effort, and sometimes money to subsidize the unwanted 
advertisement's delivery"); Ian Ayres & Matthew Funk, Marketing Privacy: A Solution for 
the Blight of Telemarketing (and Spam and Junk Mail) (Working Paper 2002), at 
http://islandia.law.yale.edu/ayers/mprivacy.pdf (proposing consumer pricing solution). 
116. Michael A. Fisher, The Right to Spam? Regulating Electronic Junk Mail, 23 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 363, 381 (2000) ("In every area of marketing discussed so far, 
including fax solicitation, a critical parameter has been the ratio of the solicitor's expense to 
that of the consumer. When this ratio is extremely small, as it is for machine-based 
marketing, the courts have upheld total bans, whereas when the ratio is not as small, only 
"opt-out" restrictions are generally accepted as constitutional."). 
117. Id. ("There is little doubt that, if left unchecked, marketers could, with minimal 
cost to themselves, subject nearly every fax machine in the country to a barrage of 
unsolicited advertisements, thereby rendering the machines useless for any other purpose."). 
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issues,118 but for present purposes it is enough to note that such exteralities 
have to be rather large-larger than they are in ordinary speech-before 
intervention is in order. 
In natural language, the other contexts in which private or government 
standards seek to shape the individual's decision of how explicitly to speak are 
ones of high stakes. In air traffic control or aboard oil tankers, the potential 
costs of a misunderstanding are sufficiently great that the decision is partially 
taken out of the speaker's hands.119 But there are other linguistic situations in 
which stakes are high and some actor intervenes to make the message simple. 
One example is the use of hockey socks in hospitals to cover the limb that is 
not supposed to be operated on.120 Mistakes involving operations on the wrong 
side of a patient are all too common, and marking the limb for operation (say, 
by writing "yes" on it) often does not work well. The problem is that the mark 
requires more search or more common knowledge than other methods of 
communicating the same information; if the drape mistakenly goes over the 
correct limb for surgery, then the wrong limb is exposed without any message. 
This is fine if the surgeon is looking for a "yes" mark or always checks both 
limbs, but this requires more effort or common knowledge, which apparently 
can be lacking even in the hospital context. The solution adopted by some 
hospitals is to mark the limb not to be operated on, either by writing "no" on it 
or putting something like a red hockey sock over it. If one accepted the often- 
heard argument that notice cures all,121 one would think that writing "yes" on 
the correct limb would be at least as good as writing "no" on the wrong limb, 
but it turns out that the "no" designation requires less context and background 
knowledge in order to work. 
Furthermore, in this high-stakes context, there is increasing recognition 
that standardization may help, although no solution seems to have yet gained 
universal acceptance.122 If some surgeons use an "X" to mark the surgery site 
while others use "X" to mark the site of no surgery, things become confusing 
(and dangerous). Even if most marked "no" on the no-surgery site, surgeons 
118. See, e.g., Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1556 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(acknowledging that a Minnesota regulation on the use of automatic dialing-announcing 
devices triggers First Amendment review but upholding the law as a legitimate time, place, 
or manner regulation); Radner, supra note 115 (examining First Amendment protection of 
commercial speech and the limitations it places on regulation of electronically generated 
phone call and fax solicitations). 
119. Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 49 (noting that "the law mandates one standard 
language or use of a shared language in certain contexts where impediments to 
communication can be especially costly, as in airplane cockpits or aboard oil tankers"). 
120. Jennifer Steinhauer, So, the Tumor Is on the Left, Right?: Seeking Ways to Reduce 
Operating Room Errors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2001, at A23. 
121. For a discussion of notice cures all, see Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 43-45. 
122. Risk Management Foundation of the Harvard Medical Institutions, Did Wrong- 
Site Surgery Remedy Work?, RESOURCE, Feb. 1999 (transcript of audiotape, on file with 
author). 
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marking the correct site with their initials (a common alternative system) could 
introduce confusion.123 If some people are using initials, then double-checking 
for this possibility may become necessary. Thus, devices range along a 
spectrum according to the demands they make on the interpreter in terms of 
background knowledge and use of context; from high to low context- 
dependence, we have the use of an "X" mark, the use of initials, the use of a 
"yes" mark, and the use of a "no" mark. And adding a nonstandard message to 
the mix of messages can raise the processing costs for all messages. 
I will argue that communication about legal relations shares the features of 
both these types of contexts; they are often widespread and anonymous, like the 
spam and junk faxing situations, and they involve high stakes like the air traffic 
control and surgery examples. For this reason, we would expect to find more 
intervention in the tradeoff between the intensiveness and extensiveness of 
information in these areas than in the everyday use of natural language in 
conversation. 
C. Levels of Information Costs of Legal Relations by Audience Type 
Actors who communicate about legal relations will sometimes face the full 
costs of the communication, but often they will not. Before turning to a theory 
of the law's response to communication costs, it will be useful to classify these 
costs. I will not be treating the privately beneficial, socially costly signaling 
that the literature has mostly focused on. For example, employees spend a lot 
to signal their productivity (e.g., by obtaining an education that is difficult for 
low-productivity employees to obtain), but, it is argued, it might be better if no 
such signaling took place.124 However, sometimes the information developed 
may be worth the cost after all, and even where this is not true there are a 
variety of mechanisms that may serve to limit information gathering in these 
circumstances.125 In any event, this type of costly signaling, to the extent that 
it occurs, would be a problem even in the absence of audience processing costs. 
123. A doctor's initials could be "N.O.," as pointed out by Lori Bartholomew at the 
Physician Insurers Association. Id. ? 17. 
124. See, e.g., A. MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING: INFORMATIONAL TRANSFER IN 
HIRING AND RELATED SCREENING PROCESSES 14-30 (1974); Kenneth J. Arrow, Higher 
Education as a Filter, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 193 (1973); Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Theory of 
"Screening, " Education, and the Distribution of Income, 65 AM. ECON. REV., June 1975, at 
283, 286 (noting that although screening may be Pareto optimal, "under any quasi-concave 
(equality preferring) social welfare function the screening equilibrium... is socially 
undesirable"). 
125. That signaling is privately beneficial but socially wasteful (rather than cost- 
effectively informative) is a theoretical possibility in many two-party transactions. See, e.g., 
Philippe Aghion & Benjamin Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can 
Enhance Efficiency, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 381 (1990) (describing signaling in the context of 
an informed entrepreneur and uninformed investor); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic 
Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 733 
(1992) (suggesting that, while some default and immutable contract rules are theoretically 
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Instead, I will be focusing on the costs of delineating rights that involve 
communicating these rights to dutyholders. This relates to the problem of 
applying the psychology of information-processing to questions of consumer 
product and risk regulation: More information may not always be better, and 
additional information may add more than trivially to processing costs.126 
Where the benefit from this communication to its producer exceeds the cost of 
producing the message, the producer will sometimes ignore the full cost of 
processing the message.127 This divergence between the private and social cost 
of communication will serve as the basis of the theory of the next section. 
The total cost of communication includes the costs of producing the 
message and the costs of processing it. For example, in the case of an 
utterance, there are production costs (the costs of formulating and articulating 
the utterance) and processing costs (the costs of listening to and understanding 
the utterance). Similarly, the owner's claim to Blackacre involves production 
costs (the costs of erecting a fence and filing title documents) and processing 
costs (the costs of viewing and respecting the fence and searching and reading 
the title documents). The goal of the owner is to minimize the private costs of 
the message. These private costs will include production costs and the 
component of audience processing costs that is reflected in a lowering of the 
price the owner can charge vendees. For example, if the title documents are 
unclear, this will make the property less marketable, and the owner will feel 
this cost directly. However, this cost will not be fully borne by the owner as 
sender of the message about the property right in three types of situations. 
First, the lack of clarity might confuse a publicly subsidized court. Second, the 
difficulty of processing by dutyholders might lead to a fully compensatory 
judgment against a hapless violator (or alternatively might raise the potential 
violator's costs of avoidance). And third, a confusing right might lead to 
confusion about titles in general, because everyone will have more potential 
features to be on the lookout for and to evaluate. 
efficient, it is very difficult to "divine the efficient rule in practice"); sources cited supra note 
124. Whether a given example of signaling is wasteful is difficult to tell. See Alan 
Schwartz, Taking the Analysis of Security Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2073, 2085 (1994). The 
tendency has been to overestimate the waste associated with information costs where 
markets encourage devices to reduce wasteful information production. See Yoram Barzel, 
Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Information Costs, 20 J.L. & ECON. 291 (1977). 
126. On the psychology of information processing and regulation, see, for example, 
WESLEY A. MAGAT & W. KIP VISCUSI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO REGULATION 
(1992); Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven C. Salop, The Efficient Regulation of 
Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491 (1981). 
127. How recipients respond to a message that is costly to process is an empirical 
question. Recipients may ignore extra information (if they can tell what is extra), engage in 
costly evaluation, invest in acquiring background knowledge, and so on. Some have even 
claimed that extra information can decrease information use or degrade decisionmaking in 
the consumer context, but it is not clear to what extent, if at all, this "information overload" 
is a real problem. See infra note 223 and accompanying text. 
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It will be most useful to focus on the processing by the audience for two 
reasons. First, the degree of interalization of cost to the speaker will differ by 
type of audience; audiences range along a spectrum from small and close-knit 
to large and indefinite. Thus, if the law tends to intervene where interalization 
of cost is low and interalization is low where audiences are extensive, then the 
type of audience will in tur help to explain the law's approach to 
communicating information about legal relations. Second, in many situations, 
the additional cost of sending more information-intensive (e.g., more 
complicated or more idiosyncratic) messages is low from the sender's point of 
view.128 The real difference between a highly information-intensive and a less 
information-intensive message will be in the processing. This turns the focus 
(again) to the types of audiences and their abilities to process. 
The audience for messages about legal relations can be classified in terms 
of an extended notion of privity.129 Where there is a closer relationship 
between the creator of the rights and the audience, the creator will be more 
likely to face the costs of processing by members of the audience. Types of 
audiences range from purchasers of the property rights in question, to 
successors in interest to those rights, to courts or other third-party enforcers, to 
potential violators of the rights, to purchasers of other rights not connected to 
the creator of the rights in question. 
1. Purchasers. 
In the case of purchasers, processing costs are no different from other costs 
that sellers may, superficially at least, impose on buyers. For example, in any 
sale, there is a question of who will measure the value of the asset and who will 
bear the buyer's search costs. This is a subtle question, but recent work, to be 
discussed shortly, has suggested that it is not always the case that individual 
sellers fully internalize buyers' costs of contracting by having to charge a lower 
asset price. To be sure, if there were one seller, the seller would be able to 
charge a monopoly price, and this price would be lower if the seller raised the 
cost of the sale itself. How much of the increase fell on the seller would 
depend on the elasticities of supply and demand. At the other extreme, with 
multiple buyers and sellers in a perfectly competitive market, there is no 
incentive for a seller to cause the costs of dealing with that seller to rise. 
Buyers are perfectly informed, do not face transaction costs, and can simply go 
elsewhere. Equivalently, in a perfectly competitive market with homogenous 
128. Cf. Eric Rasmusen, A Model of Negotiation, Not Bargaining: Explaining 
Incomplete Contracts 1-2, 8-21 (May 1, 1998) (draft of unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author) (developing a theory of incomplete contracts based on high costs of reading and low 
costs of writing). 
129. Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 27-28. 
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commodities, trading is anonymous in the sense that a buyer is indifferent to 
the identity of the seller.130 
Things become more complicated when search costs are positive.131 In 
general, if a cost falls squarely on someone who is certain to purchase the asset 
and the buyer is aware of this cost, the seller has an incentive to minimize the 
cost. Measuring the asset to be sold may be privately beneficial to the buyer 
but wasteful overall; for example, if searching through a batch of fruit is costly 
and only serves to appropriate unpriced value, the seller will incur cost in 
avoiding the information-gathering up to the point where marginal cost equals 
marginal benefit.132 The seller may use opaque bags and expend resources to 
convince consumers that a bag has average-quality fruit.133 Or the seller may 
offer a warranty to reduce search behavior if the warranty costs less than the 
search.134 Some of this behavior will involve communication, and the seller 
has every reason to make the communication less costly for the buyer to 
process. 
However, many costs involved in processing a seller's communication are 
not focused on the certain buyer. Sellers may impose costs on third parties in 
order to make a sale. For example, if the probability of phone solicitations 
resulting in a sale is high enough, it makes sense for the seller to call even 
though, by calling, the seller imposes costs on people who do not want to be 
solicited. 
2. Successors in interest. 
One difference between the typical contract right and the typical property 
right is that the latter will last much longer. This durability of property rights 
means that the communication of the right has as its audience people far in the 
future. Successors in interest to the original owner are one component of this 
audience. 
Some have argued that the durability of property explains its greater 
reliance on mandatory forms than other areas of law, such as contract.135 The 
130. This is Jevons's Law of Indifference. See W. STANLEY JEVONS, THEORY OF 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 90-95 (1871); see also Robert Cooter & Janet T. Landa, Personal 
Versus Impersonal Trade. The Size of Trading Groups and Contract Law, 4 INT'L REV. L. & 
ECON. 15, 15 (1984). 
131. See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961) 
(analyzing problem of ascertaining market price); see also THRAINN EGGERTSSON, 
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 7, 193-203 (1990) (discussing neoinstitutionalist 
work drawing on Stigler's theory). 
132. Yoram Barzel, Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets, 25 J.L. & 
ECON. 27, 28-32 (1982). 
133. Id. at 37-39. 
134. Id. at 32-34. 
135. See Carol M. Rose, What Government Can Do for Property (and Vice Versa), in 
THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PROPERTY 214-15 
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idea is that the law intervenes to make sure that the message is not garbled 
across time. Processing costs will be high for those in the future. This problem 
of remote processing costs is related to the argument that fragmentation has 
high future costs, because property is easier to fragment than to reassemble 
later.136 Excessive fragmentation can also result in an anticommons where too 
many stakeholders have a veto over use and transfer. A wide variety of rules in 
property law can be regarded as preventing excessive fragmentation of several 
types, such as excessively powerful coownership interests, excessively small 
parcels, or excessively numerous use rights over a given asset.137 These 
doctrines range from partition to the changed-circumstances doctrine, the rule 
against perpetuities to eminent domain. 
Arguments based on what will happen subsequently to a given asset must 
deal with the question of capitalization. If O is deciding whether to create 
complicated or fragmented rights, O will take into account the rights' 
durability.138 The unattractiveness of the complexity or the fragmentation of 
property will be reflected in a lower selling price to someone down the road; 
and this, discounted to present value, will be reflected in the price that the 
property will fetch right now. Thus, to the extent that O can foresee the types 
of problems that the durability of fragmentation presents, O will fully face the 
costs of those problems and may weigh them against the benefits of 
complicating or fragmenting the rights. Indeed, it is precisely the durability of 
rights that gives us confidence that an owner has the right incentives to 
maximize the value of the owned resource.139 
Furthermore, the mere failure to recombine rights when they are no longer 
"efficiently" fragmented does not tell us much unless we know a lot about 
costs. One supposed problem with property is the one-way ratchet of 
complexity: It is easier to fragment property rights than to reassemble them 
later.140 But, in any given instance, what looks like an unfortunate tendency 
(Nicholas Mercuro & Warren J. Samuels eds., 1999). 
136. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons. Property in the 
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (arguing that transitioning 
to private property is more difficult when it begins with divided ownership). 
137. See Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 
1176-78 (1999) (arguing that legal restrictions, such as the numerus clausus and reverter 
acts, prevent excessive fragmentation). Similarly, Holdemess argues that some of the same 
doctrines discussed by Heller serve to promote alienability by closing the class of 
entitlement holders. Clifford G. Holdemess, A Legal Foundationfor Exchange, 14 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 321, 334-43 (1985). 
138. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of 
Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1360 (1982) (pointing out that a seller who insists on a 
covenant that works to a purchaser's disadvantage will have to accept a lower purchase 
price); Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 29-31, 44. 
139. Demsetz, supra note 55, at 355 ("In effect, an owner of a private right to use land 
acts as a broker whose wealth depends on how well he takes into account the competing 
claims of the present and the future."). 
140. Heller, supra note 137, at 1165-66; see also, e.g., Uriel Reichman, Toward a 
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may reflect sunk costs rather than frustrated gains. Because the "costs" of any 
system of property rights include upfront capital costs in addition to ongoing 
marginal costs, we should expect rights to persist past the point at which one 
would no longer be motivated to set them up anew: Once the costs of setting 
up the system have been incurred, they are sunk costs.141 Only ongoing 
marginal costs are relevant to the decision to maintain a property system. The 
sunk start-up costs mean that it is not necessarily a reflection of high 
transaction costs when parties fail to recombine the rights now. It may not 
even be undesirable to have created the rights in the first place. A one-way 
ratchet of complexity-including fragmentation-in property rights may well 
reflect transaction costs and an anticommons, or it might reflect a low ratio of 
operating to capital costs. 
Of course, the owner may fail to anticipate problems at the time of the 
creation of the complicated or fragmented interest. Whether this is relevant to 
the design of a legal intervention will depend on whether the owner's errors are 
systematic and cost-effectively remediable by court adjudication or other legal 
intervention.142 One can imagine many intermediate degrees of intervention, 
such as default rules against complication and fragmentation or changed 
circumstances doctrines, to adjust matters long after the creation of the 
rights.143 
3. Third-party enforcers. 
Complication of property rights also impacts a very familiar audience: 
third-party enforcers. It is conventional wisdom that formalities benefit courts 
in their efforts to enforce rights. So, too, is the idea that the partial 
subsidization of courts by the public leaves parties with an incentive to overuse 
Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177, 1233 (1982) (arguing that the 
"touch and concern" test allows court to "fix" some inefficient servitudes); Jeffrey E. Stake, 
Darwin, Donations, and the Illusion of Dead Hand Control, 64 TUL. L. REV. 705, 718-20 
(1990) (contending that the Rule Against Perpetuities makes an asset easier to purchase by 
reducing the number of persons holding interests in the asset); Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom 
from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70 IOWA L. REV. 
615, 619-20, 624-34 (1985) (describing numerous costs in removing a servitude, such as 
drafting, bargaining, free riding, and holdouts). 
141. On capital costs of setting up rights and marginal costs of holding them in further 
periods, see David D. Haddock & Lynne Kiesling, The Black Death and Property Rights, 31 
J. LEGAL STUD. S545 (2002). 
142. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 30-31 (arguing that legal intervention will 
not be required in most cases). 
143. Given that complication and fragmentation do carry with them potential benefits 
such as increased specialization (think of a commercial landlord) and that officials will not 
easily measure these benefits, one would expect that the law would offer a default menu. 
One could choose fragmentation with rigidity through time or fragmentation with a strong 
changed circumstances doctrine that would allow courts to put the pieces back together 
again. What we would not normally expect is that, because complication and fragmentation 
have costs, the law would intervene to stop it altogether up front. 
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them. Someone who puts a high informational burden on a court to figure out a 
novel structure of rights is not facing the full costs of the determination. 
Formalities have what Lon Fuller called a "channeling function": They force 
the parties' actions into a format that courts can easily interpret.144 
There is, however, little reason to believe that ease of processing by the 
enforcer is what leads courts to deny enforcement altogether for certain rights. 
First, it is not clear that a court bears the cost of parties' lack of clarity: Courts 
might simply put in the same effort but make errors, the cost of which the 
parties themselves will have to bear.145 Further, penalty defaults rather than 
mandatory rules are expected where the problem is generating information for 
courts.146 Finally, in many contexts, parties have ample reason to standardize: 
The network benefits from doing the same thing as others may dominate the 
advantages of special forms.147 
Moreover, courts' need for explicit information does little to distinguish 
different kinds of rights. The channeling theory was first articulated in the 
contracts context, although it has been well understood that clarity in property 
too was partly for the benefit of courts. Of course, to the extent that property 
rights are more durable than contract rights, courts are somewhat in the position 
of successors in interest: An audience far in the future is likely to need more 
help in deciphering the rights.148 This may argue for a different approach to 
property than to contract, or at least a different approach to old property and 
144. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801-03 (1941); 
see also 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, SPECIALLY APPLIED TO 
ENGLISH PRACTICE 454-55 (1827) (describing benefits of requiring specific evidence of 
contracts); id. at 470 (arguing against refusing enforcement of contracts on grounds of failure 
to comply with formality requirement); Ayres & Gertner, supra note 51, at 124-25 (arguing 
that penalty default rules can sort contracting parties into classes perceivable by courts). 
145. See Eric A. Posner, Norms, Formalities, and the Statute of Frauds. A Comment, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1971, 1985 (1996). 
146. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 51, at 95-97 (analyzing U.C.C. ? 2-201(1)'s zero- 
quantity default as a penalty default to generate information for courts); see also Posner, 
supra note 145, at 1984 (arguing that formality of writing should not be an immutable rule, 
but that parties somehow should articulate their desire for legal enforcement). 
147. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of 
Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path 
Dependence in Corporate Contracting. Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior, and Cognitive 
Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347 (1996); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization 
and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. 
REV. 713 (1997). For skepticism on this score, see, for example, Clayton P. Gillette, 
Harmony and Stasis in Trade Usages for International Sales, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 707, 721-40 
(1999) (arguing that parties have incentive to use novel terms when current custom is 
suboptimal); Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813 
(1998); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic 
Effects, 86 CAL L. REV. 479, 562-86 (1998); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, 
Choice of Form and Network Externalities, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79, 128 (2001) 
(concluding that "network exteralities are not a significant impediment to firms' choosing 
the organizational form appropriate for their business"). 
148. Rose, supra note 135, at 214-15. 
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contract rights as opposed to more recent ones. In any case, the audience 
separated in time from the sender of the message is a subcase of the extensive, 
indefinite audience, which is likely not to share as much background 
knowledge as would a contemporaneous audience. Thus, the need for courts to 
interpret rights and the great durability of certain rights have information cost 
implications. 
Courts are not the only potential enforcers of rights. Many norms and 
some laws may be designed to facilitate informal enforcement by members of 
society. An actor may have some incentive to facilitate such enforcement, at 
least as far as this concerns the right the actor holds. Nevertheless, actors may 
have a desire for idiosyncrasies that increase the processing load for informal 
third-party enforcers. For example, allowing full customizability of marriage 
would raise the cost of bringing social disapproval to bear on those violating 
their vows.149 In this example, informal third-party enforcers face processing 
costs not fully internalized by those who would like to customize their legal 
relations. 
4. Potential violators. 
Another audience for property rights consists of the dutyholders. 
Dutyholders need to know what rules (or rights) not to violate. Each 
dutyholder will engage in measurement up to the point where the additional 
benefit in expected liability saved equals the additional cost of measurement. 
However, most property rights are protected with sanctions rather than prices, 
so that many potential violators will not be in equipoise; consequently, a small 
decrease in the sanction would not affect behavior.150 If rights become too 
difficult to process, violation and liability might be the better choice.151 
Furthermore, more complicated rights will sometimes require more 
measurement in order to avoid the violation. 
Will a creator of a right-the one sending the message-internalize the 
costs to potential violators? The answer is "no" if the potential violator would 
engage in more measurement but no greater violation, or if the violation leads 
to full compensation to the owner. Additional complication of the right would 
lead to more measurement or damage awards, but this would not be 
149. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 79-80 (2000) (arguing that 
"[t]he problem is that the existence of multiple or idiosyncratic relationships might be so 
confusing to the members of the community that community enforcement becomes 
impossible" and discussing the example of marriage); William Bishop, 'Is He Married?'. 
Marriage as Information, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 245, 252-54 (1984) (presenting signaling 
model of marriage in which standardization of marriage relation allows third parties to deter 
misbehavior). 
150. Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1524-31 (1984). 
151. See Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 150 (1995) (arguing that rules will not affect behavior where they are 
complex enough that costs of following them exceed liability for violations). 
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internalized by the owner. Nor can an owner bargain with the large and 
indefinite class of potential violators to achieve the optimal level of information 
load. Thus, the information costs will not be borne by the owner absent some 
social or legal intervention. 
It is easily overlooked that potential violators' information costs bear on 
the design of the law. Property presents a simple message to the outside 
world.152 As J.E. Penner notes, the dutyholder only needs to know that he does 
not own the asset in order to know that he must keep out.153 This keeps 
informational demands on the dutyholder to a minimum.154 Contrast this with 
a hypothetical property right that allowed twice the punishment on odd- 
numbered days and none on even-numbered days, or an easement in people 
wearing hats.155 Potential entrants would have a lot of inquiring to do before 
entering-or even following a crowd onto-any piece of property. The costs 
of dealing with this asset and with assets in general would increase. 
5. Market participants in general. 
In general, actions that make informational demands may make 
measurement costs for dutyholders increase across the board with respect to all 
assets, not just the one in question. The original creator of the right will not 
fully bear these general confusion costs. 
In such situations, sellers may find it worthwhile to take actions that 
impose costs on buyers and that are socially costly overall. For example, where 
many shoppers prefer a good other than the one for sale, and the goods are 
close substitutes, a seller may engage in bait and switch. In this scenario, the 
seller falsely advertises good A, but when the buyer arrives, only good B is on 
sale and the costs of arriving at the store are sunk.156 If a high enough 
proportion of such buyers then buy good B, bait and switch is worthwhile to the 
seller. However, the possibility of bait and switch behavior will discourage 
some buyers from searching in the first place, causing an overall social loss. 
Similarly, Victor Goldberg has shown that an individual seller will bear the full 
portion of precontractual costs only under very restrictive circumstances.157 
152. See sources cited supra note 21. 
153. PENNER, supra note 21, at 29. 
154. For example, things are often marked visually in property. See Carol Rose, 
Seeing Property, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND 
RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 267 (1994). What one sees is heavily dependent on background 
knowledge. See id. at 294-97. Even notions such as salience, see supra note 78, may well 
turn out to be partly culture-specific and partly biologically determined. 
155. Another example is artists' rights. See supra note 19. 
156. Edward P. Lazear, Bait and Switch, 103 J. POL. ECON. 813 (1995). 
157. Victor P. Goldberg, The Gold Ring Problem, 47 U. TORONTO L.J. 469, 475-81 
(1997) (discussing a model of French and McCormick in which sellers do bear 
precontractual costs, but which assumes a first-price, sealed-bid auction, no collusion by 
bidders, fixed costs of bidder participation, infinite number of potential bidders, 
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Goldberg points out that in many other situations, a seller may be tempted to 
freeride; whereas a sole seller would have a full incentive to develop an 
innovation that would cost-effectively lower bidders' costs, one of a group of 
sellers in Goldberg's model would not be able to capture the full benefit of the 
innovation and would be tempted to freeride.158 This insufficient incentive to 
innovate is similar to the problem of contractual innovation in the presence of 
network effects; if network benefits not capturable by the innovating proposer 
accrue to future adopters, the innovator will have a less than optimal incentive 
to develop the innovation.159 
We, however, are concerned here with the mirror-image of this problem. 
The seller may communicate in such a way that the communication benefits the 
seller but introduces a complication that will be borne in all transactions. Bait 
and switch is one example. Another is the use of "pound" to mean a measure 
that is particularly suited to one's own business, where the possibility of using 
everyday terms without notice forces all buyers to inquire into the nature of the 
"pound" that any seller is using. Sellers as a class (or society) may be worse 
off, but the one who uses the idiosyncratic pound will only bear a fraction of 
such costs. This type of confusion should come as little surprise because it 
forms the basis for the doctrine of trademark confusion: If two marks are 
sufficiently close, then consumers will either forego the product information 
associated with the brand or they will have to make inquiries at a cost that 
could be avoided with more clearly separated marks.160 That is, closeness of 
marks raises the costs of audience members' processing. The wider the 
audience to which the message is broadcast, the less shared, specialized 
background knowledge will be available to the average audience member to 
help make the message less ambiguous. 
D. A Model of the Communicative Tradeoff 
If we keep in mind that total communication costs involve both production 
and processing costs, then the nature of the audience becomes an important 
factor on the cost side. The cost of a message will depend both on its length 
and on the cost of deciphering it. As we have seen, one could send a long 
message that does not require much inference or background knowledge or one 
could send a short message that makes heavy demands on the receiver. 
homogeneous valuation, variance reduction by additional information, and a competitive market with zero economic profit). 
158. Id. at 480. 
159. See sources cited supra note 147. 
160. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law. An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268-75 (1987) (discussing function of trademarks to allow 
economization of search costs); see also Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 768-75 (1990) (arguing that set of marks that would be cost-effectively used for a given product category is not practically infinite). 
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In less formal contexts, we expect information per unit of production cost 
to be higher than in more formal contexts. Increasing explicitness and 
formality will achieve the benefit of less variance between the interpretations of 
audience members at the cost of less information per unit of production cost. 
Very roughly, more words carry a more stable and certain meaning, but will 
convey less information per word. 
Consider a contract. One may use terms that have developed a special 
meaning for the speaker or use longer, more explicit clauses. When common 
knowledge can be presumed, and when courts can be trusted to discover the 
parties' meanings, shorter forms might be preferred. Similarly, familiar forms 
will require less processing. In the absence of common knowledge, longer 
locutions can be used, but then the nonwriting party has to search through them 
for possible traps.161 To solve this problem, less information could be sent (by 
omitting detail), or standardized terms could be used. Again, the more 
impersonal the audience, the less personal, trust-based assurance there is that 
traps are not present. Further, the larger the amount of background knowledge 
required to discover traps, the higher the cost of discovering them. 
In order to understand the tradeoff between intensiveness and 
extensiveness of information, we must compare these concepts to a baseline. 
This requires forming an expectation of how much information cost to incur in 
delineating and processing rights to an asset. Generally, we expect assets of 
higher value to be subject to regimes of rights that involve greater delineation 
and greater information costs. That greater asset value calls forth more 
informational effort can be seen as an application of the Demsetz thesis: As 
resource values increase, it becomes worthwhile to take more actions to 
internalize externalities.162 Of course, some assets are easier to defend or to 
steal, but holding that constant, we expect a greater willingness to incur 
information costs as the stakes involved become higher. Thus, although land 
may be the subject of title registration both because it is stationary (easy to 
record) and valuable, value seems to be a main reason why people incur much 
higher information costs to keep track of the ownership of paintings and other 
artwork, as opposed to other types of less valuable personal property.163 
Given that asset value is an important consideration in expending 
information costs, there is still the question of whether the information costs 
per audience member should be relatively high or low. More precisely, we 
would expect greater delineation efforts in the case of valuable assets or high- 
stakes resource conflicts, but this delineation can rely on different 
informational strategies. These strategies range along a spectrum from very 
personal contexts characterized by intensive information all the way to 
161. See Rasmusen, supra note 128. 
162. Demsetz, supra note 55, at 350. 
163. For particularly famous artworks, much of the information is already well-known, 
especially to dealers, making it easier to keep track of the object. 
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impersonal contexts characterized by extensive information. The more 
impersonal contexts will require greater formality, so that the typical audience 
member will not incur large processing costs. 
By focusing on the foregoing aspects of audiences and messages, we can 
focus the model on measurable quantities. The rate of information is the 
amount of information per unit of delineation cost. The amount of information 
content can in principle be measured, for example, by the length of the shortest 
description in an agreed upon language.164 Delineation cost is in principle 
measurable too, especially if all that is required is a comparison of delineation 
costs and their changes over time.165 A high ratio of amount of information to 
delineation cost (information intensiveness) can reflect a strategy that relies on 
a high quantity of information (relative to the other components of delineation). 
Alternatively, it can reflect the compacting, through reliance on context, of a 
large amount of information per unit of information-production cost. Further, 
the processing cost of the audience is likely to increase more than linearly with 
rate of information: The audience members most interested in the information 
will be the best equipped to extract it (with specialized skills and experience, 
along with background knowledge), but the marginal cost of each additional 
audience member (who will be less expert) will rise. At the same time, the 
marginal benefit of reaching additional audience members will fall.166 
Consider property versus contract. Because many audience members have 
to process in rem rights, there is reason to standardize and simplify property 
rights, leading to a lower rate of information. Moreover, large audiences for in 
rem rights cannot process implicit context-dependent messages at low cost, and 
this means that the amount of information per unit of delineation cost must be 
kept low (i.e., by ensuring that a message will come in an explicit, formal 
package). By contrast, with more personal rights, greater amounts of 
information can be processed by the few, and greater reliance on context allows 
more information content to be achieved through less delineation (and 
delineation cost). Thus, if the information rate is best regarded as the ratio of 
amount of information to delineation cost, in personam and in rem contexts 
represent opposite ways of striking a tradeoff. In the former, high intensity 
case, adding additional audience members who are expected to process a large 
amount of information causes costs to mount quickly. In the latter, low 
intensity case, additional audience members can be added at low cost. 
164. See, e.g., MING LI & PAUL VITANYI, AN INTRODUCTION TO KOLMOGOROV 
COMPLEXITY AND ITS APPLICATIONS (2d ed. 1997); see also supra notes 11-73 and 
accompanying text. 
165. Steven N.S. Cheung, The Transaction Costs Paradigm, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 514, 
516 (1998). 
166. These modest assumptions suffice for the present model. For a preliminary 
discussion of the value of information under different assumptions about utility functions, 
see Kenneth J. Arrow, The Value of and Demand for Information, in DECISION AND 
ORGANIZATION: A VOLUME IN HONOR OF JACOB MARSCHAK 131 (C.B. McGuire & Roy 
Radner eds., 2d ed. 1986). 
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Therefore, we expect high information rates to be associated with small 
audiences (information intensiveness) and we expect low information rates to 
tend to be associated with larger audiences (information extensiveness). 
Different assets call for different levels of information overall and for 
different mixes of information intensiveness and extensiveness. Consider for a 
moment the world of zero transaction costs (including processing costs), in 
which everyone could have a contractual duty to the owner of Blackacre to stay 
off and this duty could be tailored individually to each right-duty relationship 
holding between O and every other member of society. At the other extreme, O 
might decide just to keep everyone off and use Blackacre by himself. This 
requires everyone else simply to keep off what they do not own-a principle 
that applies not only to all nonowners of Blackacre but also to all nonowners of 
most owned assets.167 These two approaches would cost the same (nothing) in 
a zero-transaction-cost world. But, in the world of positive transaction costs, 
the tradeoff between intensiveness and extensiveness of information does 
matter.168 For rights to assets that can elicit value from a small number of 
people having special access, it makes sense for the rights involving those few 
to be in personam and of high information content relative to delineation cost 
(and to the value of the asset). For the audience of people who can contribute 
to output by simply staying away from the asset, we would expect an in rem 
duty of low information content relative to delineation cost and asset value. 
Thus, relative to the cost of producing a message, one can communicate at 
a high information rate, but this will require a smaller audience in order to keep 
communication costs down. In other words, there is an isocost reflecting the 
tradeoff in communication between average information rate and numbers of 
hearers: Points along the line connecting the two axes in Figure 1 all represent 
different combinations of information rate and audience size that are equally 
costly.169 Additional isocost lines to the northeast in Figure 1, not drawn here, 
would involve a greater level of cost. In Figure 1, this is illustrated with 
information rate (r) on the y-axis and audience size (n) on the x-axis. Here I 
model audience extensiveness based on audience size, but the model could 
easily be extended to create an index based not only on audience size but also 
on its heterogeneity, indefiniteness, and other features implicating processing 
167. PENNER, supra note 21, at 25-31; Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 792-97; 
Merrill & Smith, supra note 22, at 359, 389. 
168. Analogously, it is the presence of transaction costs that makes the distinction 
between intrafirm and market transacting relevant. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 
ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386 (1937). 
169. If processing costs are the important variable here, they will determine the slope 
of the isocost. If the fixed costs of producing a message increase, this will shift the isocost 
inward but will not shift the optimal ratio of intensiveness to extensiveness as long as the 
isobenefit curves all have the same shape. If this model is used dynamically, the fact that 
production costs may vary with the size of the audience may become important. For 
example, technology might make an informationally intense "data dump" relatively cheaper 
(although not necessarily cheaper to process). 
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costs.170 The origin depicts the minimal unit of information being 
communicated to one person.171 




0 n,* n n 
n = audience size 
r = information rate 
C = isobenefit for contract situation 
P = isobenefit for property situation 
The diagonal line in Figure 1 is an isocost for communicating legal 
relations, which depicts combinations of information rate and audience size that 
are achievable at a given cost. Cost (of any sort) will be incurred up to where 
marginal cost equals marginal benefit. This leaves the question of how to 
allocate resources within this overall cost-to information rate or audience size. 
For the same cost, one can communicate at a high information rate to a small 
audience (high r, low n), or at a low information rate to a large audience (low r, 
high n). Recall that information rate is the amount of information per unit of 
delineation cost, which has implications for the amount of information and its 
degree of context-dependence. For convenience, I will assume there is one 
linear isocost constraint on communication, but nothing essential to the analysis 
turns on this. 
170. Usually audience size will correlate with audience heterogeneity and anonymity, 
but this is not always so. For an attempt to trace the implications of breaking up the notion 
of in rem dutyholders into numerosity and indefiniteness, see Merrill & Smith, supra note 
16, at 789-809. 
171. Otherwise we would need asymptotic isocost lines. The linear isocost line is 
adopted for convenience only. 
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For some matters, the benefits of communicating information about rights 
does not extend beyond a small group, and this is illustrated with isobenefit 
curve C (mnemonic for contract) and those parallel to it. Points along C 
represent the attainment of the same level of benefit in the contract-like 
situation and, moving outward toward the northeast, each curve represents a 
higher level of benefit. In other situations, there is a benefit to communicating 
with the world, as in the case of in rem rights, although not much information 
need be communicated to secure most of the benefit. This is illustrated by the 
isobenefit curve P (mnemonic for property) and the curves parallel to it.172 
The optimal mix of information intensiveness and extensiveness in a given 
situation occurs at the highest isobenefit curve reachable from the isocost (i.e., 
where the isocost line is tangent to an isobenefit curve). In the first, contract- 
like case, the curve C is tangent to the isocost at point (n,*, r^*), which means 
that the right will be characterized by intensive information directed at few 
people. In the case of curve P, the tangency point is at (np*, rp*) and the right 
will be characterized by less intensive but more extensive information than 
curve C. 
Now, as discussed in the last section, the externality problem emerges here 
on the extensive margin. Costs are most likely not to be internalized by a 
sender of a message when the message is broadcast to the world at large. In the 
case of ordinary speech, this exterality does not normally exceed the nuisance 
of being bothered by a message one does not want to hear. But, where greater 
consequences attach to how a message is decoded, more intervention, public or 
private, is likely to occur. 
This informational externality can be depicted by drawing three isocost 
lines as in Figure 2. This is a model of a speaker who does not face the full 
costs of the processing by the audience. It could, for example, be a junk faxer 
who does not have to pay for the paper, time, and machine wear and tear of the 
faxees whom he tries to reach, or a telemarketer who does not pay the 
opportunity cost of the called party's disrupted activity. Or it could be 
someone communicating a possessory claim to the world. The communicator 
does not fully face the costs of the extensiveness of information. Thus, to this 
person, the isocost line appears to be AB rather than the actual line AA, which 
would reflect all the costs of the communication.173 
172. Both curves are concave reflecting the fact that information rate and information 
extensiveness are not perfect substitutes: By giving up some of one input, one can achieve a 
given quantity of benefit as long as one substitutes some of the other input, but as one 
approaches the extremes, more and more of the first input has to be given up. 
173. For convenience, I have adjusted the scale so that the slope of AA is -1. Nothing 
important turns on this. 
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FIGURE 2: THE DIVERGENT COMMUNICATIVE TRADEOFF 
A 
q q2 q3 
0 n* n' A B n 
n = audience size 
r = information rate 
AA = social isocost line 
AB = private apparent isocost line 
The speaker's choice is skewed towards excessive extensiveness. The 
optimal point is n*, which is where the full-cost line AA is tangent with the 
isobenefit curve q2-the highest level of net social benefit attainable with this 
budget. Because the speaker does not fully internalize processing costs on the 
extensive margin, the private apparent budget line AB has a less steep slope, 
reflecting the preference for extensiveness. As a result, the speaker will choose 
n' as the degree of extensiveness: The speaker, not facing the full cost, will 
believe himself to be at the tangent point of line AB with the high isobenefit 
curve q3. Actually, netting out all costs and benefits (not just those facing the 
speaker), the speaker has chosen a point where the actual budget line AA 
intersects the lower isobenefit curve ql. The speaker's choice reflects more 
extensiveness than would be optimal by the amount n'-n*; and, from a social 
point of view, there is less net benefit (q2-ql) than would be the case if the 
speaker had chosen less extensiveness, n*, rather than the greater n'.174 
174. Another way to see this is to consider that, from a social point of view, one cannot 
do better than AA, so the private actor is in effect selecting along a budget line CA, which 
shares a point with AA on the x-axis but is parallel to line AB. That is, when the private actor 
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The divergence of the private from the social cost leads to a deadweight 
loss. If cost-effective, intervention might be used to close this divergence. I 
will argue that a wide variety of devices in the law are obligatory analogues of 
the devices adopted in natural language when audiences are large and 
anonymous. These devices come at some cost. They require setting up and 
policing, and they may prevent private actors from accomplishing beneficial 
objectives-what may be termed "frustration costs."175 But in keeping with 
the Demsetz thesis, we expect more such mandatory devices where more is at 
stake. 
Generally, with more at stake, we would expect more complexity to be 
worth incurring, but this makes some of the informational intervention under 
discussion here all the more striking. In the case of high-value assets, we might 
expect the complexity of the rights to be high, in Demsetzian fashion. At the 
very least, as assets increase in value we would expect an increase in 
complexity. But complexity and information cost are not incurred evenly with 
respect to all rights in an asset. In personam rights will impose higher 
informational demands on dutyholders than will in rem rights. And if the law 
intervenes to prevent in rem rights from imposing large informational demands 
on the broad audience, this in a sense runs against the expectation created by 
the asset value. Thus, where a lot is at stake in terms of asset value and the law 
intervenes to keep things simple, an explanation is all the more needed. The 
informational tradeoff supplies a rationale for the intervention and can also 
explain where, in the constellation of rights surrounding an asset, the 
intervention will take place. The informational exterality is largest where 
rights are broadcast to a large, heterogeneous, anonymous audience. 
This model is testable, but only in a rough way. Because we are often not 
(yet) in a position to measure absolute amounts of information or audience 
processing costs, it might seem that we cannot test the propositions we derive 
from this model. This is not the case. What we need is a way to estimate 
relative magnitudes of information and processing cost, and measurement at 
this level is feasible.176 To facilitate this sort of informal empiricism, we must 
believes he is at point B, he is really at point A on the x-axis. Then the actor will trade off r 
and n at the rate reflected in line AB (and parallel line CA), i.e., at a rate of- OA/OB. The 
line CA is the social equivalence isocost line; it is drawn to reflect the tradeoff made under a 
full accounting. Notice that CA is tangent to the low isoquant ql, again reflecting the social 
benefits of only qj, instead of the attainable and higher q2. 
175. These frustration costs are lower than they might otherwise be because of a 
feature that the system of building blocks of property law share with natural language: 
recursion. The elements can be combined in various iterative ways. See Merrill & Smith, 
supra note 4, at 36-37. 
176. See DRETSKE, supra note 7, at 54-55 (noting methods of comparing amounts of 
information without measuring absolute levels); Cheung, supra note 165, at 516 (arguing 
that as long as different observers can agree that transaction costs are higher in one type of 
situation than in another, then the transaction costs are measurable at the margin, and testable 
propositions can be derived). 
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choose examples that differ as little as possible except along the dimension 
being measured-typically audience size or character.177 For now, we will not 
be able to predict or recommend an absolute level of information intensiveness 
given a context, but we will be able to show that the law tends to allow more or 
less information intensiveness in contexts where the model leads us to expect 
such differences. Most clearly, at the poles of small and personal audiences 
and large and anonymous audiences, the law will, if anything, allow more 
intensiveness of information in the former and restrict it in the latter. What we 
do not expect is the reverse pattern (greater facilitation of intensiveness for the 
wide and anonymous audience). 
These patterns reflect devices for addressing informational externalities, 
but the question remains, who would supply such devices and why? As already 
mentioned, communication about legal relations may supplement or contradict 
extra-legal norms. Judges may be the audience for these norms, as legal 
realists tend to celebrate, but judges may not have the knowledge needed to 
apply them directly, as neoformalists deplore. Present parties and future actors, 
including future judges, are in turn part of the audience for judges' opinions. 
The extent to which officials address part of their messages solely to expert 
audiences of lawyers and judges is a central question to legitimacy: Is it 
legitimate for official actors to address different messages to different 
audiences in a form of "acoustic separation"?178 
What the debates about formalism and acoustic separation have in common 
is that they often proceed on an all-or-nothing basis. Either formalism is bad 
(because it is unjust or not nuanced enough to achieve efficiency) or it is good 
(because, absent a formalistic approach, judges will misinterpret parties' norms 
and disrupt settled expectations).179 Similarly, the plain language movement 
177. For this reason, comparisons between contracts and statutes or statutes and 
constitutions would have to be undertaken, if at all, with far more care than would contract- 
to-contract comparisons (as discussed infra Part III.C), statute-to-statute comparisons (e.g., 
for intellectual property infra Part III.B) or constitution-to-constitution comparisons. Also, 
for this reason, factors like the velocity of transactions must be held constant. As a dramatic 
example, calculating fractions is not hard given more than minimal time, but Lawrence 
Ritter has indirectly measured transaction costs associated with a medium of exchange by 
showing the amount of advantage that Las Vegas casinos forego in order to avoid time- 
consuming handling of chips in the context of odds bets in games of dice. Lawrence S. 
Ritter, On the Fundamental Role of Transactions Costs in Monetary Theory: Two 
Illustrationsfrom Casino Gambling, 10 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 522, 524-28 (1978). 
178. On how criminal law addresses different messages about primary conduct 
addressed to the public and about decision rules addressed to officials who apply conduct 
rules and what moral dilemmas this "acoustic separation" creates, see Meir Dan-Cohen, 
Decision Rules and Conduct Rules. On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 625 (1984). 
179. Within law and economics, part of the context that some scholars have recently 
questioned include the use of evidence of custom and conduct. Compare Lisa Bernstein, 
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business 
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1796 (1996), and Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of 
Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 615 (1990), with Jody S. 
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often assumes that speaking to any audience other than the public at large is 
illegitimate.180 As we will see, the present framework points towards 
differentialformalism. However we resolve these questions about the desirable 
level of formalism or audience composition, a constraint applies: 
Communicating to a wider, less expert audience will entail more cost or it will 
require a reduction in the intensiveness of information. 
This Article will illustrate the tradeoff between the intensiveness and 
extensiveness of information. I do not argue that a certain level of 
intensiveness or extensiveness is optimal in any given area of law. Instead, I 
contend that this informational tradeoff is basic enough that it is a theme 
running through disparate areas of law. I thus present a partial explanation for 
certain features of the law, bringing out what they have in common along the 
informational dimension. In proceeding in this informally empirical fashion, 
the aim is to explain (partially) a range of features and to avoid 
counterexamples. Whether these illustrations amount to explanations can only 
emerge in the long run, but this Article will start the process of testing its main 
propositions. Allowing for the limits of this approach, I will argue that the 
patterns that emerge so far are striking. 
E. Legal and Institutional Responses to Informational Externalities 
Before turning to the devices by which the law manages the informational 
tradeoff, a word is in order on how the tradeoff makes itself felt in the legal 
system. I am not claiming that the law as it exists reflects the optimal point in 
striking this tradeoff. My claim is rather that the law reflects some attempt to 
deal with the information externalities discussed earlier, and my immediate 
concern is how the tradeoff operates in legal institutions. That the tradeoff is a 
major feature of courts helps to explain why courts are as responsive to the 
costs of extensive communication as I argue they are. 
Each judge is part of a network of judges communicating with each other. 
Martin Shapiro's theory of legal decisionmaking is based in large part on the 
costs of communicating extensively to other judges of other courts.181 
Redundancy in legal communication is valued because of the large number of 
potentially interfering messages being sent.182 To this one can add that a more 
heterogeneous audience is likely to find redundancy helpful in processing a 
message. 
Why would judges police the costs of communicating intensively to a 
broad audience? First and most straightforwardly, judges may realize that 
Kraus & Steven D. Walt, In Defense of the Incorporation Strategy, in JURISPRUDENTIAL 
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 88, at 193. Additionally, see infra Part III.C. 
180. See infra notes 253-55 and accompanying text. 
181. See Martin Shapiro, Toward a Theory of Stare Decisis, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 125, 126 
(1972). 
182. See id. at 129; see also infra notes 196-99 and accompanying text. 
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intensive communication to large and heterogeneous audiences is costly. 
Certainly, important features of the law-such as the numerus clausus 
principle, which directs judges to leave changes in the limited menu of in rem 
property forms to legislatures, and rules of thumb that equity will modify 
property less readily than contract-are consistent with such a realization.183 
Because we all have experience with communication, a concern for the 
informational tradeoff may operate semiconsciously in the ready acceptance of 
these doctrines. As in the realm of communication, an audience's lack of 
understanding or disapproval counts as a major device for internalizing 
processing costs of information to the sender of the message. 
Reinforcing this basic concern is the fact that judges are included in the 
audience for many of the communications they are policing. Thus, 
idiosyncratic communication will meet with judicial skepticism in part because 
the judge does not share the necessary background knowledge. Thus, a 
generalist court's communicative interests are to some extent aligned with 
those of third parties, forming with them a large and heterogeneous audience. 
As compared with legislatures, however, courts are likely to be more 
comfortable with higher degrees of information intensiveness. Put differently, 
there is some tendency for legislatures to announce rules and for courts to 
fashion standards. Although legislatures, courts, and agencies all may create 
rules and standards, in areas such as basic property law, historically legislatures 
have tended more in the direction of rules. Legislatures have often designed 
very clear, sharp-edged rules-"crystals" in Rose's terminology-that are 
relatively easy to process ex ante, whereas courts with access to the greater 
amounts of information generated by particular cases are tempted to add 
complex ex post judgments or "mud."184 Recording acts and their judicial 
interpretation are the classic example.185 Legislation operates prospectively, 
and, ex ante, a rule that involves little judgment is sometimes cheaper186 and 
often involves lower processing costs by nonexpert audiences. Indeed, in Louis 
Kaplow's formulation, being ex ante is definitional for rules.187 Thus, 
providing for the creation of standards often involves delegation (or usurpation) 
183. See infra note 315 and accompanying text. 
184. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 578-79 
(1988) (discussing how over time "straightforward common law crystalline rules have been 
muddied repeatedly by exceptions and equitable second-guessing, to the point that the 
various claimants ... don't know quite what their rights and obligations really are"). 
185. See id. at 585-91. 
186. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 
DUKE L.J. 557, 608-17 (1992). 
187. See id. at 559-60 ("This article will adopt [a definition of rules and standards], in 
which the only distinction between rules and standards is the extent to which efforts to give 
content to the law are undertaken before or after individuals act."); see also FREDERICK 
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED 
DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 131 (1991) (stating that "rules are necessarily made 
in advance of their application"). 
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of the legislature's power.188 Legislatures may increase their overall power by 
delegating some questions to agencies or courts, if otherwise they could not 
address these areas at all because of limited resources. But, for a given 
question, delegation increases the role of the other institution vis-a-vis the 
legislature. As with the numerus clausus principle in property, the effect of the 
norm of judicial self-restraint is to increase the legislature's role. For present 
purposes, it is only important that different institutions are likely to strike the 
tradeoff between information intensiveness and extensiveness differently. 
Courts are producers as well as processors of messages. The plain 
language movement can be seen as an objection to courts' engaging in such 
intensive communication with the lay public (if the movement is not really a 
denial of the tradeoff in the first place).189 Whether this is a problem depends 
in part on what one thinks of the role of potential informational 
intermediaries-for example, lawyers and journalists. Thus, lawyers and 
judges share a great deal of background knowledge, which can facilitate 
intensive communication between them. What looks like nonsense to the 
untutored eye may lead to a high degree of convergence in interpretation by 
experts.190 If (a big if) lawyers can then communicate clearly in everyday 
language with their clients, the fact that the sources of law-such as statutes, 
cases, and regulations-are not accessible is less of a problem than would be 
the case if the unaided public were meant to be a direct audience for these 
communications. 
If the problem is that the costs of information on the extensive margin are 
less likely to be interalized, then high stakes would call for a reduction in the 
emphasis on information intensiveness in extensively broadcast communication 
about legal relations. As we will see, the law does tend in the direction of 
enforcing the correct tradeoff between the intensiveness and extensiveness of 
legal information. Moreover, the law's methods of doing so are similar to 
188. See, e.g., id. at 159 ("[A]ny argument for rule-based decision-making can be seen 
to view rules as essentially jurisdictional, as devices for determining who should be 
considering what. Rules therefore operate as tools for the allocation of power."); Adrian 
Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 92-93 (2000) (discussing that 
"[s]tandards, in effect, delegate decisionmaking authority to the decisionmaker at the point 
of application"). 
189. See infra notes 253-54 and accompanying text. 
190. A dramatic example occurred at a conference at Washington University that 
brought together linguists and law professors. Linguist Charles Fillmore brought in what he 
claimed was a "semantically incompetent" document, meaning that it was uninterpretable. 
The document in question was an antenuptial agreement. After guffaws by the linguists who 
professed not to understand the document, each of the half dozen or so lawyers present came 
up with the same interpretation (as likely would have the reader of this article), to the 
irritation of the linguists. See Northwestern University/Washington University Law School 
Law and Linguistics Conference, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 785, 922-40 (1995) [hereinafter Law 
and Linguistics Conference]. More generally, the linguists at this conference did not seem to 
want to extend their broad notions of context and pragmatic interpretation to legal language. 
Id. at 865-68. 
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devices used in natural language, except that in law they are mandatory on 
account of the higher stakes involved. 
1. Limiting the amount of information. 
The larger the amount and variety of information, the higher the processing 
costs for a large and anonymous audience. This often results in standardization 
of the type and format of the information. As Merrill and I have argued 
elsewhere, the numerus clausus principle in property law reduces processing 
costs for the broad audience of in rem dutyholders: In contrast to the 
customizability of contract rights, which hold between a few identifiable 
persons, in rem property rights must fit into the categories the law 
prescribes.191 As such, these rights contain less information along certain 
dimensions than they otherwise might. The major difference between most 
natural language contexts and an area of law like property is that 
standardization usually emerges spontaneously in the case of natural language 
but is often imposed mandatorily in the case of property under the numerus 
clausus principle.192 One might say that generally the stakes are higher in law 
than in everyday conversation, but of course an exterality in conversation 
would add up given that everyday conversation is so common. 
Strikingly, we also get legal intervention in the format of statements when 
the communication is in rem (i.e. broadcast to a large and indefinite audience). 
Format for present purposes refers to how the representation of information is 
organized. This includes spatial arrangement, including ordering, indexing, 
and the like. Format is especially important for processing, as is suggested by 
evidence that the format of labels influences consumer behavior.193 For 
example, the Nutritional Labeling and Education Act requires, in most cases, 
that food products carry a standardized nutrition label.194 Likewise, the 
examples earlier of surgeons and wrong-site surgery have a somewhat in rem 
character: The communication is anonymous rather than face-to-face.195 The 
identity and many specific characteristics (including background knowledge) of 
the physician who receives the message are unknown to the communicator. 
Whereas in everyday personal communication, the speaker's desire to be 
understood and not to incur disapproval will be enough to prevent non-cost- 
191. Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 24-42. 
192. See id. at 37-38. 
193. See MAGAT & VISCUsi, supra note 126, at 107-18; Alan D. Mathios, The Impact 
of Mandatory Disclosure Laws on Product Choices: An Analysis of the Salad Dressing 
Market, 43 J.L. & ECON. 651 (2000). 
194. 21 U.S.C.A. ? 343 (West 2003) (requiring nutrition labeling and preempting 
certain nonidentical state labeling requirements); see also Pauline M. Ippolito & Alan D. 
Mathios, New Food Labeling Regulations and the Flow of Nutrition Information to 
Consumers, 12 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 188 (1993); Mathios, supra note 193. 
195. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text. 
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effective demands on the hearer, in more widespread and anonymous contexts 
with higher stakes, intervention becomes more likely. 
Another method of reducing processing costs relies on redundancy. This 
may seem paradoxical, but, in information theory, redundancy-repetition or 
pattern in a message-allows reconstruction of a message, even if some of the 
message is degraded.196 Messages that are to be communicated broadly are 
often more subject to degradation if damage correlates with distance and 
retransmission (especially by large numbers of retransmitters who may not 
share background knowledge, as in the parlor game called "telephone"). 
Martin Shapiro's theory of stare decisis and the "legal" style of discourse- 
complete with string citations and repetition of long-standing formulas-is 
based on the need for a high degree of redundancy where legal communicators 
(especially judges) are trying to coordinate across court systems and across 
time.197 Repetition or pattern in a message increases the probability of what 
appears in later parts of a message, decreasing the amount of (new) information 
these later parts (and hence the overall message) contain. As Shapiro points 
out, in complex and loose organizations, like a court system, the large numbers 
of signals and their disparate and complex subject matter will lead to noise and 
a need for redundancy to counteract the noise.198 
As the flip side of information, redundancy is subject to a tradeoff. The 
"ideal" message contains that amount of information such that one more bit of 
information provides a marginal benefit that is offset by the marginal cost of 
errors that could be prevented by cutting back on the amount of information 
(i.e., by increasing redundancy).l99 In our terms, the likelihood of error 
increases with audience extensiveness, and so one must either incur more 
communication processing costs or lower the intensiveness of the information 
(by increasing redundancy). The fact that judges are the audience for many 
communications, including those of other judges, means that judges will 
perceive information intensiveness as more costly than they otherwise might. 
Related to the issue of amount of information is its variety. 
Communication can be costly if it is complex. Complexity can be defined in 
many ways, but one common definition is that the complexity of an object is 
measured by the length of the shortest possible description in an agreed upon 
196. See J. von Neumann, Probabilistic Logics and the Synthesis of Reliable 
Organisms from Unreliable Components, in AUTOMATA STUDIES 43-98 (C.E. Shannon & J. 
McCarthy eds., 1956). 
197. See Shapiro, supra note 181, at 127 (stating that "legal discourse organized by the 
rules of stare decisis emphasizes, and itself insists that its success rests upon, high levels of 
redundancy and, therefore, . .. low level of information"). 
198. See id. at 129 ("High levels of noise should invite the deliberate introduction of 
high levels or redundancy to counteract the noise ...."). 
199. See id. at 126 ("The ideal message... will contain the highest proportion of 
information and the lowest proportion of redundancy necessary to identify and correct errors 
in transmission."). 
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specification method.200 This measures the amount of information contained in 
a message. For our purposes, we are interested in the costs of processing 
complexity, which means that the variety of information can add to the amount 
of information in a particularly costly way. Thus, for example, a right that has 
many different and interacting dimensions is complex and leads to high 
information cost because there is an overall budget constraint on resources used 
for processing.201 Thus, complex structures of rights will be costly to process 
because there are more elements to process and more interactions between 
elements to process. 
Complexity can lead to information intensiveness, but complexity is 
distinct from whether information is packaged as a rule or a standard. The 
latter distinction refers to the timing of the determination of a legal result.202 A 
rule sets forth ex ante the criteria for its application to facts, whereas a standard 
leaves much for ex post evaluation. Rules can be simple or complex, as can 
standards. Frequency of application can militate in favor of rules (to take 
advantage of economies of scale in one-time determination) and in favor of 
complexity (because of the higher stakes involved).203 Information 
intensiveness will tend to rise with complexity if the ratio of complexity to 
delineation effort increases. But either rules or standards could be information 
intensive when they require the application of a great deal of background 
knowledge by actors or adjudicators. 
2. Limiting reliance on special contexts. 
More generally, communication can be costly for members of a large and 
relatively anonymous audience if it requires a high degree of background 
knowledge. If a message requires the acquisition of such knowledge for 
interpretation, this is very costly.204 Alternatively, hearers (dutyholders or 
200. See, e.g., LI & VITANYI, supra note 164. Greater precision-distinguishing more 
cases-will, all else equal, lead to more complexity in this sense, and to greater production 
and processing costs. On the costs and benefits of this type of complexity in the law, see, for 
example, Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 
(1983); Kaplow, supra note 151, at 150. 
201. See W. Bentley MacLeod, Is Multi-Tasking Complex?, 21 BEHAV. & BRAIN ScI. 
840, 841 (1998). 
202. See Kaplow, supra note 186, at 560 (adopting definitions according to which "the 
only distinction between rules and standards is the extent to which efforts to give content to 
the law are undertaken before or after individuals act") (emphasis omitted). 
203. Id. at 593-96. Kaplow makes the point that complexity would increase with 
frequency of application. See id. at 595. This can be regarded as an example of a 
Demsetzian account of higher stakes calling forth more delineation effort. See, e.g., Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 
J.L. & ECON. 163, 170 (1975); Smith, supra note 16, at S462-64, S474-78 (discussing 
changes in benefits and costs of delineation efforts and their methods). 
204. An analogous cost may exist with reliance on legislative history. See William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist but Not Statutory Legislative 
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potential purchasers in the legal context) will make mistakes or forego 
opportunities because of lack of background knowledge. Measurement costs 
include performing the measurement and the residual error cost, and these costs 
increase with excessive reliance by a communicator on background knowledge. 
In most contexts, this potential externality does not matter, because audience 
members can largely ignore the message if it is unfamiliar. However, in the 
communication of legal relations, audience members have some stake in 
interpretation. Potential violators, in particular, need to arrange their actions in 
order not to violate property rights. And it is no coincidence that, as we see in 
possession and related law, the message communicated to potential violators is 
kept simple and the law is sensitive to the amount and type of background 
knowledge that such messages require in those processing them.205 
The flip side of limiting reliance on specialized contexts is the use of 
general knowledge that forms the basis for conventions (or focal points).206 If 
a certain piece of knowledge is (or can be made) widely known, then one can 
rely on it in shaping the legal rule. Thus, although the court's task is ultimately 
regulatory207-the court decides what conventions count and need not take 
preexisting conventions as given-the court can find it worthwhile to impose a 
greater informational load on audiences of dutyholders and others interested in 
legal consequences if the court's rule piggybacks on already existing 
conventions. Alternatively, if a court is creating a convention, relying on what 
is salient to a large group will make the rule less demanding on its audience. 
3. Limiting ambiguity. 
As mentioned earlier, audiences can bear large costs when they have to 
distinguish between two messages that are confusingly close to each other on 
the surface but have different meanings. This is quite familiar from trademark 
law, in which customer confusion is the main test of infringement.208 
History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1321-23 (1998) (evaluating arguments for and 
against use of legislative and constitutional ratifying history and noting that researching and 
arguing the former may be quite expensive). 
205. See supra Part I.A. 
206. The law can create this background knowledge. See McAdams, supra note 76, at 
1663-89. Creating special rules is likely subject to diminishing returns, and a decision will 
need to be made which types of situations deserve special treatment. This may be difficult 
for judges to do on a case-by-case basis. 
207. See Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick?: The Economics of Promissory 
Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1250-53 (1996) (contrasting 
interpretive or convention maintenance approach and regulatory approach); Lawrence 
Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 1039-42 (1995) (arguing that regulation of social meaning can happen through text or through the context against 
which texts have meaning). 
208. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
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If two marks are confusingly close, consumers will no longer be able to 
save on search costs by relying on the gross features of the mark.209 They will 
have to do without the message or engage in the kinds of costly search (testing 
the product or investigating the brand name) that the trademark was supposed 
to economize on in the first place. For those with high familiarity with the type 
of product (say, others in the industry or very large customers), the two close 
marks might not be confusing because such actors can rely on an already 
acquired large background knowledge. So, to the knowing few, there will be 
little extra cost. But to the large and anonymous audience, closeness can cause 
much greater additional cost. Thus, ambiguity or confusion is one cost of 
information intensiveness in communication to an extensive audience. 
More generally, the avoidance of ambiguity would seem simply to reflect 
the well-known factor of clarity, which is usually desirable in a legal rule as 
long as it is worth whatever has to be traded off against clarity.210 However, 
some avoidance of ambiguity is also required by the informational tradeoff. 
Ambiguities can be costly not only because risk-averse people will take 
excessive precaution, but also because resources must be expended to resolve 
the ambiguity. In a personal context, where speaker and hearer share much 
background knowledge, ambiguities can be resolved with a high probability of 
successful communication at fairly low cost. More impersonal audiences that 
do not share this knowledge would have more inquiring to do in order to 
achieve a given level of disambiguation. Reducing ambiguity permits the 
audience to bring less background knowledge and context to bear on resolving 
the ambiguity, and limiting ambiguity is a method of lowering context- 
dependence and its attendant information costs. 
4. Nondefeasibility and structured search. 
Another method of reducing the information processing costs of a wide 
audience is to provide for nondefeasibility and structured search. As discussed 
earlier, in natural language some inferences are defeasible, which allows them 
to be canceled, and this usually requires a high degree of audience background 
knowledge to succeed. Recall that pragmatic inferences-like the one from 
"It's cold here" to "Please close the window" and that involved in Grice's gas 
station example-require a lot of context but allow great economy of 
expression.211 
209. See Landes & Posner, supra note 160, at 288. 
210. For one of many examples of an analysis based on certainty, consider again the 
majority opinion in Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). The recognition of 
this tradeoff goes back to the beginnings of modem law and economics. See R.H. Coase, 
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 19 (1960) (arguing that rights should be 
assigned with economic efficiency in mind, "insofar as this is possible without creating too 
much uncertainty about the legal position itself'). 
211. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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Pragmatic implicature allows for economy of expression, but implicatures 
are provisional or defeasible, such that to be secure in one's inference one has 
to wait to make sure that implicatures are not canceled. Thus, with 
nondefeasible inferences one can have confidence in the inference without 
waiting for the rest of the statement, and this is one aspect of their being less 
context-dependent than pragmatic inferences. As we will see, the 
communication of legal relations exhibits a similar distinction.212 If one 
describes a right as a fee simple or as a term of years, then one need not 
examine the rest of the document to know roughly what one is getting. A 
simple glance suffices and one need not worry about an entire class of traps.213 
That is, nondefeasible features allow conclusions to be drawn without elaborate 
processing of the whole communication and its context. Nondefeasible 
inferences typically rely less on background knowledge and context than do 
defeasible inferences. 
Nondefeasible inferences are more matters of conventionalized (semantic) 
meaning and so are more crystallized than are the more ad hoc, highly context- 
dependent inferences that can be modified or cancelled with more information. 
For communication to a wide audience, greater reliance on conventionalized 
meaning and nondefeasible inferences is to be expected. As we will see, this is 
the case in the law's regime for communicating legal relations. 
Generalizing somewhat, we can say that the law will reduce processing 
costs to the extent that it structures inquiry in the following way. If by 
examining some subset of relevant information one can draw a conclusion that 
will persist even though one stops there, the cost of searching the rest of the 
information set can be saved. This also extends to organizing complexity in 
such a way that a class of information relevant to only some searchers is 
cabined off. Trusts have this function: When elaborate interests corresponding 
to the traditional legal estates in land are accomplished in trust, they are mostly 
of concern to a small group consisting of settlor, beneficiary, and trustee and 
are not of concern to potential purchasers or violators of the property right.214 
And, in general, the trust form serves as a signal that potential complexity lies 
ahead. So, to the extent that the law encourages these types of complexities to 
be cast in the form of a trust, those who want to avoid these complications can 
just make sure that they steer clear of trusts. Structuring complexity allows 
general rules of thumb to obviate much potential search behavior. Just as 
212. Some have argued that defeasibility is an inherent property of legal rules and 
concepts. I return to this broader-but related-notion of defeasibility. See infra note 255. 
213. Relatedly, Rasmusen notes in the contract context that one reason for incomplete 
contracting is that boilerplate is cheaper to write than to read and that short, standard terms 
can be used as a way of cheaply signaling that there are no traps. See Rasmusen, supra note 
128, at 1-2, 8-21. 
214. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 849 (arguing that while trusts "minimize[] 
third-party transaction costs" they primarily focus on the concerns of those directly affected 
by the trust). 
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nondefeasible information allows one to avoid searching for the potential 
override, cabining some information behind a well-known signal allows one to 
ignore it for most purposes. 
5. Limiting audience responsibility. 
As argued above, the law intervenes to abate informational externalities 
only because the stakes are high. One method of addressing this problem is to 
lower the stakes for the audience members, thereby reducing the size of the 
class of those audience members who will incur the cost of processing. 
If an audience member will suffer legal consequences or some kind of loss 
if she does not understand legal relations, then she will have an incentive to 
measure, even if this is not desirable from an overall societal viewpoint. One 
method of addressing this problem is quite direct: Limit the liability of 
audience members. In keeping with the theme of standardization, individual 
communicators are not allowed to broaden the audience unilaterally. 
Most familiarly, the rules about bona fide purchasers for value of 
mishandled, entrusted property limit the amount of inquiry necessary. The duty 
to inquire is minimal; someone contracting for purchase does not need to 
engage in all cost-effective inquiry, and thus the standard is not a negligence 
one.215 Lowering the stakes for the members of the wide audience likewise 
lowers their processing costs. 
The types of externalities from information extensiveness correspond 
closely with potential methods of reducing them. Both the law and natural 
language exhibit these methods, the main difference being that they are not 
mandatory in normal speech. But, as we have seen, they become mandatory 
when the stakes are higher, as in many legal contexts. As Bell showed in the 
context of natural language, speakers adjust less to audience members further 
out in their scale (of addressees, auditors, overhearers, and eavesdroppers).216 
In the higher-stakes legal context, the potential lack of adjustment to the 
audience increases as we move away from privity with the producer of a 
message about legal relations: The potential exterality grows as we move 
from contracting partners to successors in interest, potential violators of rights, 
and other market participants.217 And, generally speaking, the externalities 
215. See U.C.C. ? 2-403(1)-(2) (1998); Richard A. Epstein, Inducement of Breach of 
Contract as a Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 10-15 (1987); Saul 
Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser, 16 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 43, 59-60 (1987). 
216. See Bell, supra note 6, at 160 (stating that "the effect of each audience member on 
a speaker's style design is graded according to role distance"). 
217. For the notion of a zone of privity, as it is used in this sense, see Merrill & Smith, 
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have to do with demands made on the audience in terms of background 
knowledge and use of context; these include confusing ambiguity, reliance on 
particularized knowledge and specialized conventions, complexity, and 
defeasibility. Resolving ambiguities or assessing the strength of defeasible 
inferences is easier with more background knowledge of context; and imposing 
the burden of using context on wide audiences without background knowledge 
raises processing cost in two ways. First, such audiences are not likely to have 
this background knowledge at low cost. Second, the number of those incurring 
this cost can also be large. 
Returning to the simple model presented above, the law can be expected to 
intervene where it can cost-effectively push the private isocost line closer to a 
level that reflects all the costs of communicating, including the full processing 
costs. These devices can be thought of as helping to manage the informational 
tradeoff, given existing technologies for communicating. Among such devices 
for lessening processing costs to wider audiences are: standardization of rights 
and obligations; reliance on conventions of general application; avoidance of 
specific background knowledge and context; nondefeasible information; and 
limitations on the size of the audience. 
III. DIFFERENTIAL FORMALISM AND THE INFORMATIONAL TRADEOFF 
As we have seen, certain basic features of property and related law reflect a 
concern with audience processing costs. In this Part, I will present some 
further applications of the framework based on audience processing costs and 
the informational tradeoff. First, I will show that the full range of devices 
identified in the previous Part as mediating the informational tradeoff are 
present in the law of land records. Then, I will show that concerns with 
audience processing allow a partial explanation of the differences between 
patent and other forms of intellectual property protection. Finally, I turn to 
contract law, an area of property that has become increasingly contextual, or 
antiformal. I will show that even recent contract law is not uniformly context- 
sensitive. In particular, I will show that the law varies along the spectrum from 
complete context-sensitivity to total formalism and adopts differential 
formalism to questions of communication and interpretation. Depending on the 
nature and size of the audience, the law takes the form one would expect as 
reflecting a concern with maintaining a balance between information 
intensiveness and extensiveness. 
A. Search and Notice in Land Records 
The nature and history of recording acts provide a striking example of the 
use of devices like those used in natural language to reduce the costs of the 
supra note 4, at 28. 
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extensiveness of information-but, in the recording context, these devices are 
mandatory. Recording may seem prosaic, but it is at the heart of many a 
system of property in land. The first thing to notice about recording is that 
most legal treatments of recording focus on the producer side of the equation. 
Most of the time, this takes the form of noting that recording makes furnishing 
notice to the set of potentially interested parties much cheaper than earlier 
methods, such as maintaining possession or staging ceremonies like livery of 
seisin.218 It is true that, once recording is provided for, there may be less 
reason to standardize the system of what gets recorded (say, interests in 
land).219 But, often the literature takes the much stronger position that 
recording solves the notice problem so completely that no standardization of 
property interests-a numerus clausus-is needed at all.220 This "notice cures 
all" argument focuses too exclusively on the producer side. As in the context 
of warnings in tort law, the costs of furnishing notice (or a warning) are 
sometimes taken to embrace only the costs of writing down a description of the 
problem.221 This ignores the problem of the recipient of the message and her 
218. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Fulton, 31 Pa. 475, 480 (1858) (noting that susceptibility to 
livery of seisin was a criterion in earlier law of corporeality of an interest but that this 
distinction no longer mattered because "[w]ith us delivery and registration of the deed stand 
in lieu of livery"); Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the 
Transfer of Property, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299, 303 (1984) (discussing costs and benefits of 
recording as opposed to possession); Robert C. Ellickson & Charles Dia. Thorland, Ancient 
Land Law. Mesopotamia, Egypt, Israel, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 384-87, 397 (1996) 
(discussing benefits and prerequisites of furnishing notice through recording as opposed to 
possession in ancient land law); Epstein, supra note 138, at 1355 (1982) (discussing how 
recording makes furnishing of notice easier); Michael Madison, The Real Properties of 
Contract Law, 82 B.U. L. REV. 405, 470 (2002) (concluding that, in an age of recording, 
formalities such as livery of seisin have lost their rationale); Benito Arruniada, Property 
Enforcement and the Organization of Consent 12-14 (Sept. 2002) (Working Paper, on file 
with author) (discussing old forms of notice including livery of seisin and conditions under 
which they made sense). 
219. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 40 ("As the costs of standardization to the 
parties and the government shift, we expect the optimal degree of standardization to rise and 
fall."). Notice that if, as in registration of title, the records are supposed to have conclusive 
effect and the registrar of deed must certify their validity, the tendency may be towards 
standardization in order to make this process less costly. See Arrufiada, supra note 218, at 
20-21, 31, 43. 
220. See Epstein, supra note 138, at 1354-56; see also Alfred F. Conard, Easement 
Novelties, 30 CAL. L. REV. 125, 131-33 (1942) (arguing that enforcement of easements 
should not be objectionable on grounds of novelty as long as there is notice). For a response 
to this notice-cures-all argument, see Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 43-45 (arguing that 
"because not all costs of nonstandard rights would be internalized... some individuals 
[would] exercise their freedom in a way that would lead to a suboptimal level of 
standardization"). 
221. In the context of the duty to warn, some courts place great emphasis on the low 
cost of writing a warning. See, e.g., Ross Labs. v. Thies, 725 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Alaska 1986) 
("The cost of giving an adequate warning is usually so minimal, i.e., the expense of adding 
more printing to a label, that the balance must always be struck in favor of the obligation to 
warn when there is a substantial danger which will not be recognized by the ordinary user."); 
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costs. When the literature does express concern about the adequacy of record 
notice it usually focuses on the fact that the records may deteriorate over 
time.222 
Recordation illustrates the use of all five of the interrelated methods for 
maintaining something closer to the correct tradeoff between the intensiveness 
and extensiveness of information, where speakers tend not to face the full costs 
of processing by the audience: limiting the amount of information; reducing 
the contextual knowledge required to interpret; limiting ambiguity; using 
nondefeasiblity and structured search; and narrowing the legally responsible 
audience. Far from being a costless method of furnishing notice, the nature and 
evolution of recording reflect a concern with the audience. 
First and least surprising is that the amount of information presented can 
affect the cost of a search. In the tort and consumer protection context, some 
have raised a concern about "information overload," in which more information 
degrades decisionmaking.223 This overload problem has not been such a 
concern in the title context, probably because a title search often involves 
higher monetary stakes than the use of a product.224 Relatedly, a high-stakes 
context often calls forth efforts at specialization, and thus the audience for a 
see also, e.g., Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Prods. Co., 797 P.2d 527, 532 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1990) (concluding that "the burden on Johnson & Johnson, essentially the cost of 
printing and affixing a warning label, seems light indeed"). Judge Williams, in a case about 
whether a warning was required that propane cylinders were explosive (in addition to the 
flammability warning), noted that "[t]he primary cost is, in fact, the increase in time and 
effort required for the user to grasp the message" and noted that the defendant used what I 
call a structured search (a brief warning on a canister and longer warning in pamphlet). 
Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also McMahon 
v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 150 F.3d 651, 656 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that "a detailed 
warning... might obscure the principal point that precautions should be taken"); Todd v. 
Societe BIC, S.A., 9 F.3d 1216, 1218 (7th Cir. 1993) (en bane) (Easterbrook, J.) (discussing 
problems with extended warnings); Ayers, 797 P.2d at 534 (Reed, J., dissenting) (noting 
possible information overload). For a discussion of these and other cases, see 1 MARSHALL 
S. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY ? 19.08[1] (3d ed. 1994 & 1999 Cum. Supp.); 
see also sources cited supra note 126. 
222. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the 
Law of Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 675 (1986) ("Time forces a greater reliance upon 
documentary evidence, and even that may be forged, lost, altered or destroyed."). 
223. Whether information overload is a true problem has been controversial, but the 
best evidence that there is some problem comes from studies indicating a longer reaction 
time with more information or degraded decisionmaking where information recall is 
important; specifically, clutter on labels seems to impair recall of information and structure 
improves it. See, e.g., MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 126, at 90-105 (summarizing 
controversy and presenting study); Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 
B.U. L. REV. 657, 690-91 (1985) (noting controversy over information overload theory, 
which posits that more information can cause recipients to ignore all information, and 
explaining possible crowding out effect of mandatory information). These studies are only 
suggestive, since people can reread labels, but possibilities such as rereading suggest that 
additional information increases the costs of processing, the question being by how much. 
224. This would become increasingly true considering the low probability of the 
remote risks on which a long warning on a product would increasingly focus. 
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title search-title examiners, lawyers, and the like-is not exactly a 
nonspecialized one. 
Nevertheless, recording acts do limit the amount of information in several 
ways. Not every instrument can be recorded. The type of instrument may not 
be within the recording act,225 or it may not be in the duly executed and 
acknowledged form required.226 Moreover, finding constructive notice for 
subsequent purchasers only through documents within the "chain of title" limits 
the amount of information and the search costs than would a more open-ended 
search for any past transactions over the land.227 
Further, although one can argue that there is less need to keep the 
substance of property interests simple if they can be recorded, simplifying 
property law and requiring recordation for enforcement against third parties 
have often gone hand in hand.228 Most dramatically, the 1925 legislation in 
225. A state's recording act may not cover a type of instrument, for example, a 
mortgage assignment. See, e.g., Hellweg v. Bush, 74 S.W.2d 89, 93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934) 
(holding that because the statute did not provide for recording of mortgage assignment, 
recording one would not give constructive notice or confer priority); Ann M. Burkhart, Third 
Party Defenses To Mortgages, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1022-32. Most states' courts 
have construed the recording acts broadly to include most instruments affecting titles, see 4 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY ? 17.8, at 549-50 (A. James Casner ed., 1952), and some states 
have passed separate legislation allowing mortgage assignments to be recorded, see Ann M. 
Burkhart, Freeing Mortgages of Merger, 40 VAND. L. REV. 283, 359 n.257 (1987). As 
another example, a listing agreement (as opposed to a contract for sale) is not a recordable 
instrument in some jurisdictions. See In re L.D. Patella Constr. Corp., 114 B.R. 53, 59-60 
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1990) (holding listing agreements not to be recordable under New Jersey 
statute). Other instruments do not affect title and so are not recordable. See, e.g., Snoddy v. 
NCNB Nat'l Bank of Fla., 575 So. 2d 231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). 
226. See, e.g., Messersmith v. Smith, 60 N.W.2d 276 (N.D. 1953) (holding that deed 
was not recordable, because the notary had not personally witnessed the grantor's signature, 
and that despite lack of defect on the face of the deed, one could not rely on it to establish 
oneself as a bona fide purchaser who recorded first); S. Penn Oil Co. v. Blue Creek Dev. 
Co., 88 S.E. 1029, 1030 (W. Va. 1916) ("'The record does not operate as a constructive 
notice, unless the instrument is duly executed, and properly acknowledged or proved, so as 
to entitle it to be recorded."' (quoting JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE ? 652 (1899)) (citations omitted)). 
227. Record chain of title means that the purchaser is only responsible for determining 
whether his grantor or that grantor's grantor, etc., made any conveyances inconsistent with 
the current record title during the period from acquiring the interest until the next interest 
was recorded. See 6 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 13, ? 916; Francis Philbrick, 
Limits of Record Search and Therefore of Notice: Part I, 93 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 168-86 
(1944). 
228. This question formed one of the bones of contention over title registration 
(Torrens-style) between Richard R. Powell and Myres S. McDougal. Compare RICHARD R.
POWELL, REGISTRATION OF THE TITLE TO LAND IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 59 (1938) (noting that English title registration has gone hand in hand with a system of few estates), and Percy 
Bordwell, The Resurrection of Registration of Title, 7 U. CHI. L. REV. 470, 476 (1940) 
(arguing that "the register appears to be unsuitable for the multiple common law esta-es"), 
with Myres S. McDougal & John W. Brabner-Smith, Land Title Transfer: A Regression, 48 
YALE L.J. 1125, 1136-38 (1939) (critiquing Powell), id. at 1138 n.73 ("In fact it is precisely when there are future and other multiple interests that registration is most obviously superior 
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England both increased reliance on registration and radically simplified the 
number of estates.229 If notice cured all, one would expect that there would be 
no need to reduce the number of legal estates as long as the land records 
furnished notice. On the contrary, many commentators in England and the 
United States have long seemed to believe that recording and standardization 
increase each other's effectiveness overall, even if they can be regarded as 
substitutes at the margin.230 
Second, the method of interpretation of recorded instruments reflects a 
desire to limit the need for contextual background. The simplification of the 
estate system and its basic standardization both achieve a degree of context- 
independence in the interpretation of property interests. Following transactors' 
"intent" in the context of even a recorded interest is something much more like 
a pigeonholing exercise, despite what courts seem to be saying about this 
process.231 (I return to the issue of differential formalism in interpretation in 
Part III.C.) 
to recordation. Under registration is it easier both to keep track of and to protect such 
interests."), and Myres S. McDougal, Title Registration and Land Law Reform: A Reply, 8 
U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 73 (1940) (calling complexity of system of estates and method of 
keeping the records different and unconnected problems). 
229. See Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20 (reducing number of legal 
estates to two, limiting legal concurrent tenants, and defining trust for sale); Land 
Registration Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 21 (setting up title registration system). In his 
analysis of the English legislation and its relevance for the United States, one commentator 
notes that: 
One purpose of the acts was to reduce the number of legal estates in land to a manageable 
number so that the purchaser would have to deal with a minimal number of estates and 
parties in securing good legal title. A further very important benefit from the drastic 
reduction in the number of legal estates was to make possible a simpler land registration 
system. 
C. Dent Bostick, Land Title Registration: An English Solution to an American Problem, 63 
IND. L.J. 55, 77 (1987). 
230. See, e.g., SECOND REPORT MADE TO HIS MAJESTY BY THE COMMISSIONERS 
APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE LAW OF ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL PROPERTY 4-21 (1830) 
(describing insecurity of title and costs of investigating, noting need for uniform system, and 
advocating general registry for real property); THIRD REPORT MADE TO HIS MAJESTY BY THE 
COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE LAW OF ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL 
PROPERTY 4-21 (1833) (noting inconvenience and costs of nonuniform and complex systems 
of estates across England); see also W.S. HOLDSWORTH, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO 
THE LAND LAW 313-18, 322-24 (1927) (discussing simplification of tenure and registration 
as strands of reform in England from the nineteenth century to the 1920s); JOHN STUART 
MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 884 (J.M. Robson ed., 1965) (1848) (criticizing 
law of real property for uncertainty, complexity, lack of registry, consequent expensive 
formalities, and costly legal proceedings); FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAND LAWS 171-72, 74 
(3d ed. 1896) (describing cost and trouble of investigating title in nineteenth century 
England, noting that registering and simplifying property law were main solutions 
advocated, and describing reforms). 
231. The numerus clausus principle is associated with differential formalism in the 
sense that in rem rights are subjected to pigeonholing into prescribed categories. 
Interestingly, courts often use the rhetoric of intent while engaging in a formalistic 
pigeonholing exercise-for example, in the context of assignments versus subleases, see 
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Third, and relatedly, these formal rules purport to reduce the ambiguity of 
the language of instruments relating to title, and the recording acts seek to 
define clearly what is and is not "in the chain of title," such that constructive 
notice to a subsequent purchaser will be found.232 Despite the many problems 
with achieving an actual reduction in ambiguity, the purpose is there. 
Fourth, recording acts in conjunction with the numerus clausus principle 
rely heavily on nondefeasibility and structured search. As mentioned earlier, 
the nature of the estate system allows one to conclude some things about an 
interest without inspecting an entire instrument closely. A fee simple or a 
sublease can be identified quickly, and the fine print will not be allowed to 
contradict the basic features of the estate. This also offers one rationale for 
traditional courts' apparently circular statements about this or that feature being 
"repugnant" to an estate or contradicting its "inherent nature."233 Such 
statements were condemned by the realists (and protorealists like Gray) as 
examples of outmoded conceptualism and stunted formalism,234 but some 
limits on modifications to the basic estates may serve to limit measurement 
cost.235 
Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 830 (discussing that while the courts use the rhetoric of 
intent, "[i]n practice, courts follow standardized rules for identifying assignment and 
subleases"). Another well-known example is courts' traditional approach of claiming to be 
seeking the testators' intent in interpreting a will but then applying formal rules of 
construction. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 489, 489 (1975) (arguing against courts' approach of voiding potential wills 
with "the most minute defects in formal compliance... no matter how abundant the 
evidence that the defect was inconsequential"). See generally Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing 
Family Promises: Reliance, Reciprocity, and Relational Contract, 77 N.C. L. REV. 551, 600- 
08 (1999) (reviewing courts' formalism and commentators' reaction that formalism defeats 
testator intent). 
232. See, e.g., Harry M. Cross, The Record "Chain of Title" Hypocrisy, 57 COLUM. L. 
REV. 787 (1957); Ralph L. Straw, Jr., Off-Record Risks for Bona Fide Purchasers of 
Interests in Real Property, 72 DICK. L. REV. 35 (1967). 
233. See, e.g., Potter v. Couch, 141 U.S. 296, 315 (1891); N.W. Real Estate Co. v. 
Serio, 144 A. 245, 246 (Md. 1929); Hutchinson v. Maxwell, 40 S.E. 655, 656 (Va. 1902); J. 
KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *131 (12th ed. 1896) ("Conditions are not 
sustained when they are repugnant to the nature of the estate granted, or infringe upon the 
essential enjoyment and independent rights of property .... Such restraints were held by 
Lord Coke to be absurd, and repugnant to reason ...."). Alexander notes that repugnancy 
theory was very popular in the nineteenth century and can be found even in some twentieth 
century cases. Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the 
Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1224-27 (1985). 
234. Alexander, supra note 233, at 1223-24 (claiming that the devices used by pre- 
Classical legal scholars and debunked by realist writers in the 1930s and 1940s were 
"actually demolished earlier by Classical writers such as Gray near the end of the nineteenth 
century"). 
235. Further, this formalistic approach was reinforced by the strict structure of a 
traditional deed. In the structure of the traditional deed, one clause (the "granting" clause) 
set out the basic nature of the estate (within the bounds of the numerus clausus); not only 
could this clause not contradict the estate but according to quite formal rules this clause 
trumped conditions in other clauses. See PHILIP H. WARD, WARD ON TITLE EXAMINATIONS 
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Although proponents of title registration prefer a tract index and a 
definitive proof of title, the usual American recording system based on grantor 
and grantee indexes does at least organize search. The grantor-grantee indexes 
obviously structure search, and the chain of title concept is meant to allow 
search to come to an end with a (somewhat) determinate result as to whom the 
prospective purchaser would lose out to in a title contest. 
Finally, the law of recordation limits the audience. To the extent that a 
specialized audience has arisen (and the law allows for malpractice claims in 
this area), the audience is constricted from the start.236 In addition, cases have 
held that third parties who interact with property but who do not have an 
interest in the property are not required to investigate the records. Thus, 
contractors who are digging do not have to consult the land records to discover 
easements for buried cables or rights of way.237 Much of what could come 
under the heading of the landowner as the cheapest cost avoider effectively 
limits the class of persons making up the audience for property interests such as 
easements. 
B. Specialized Audiences in Intellectual Property 
As in this case of interests in real property, some rights that are in rem are 
in practice addressed only to a proper subset of the members of a given society. 
As the stakes involved in a resource conflict become higher, one might expect a 
greater degree of specialization in activities with respect to the asset. Divided 
property rights in assets can be used to facilitate specialization in production or 
consumption. And this extends to legal communication itself. Specialization 
of function here allows a greater degree of background knowledge and 
measurement expertise to come to bear on the problem, not just of 
communicating, but also of processing legal rights. Commonly, legal 
communication is indirect. The general public or litigants may be the ultimate 
audience for statutes, opinions, and regulations, but lawyers and journalists are 
the audience in the first instance. They then selectively translate this 
communication for the benefits of the public or certain members, such as 
clients. 
(3d ed. 1997). 
236. See, e.g., Quintin Johnstone, Land Transfers. Process and Processors, 22 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 493 (1988) (surveying types of specialists involved in land transactions). 
237. See, e.g., Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kelton, 285 P.2d 168, 173-74 (Ariz. 
1955) (holding that contractor is not deemed to have constructive notice of buried cable that 
was subject of recorded right of way because those with no interest in the title are not bound 
to search title to land); Statler Mfg., Inc. v. Brown, 691 S.W.2d 445, 451 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1985) (holding no constructive notice to contractor of properly recorded easement for 
aircraft right-of-way); Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 848 & n.264 (noting that 
"independent contractors and trade creditors who deal with ostensible fee simple owners of 
real property will not ordinarily find it economically worthwhile to undertake a title search 
before providing services" and citing examples and commentators' perspectives). 
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Thus, to continue on the subject of real estate, to the extent that specialists 
in title search have emerged, the deficiencies in the clarity of the system are 
partially overcome. Lawyers and title investigators can assimilate detailed and 
specialized information. Even here, however, simplification has often been 
advocated. To this we can add that there is a range of specialization from 
requiring knowledge of the niceties of future interests at one extreme and 
requiring comprehensibility to the layperson on the other. As it is, the direct 
audience of expert title searchers is indeed broader than the set of real estate 
lawyers, but for the most part does not embrace laypeople. Costs to nonexperts 
can be lowered to the extent that title search is mechanical and does not require 
the application of costly background knowledge. 
Patents are another striking example in which the delineation of the right 
presupposes expertise. First, as in the real estate case, certain specialists focus 
on this branch of the law. Prosecuting applications for, challenging, and 
defending the validity of patents is in large part what patent lawyers do. 
Furthermore, the users of inventions themselves are specialists in the relevant 
area of technology and can be expected to be able to process the information 
that the patent law requires to be disclosed in the patent application process. 
These disclosure requirements are explicitly measured against an audience of 
persons "skilled in the art."238 Whether a disclosure would, as required, enable 
one skilled in the art to make and use the invention often involves language and 
context special to this audience.239 Indeed, the Federal Circuit has described 
the "purpose" of the written description requirement as being to "convey with 
reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he 
or she was in possession of the invention," in a manner reminiscent of the 
communication we saw in possession law itself.240 In the case of land, fences 
238. See 35 U.S.C.A. ? 112(1) (West 2003) providing: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and 
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any 
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to 
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of 
carrying out his invention. 
See also In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 996 (C.C.P.A 1967) (holding written description to be 
separate requirement from enablement and that issue is whether "the specification convey[s] 
clearly to those skilled in the art, to whom it is addressed, in any way, the information that 
appellants invented that specific compound [claimed]"). 
239. See, for example, Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580, 585 (1882), describing 
aspects of the loom and noting that: 
[A]ll these things were as well known as the alphabet to those skilled in the art of pile 
weaving, as it then stood. With this mass of previous knowledge and nomenclature intheir 
minds (as we must suppose it to have been), the language, the explanations, the drawings, and the claims of Webster's patents must have been perfectly intelligible to them. 
Judge Bradley analogizes the situation to astronomers who "understand the language of their 
brother scientist" which is "all Greek to the unskilled in science." Id. 
240. Vas-Cath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (emphasis 
omitted). This purpose does not exhaust the written description inquiry. See Enzo Biochem, 
Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 296 F.3d 1316, 1329-30 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that showing 
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and other boundaries must be easily processed by a lay audience-anyone 
might stray onto the land-but, in the case of patents the possibility of a 
nonexpert inadvertently "trespassing" on a patent is less likely. Highly detailed 
and patent-specific information is not only indispensable, but the limited 
audience of potential violators can be expected to process it. Consumers, while 
potentially liable for patent infringement simply for using an infringing article, 
are almost never sued.241 Correspondingly, very few people seem to be aware 
that a consumer could be liable for patent infringement.242 
First sale doctrine, a feature not only of patent but also of copyright and 
other intellectual property law, also reduces the informational burden on the 
wide lay audience.243 Under first sale doctrine, a person who legally acquires a 
patented product or copy of a copyrighted work is presumed to be permitted to 
resell the item, because the first sale by the holder of the patent or copyright 
exhausts her monopoly. But interestingly, various branches of intellectual 
property law differ in just the ways one would expect based on the problems of 
informational extensiveness. 
Contrast patent law with copyright law.244 Here, as in patent law, plaintiffs 
have an incentive to focus on producers rather than on passive consumers of 
infringing items. But, unlike in patent law, almost anyone can be a producer of 
violating material simply by illegal copying. In patent law, it is unlikely that 
someone will practice the invention in his garage for his own use. As expected, 
the delineation of a copyright is much simpler and easier to grasp by a lay 
audience than the delineation of a patent. And, also as expected, lay people are 
quite aware that they are at least theoretically liable when they engage in illegal 
copying. 
possession is not always sufficient o satisfy written description requirement). 
241. Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Seller and User 
Liability in Intellectual Property Law, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999). Patent liability can be 
for making, using, or selling an infringing product and liability can be direct or indirect. 35 
U.S.C.A. ? 271 (West 2003). Although this may seem quite wide, the plaintiff usually wants 
to sell to the same consumers and so suits are usually against producers rather than small 
retailers or consumers. See also Thomas J. Stueber, Insurance Coverage for Patent 
Infringement, 17 WM. MITCHELLL. REV. 1055, 1083 n.202 (1991). 
242. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 241, at 1-2. 
243. 17 U.S.C.A. ? 109 (West 2003) (copyright first sale doctrine). The patent first 
sale doctrine is not codified but has long been a feature of the caselaw. See United States v. 
Univis Lens, Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249 (1942) ("An incident to the purchase of any article, 
whether patented or unpatented, is the right to use and sell it...."); Adams v. Burke, 84 
U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456 (1873) ("[W]hen the patentee, or the person having his rights, sells 
a machine or instrument whose sole value is in its use, he receives the consideration for its 
use ... and he parts with the right to restrict that use."); Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 
How.) 539, 549-50 (1852); Glass Equip. Dev., Inc. v. Besten, Inc., 174 F.3d 1337, 1342 n.1 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) ("The first sale doctrine stands for the proposition that, absent unusual 
circumstances, courts infer that a patent owner has given up the right to exclude concerning a 
patented article that the owner sells."). 
244. Because patent and copyright differ along more dimensions than audience, the 
argument here is meant to be a tentative one. 
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At the opposite extreme from copyright is the little-used statute on 
semiconductor chip protection.245 Here there is an even higher level of 
specialized detail in the delineation of the right and an even lower probability 
of significant violation by lay people than in the case of patents. Even the 
subject matter of the act is specialized.246 Also, as expected, the scope of the 
right is narrow, further lessening the audience for these specialized rights.247 
And various defenses narrow the class of potential defendants to those who are 
likely to have expertise.248 
Variable audience may also explain courts' seemingly uneven approach to 
standardization in intellectual property. Merrill and I have noted that the 
numerus clausus principle, under which any innovations in the menu of types 
of property rights are supposed to come from legislatures rather than courts, 
operates in intellectual property but with somewhat weaker force with respect 
to noncore intellectual property interests.249 The notable exceptions to the 
numerus clausus principle in intellectual property come in the areas of hot news 
and the right of publicity. In International News Service v. Associated 
Press,250 the Supreme Court provided a somewhat novel right against 
misappropriation of hot news: A rival wire service cannot pick up news and 
immediately retransmit it even if the news is not protected by copyright or as a 
trade secret. Note that the audience here is likely to be restricted to other news 
organizations (wire services at the time). Hence, the informational burden of 
the right is less than would be the case with a new copyright-like property right. 
Note too that Judge Learned Hand's effort to prevent the expansion of the INS 
approach came in a case that implicated a wider audience. In Cheney Bros. v. 
Doris Silk Corp.,251 the plaintiff was asking for INS-style protection for fashion 
designs. A property right in a design is likely to affect a wide audience; even 
protection for "fashion" designs may well have a practical impact on a wider 
class of dutyholders than would a right to prevent retransmission of hot 
news.252 
245. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act (SCPA), 17 U.S.C.A. ?? 901-914 (West 
2003); see also, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual 
Property Protection of Software, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 373-75 (1995) (noting that SCPA 
has not been considered successful because of the narrow protection it affords and its lack of 
relevance in the face of changed technology); Leon Radomsky, Sixteen Years After the 
Passage of the U.S. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act. Is International Protection 
Working?, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1049, 1082-85 (2000) (arguing for minor indirect effects 
of SCPA). 
246. Protection is for a "mask work," a series of related images, 17 U.S.C.A. ? 901, 
rather than for the chip itself, id. ? 902. 
247. See PETER A. ALCES & HAROLD F. SEE, THE COMMERCIAL LAW OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 167 (1994). 
248. Id. at 69. 
249. Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 19-20, 23. 
250. 248 U.S. 215 (1918); see also supra note 53. 
251. 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929). 
252. Rights of publicity are another area where some of the innovation has occurred in 
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Specialization of audience does not come without costs, including, it is 
sometimes argued, costs in openness and legitimacy. These concerns have led 
to the plain language movement in law,253 which echoes criticisms made 
forcefully by Jeremy Bentham.254 In terms of the model presented in this 
Article, this movement can best be taken as calling not for the abrogation of the 
tradeoff between intensiveness and extensiveness of information, but for a 
striking of the tradeoff in favor of a lesser degree of intensiveness appropriate 
to a more extensive audience. Gaining extra audience members would come at 
the cost of the intensiveness of the law's messages. 
C. Contract Interpretation 
Another method of reducing the costs of information extensiveness is to 
reduce the audience's need to rely on context and background knowledge. In 
such situations, the law will rely on conventionalized meanings from natural 
language or will create conventions of its own. This formalism often takes the 
very form that it does in natural language.255 Here, legal language looks like 
the judicial arena. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 20, 68. Rights of publicity might 
likewise be unlikely to be violated by the layperson, but here the concerns may be greater 
than in the hot news context. It does not take a specialist of any sort to come up with the 
idea of using a celebrity's image to promote any kind of business. 
253. See, e.g., DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW (1963); LAWRENCE M. 
SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 130-33 (1993) (giving a qualified endorsement of plain 
language movement and noting the dangers of discarding settled terminology); R.W. 
Benson, The End of Legalese: The Game Is Over, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 519 
(1985); G. Gopen, The State of Legal Writing. Res Ipsa Loquitur, 86 MICH. L. REV. 333 
(1987). On the history of plain language ideas, see MELLINKOFF, supra, at 202-03, 238-56, 
261-66. 
254. See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, Nomography, in 3 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 
231, 241, 260, 271 (John Bowring ed., 1843) (decrying lawyers' language as 
"excrementitious matter" and "literary garbage" and advocating codification so as to make 
law comprehensible to citizens); Jeremy Bentham, A General View of a Complete Code of 
Laws, in 3 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra, at 155, 207-09 (strongly advocating 
codification); Jeremy Bentham, Truth Versus Ashhurst, in 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM, supra, at 231, 235-37 (criticizing lawyers' language). 
255. Formalism has been used in many interrelated ways in law. See, e.g., ANDREI 
MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 124-29 (1992) (arguing that judicial 
formalism as logical inference is a "scarecrow" argument not involved in positivism); 
Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 355 (1973) (defining formalism 
as view that decisionmaking is mechanical application of rules); Frederick Schauer, 
Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988) [hereinafter Schauer, Formalism] (arguing that 
formalism is a term used to describe decisionmaking constrained by the specific linguistic 
formulation of rules). What I am calling "formalism"-the degree of invariance of 
interpretation under varying contexts-is a matter of interpretation of language. Because 
interpretation is involved in applying rules, formalism as decisionmaking constrained by rule 
(or rule-ism) depends on some stability of meaning. Usually this is understood to require a 
(fully) literal or acontextual interpretation in at least some subset of cases. Although it far 
exceeds the limits of this Article, one might say that relative formalism at this higher level of 
rule application is also possible, if rules are constrained more or less depending on how 
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an extreme form of everyday language.256 For example, lawyers try to increase 
precision by repeating nouns instead of using pronouns (as in "Player promises 
that Player will play ... ."), a method that we saw was one of the factors used 
by linguists measuring the degree of formalism in communication.257 As the 
numerus clausus principle starkly illustrates, the law imposes different levels of 
standardization in property and contract. This differential treatment reflects 
third-party information costs; accordingly, legal intervention to standardize is at 
its greatest where these third-party information costs loom largest.258 In this 
formal (in our sense) is the language in which they are couched. In any event, for those who 
associate the word "formalism" with rule-following or logical deduction, one could 
substitute "relative literalness" (or the opposite of "relative contextuality") for my "relative 
formalism." 
There is a second, related relation between relative formalism in my sense and legal 
philosophers' debates over positivism and the possibility of decisionmaking constrained by 
rules. Some believe that legal rules are inherently defeasible, in that they are always open to 
override by an open-ended set of exceptions that only become clear as a context for 
application is supplied. See, e.g., G.P. Baker, Defeasibility and Meaning, in LAW, 
MORALITY, AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF H.L.A. HART 26 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz 
eds., 1977) (elaborating on Hart's claim that legal concepts are irreducibly defeasible); 
H.L.A. Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, 49 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 
171 (1949); Richard H.S. Tur, Defeasibilism, 21 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 355, 355 (2001) 
(suggesting that law is best understood in the form of "open-ended, defeasible, normative, 
conditional propositions"). But see Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Defeasibility of 
Legal Rules, 51 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 223 (1998) (arguing that the claim of necessary 
defeasibility is not always sound). This notion of defeasibility has informational 
implications similar to the defeasibility of inference in interpreting any communicative act. 
To the extent that information drawn from a communication (for example, a claim, a legal 
rule) is defeasible, processing it will be more costly. Determining to what degree to pursue 
nondefeasibility will depend in part on the nature and size of the audience. 
256. This hardly need be so. First, it is surprisingly controversial whether legal 
language should be regarded as a dialect of the corresponding natural language or should be 
regarded as another type of communication system. Linguists, in particular, have shown 
themselves to have a fairly narrow definition of what is a natural language (or, despite their 
resistance to prescriptivism, what is permissible in a system that is called "natural 
language"). See Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 190, at 838-39, 865-68. 
Second, whatever one considers the status of legal language to be, there is no necessity for it 
to work the same way as everyday uses of English in its use of devices to manage the 
informational tradeoff. 
257. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text; see also PETER M. TIERSMA, 
LEGAL LANGUAGE 71-73 (1999). Tiersma notes how specialized vocabulary can sometimes 
undermine precision and that some ambiguity is strategic. Id. at 74-86. This observation is 
consistent with differential formalism. 
258. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16; Merrill & Smith, supra note 4. Interestingly, 
a protorealist like John Chipman Gray, who was no friend of traditional conceptualism, was 
nevertheless an advocate of applying (his formulation of) the Rule Against Perpetuities 
"remorselessly" and without regard to its purpose. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE 
AGAINST PERPETUITIES ? 629 (4th ed. 1942). However realistic this proposition ever was, 
the idea that different degrees of formalism might be appropriate in different areas of 
property law makes sense if the more formalized areas involve defining rights in such a way 
that third parties can form stable expectations at low information cost. It emerges that Gray 
was concerned about informational problems as well as the dead hand when he discussed 
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Part, I will show that, even in the increasingly customization-oriented area of 
contract, courts have tended to preserve a more formalistic approach precisely 
where concerns about the costs of information extensiveness are most acute. 
Often one thinks of contract interpretation as an increasingly nuanced and 
context-sensitive enterprise, particularly since the legal realists' attack on the 
older, more objective and formalistic theories of contract (and of contract 
interpretation in particular).259 The debate over contract interpretation 
antedates the realist movement. Early in the twentieth century, even a 
protorealist like Holmes came down in favor of an interpretive methodology 
that would ask what a reasonable person would make of a statement, without 
inquiry into the intent of the person making the statement.260 Meanings were 
to be measured from a (reasonable) recipient's point of view, not the 
communicator's point of view, because "it would open too great risks if 
evidence were admissible to show that when they said, 'five hundred feet,' they 
agreed that it should mean one hundred inches, or that 'Bunker Hill Monument' 
should signify the Old South Church."261 Holmes was not arguing against the 
use of context, but rather that the context should be viewed from the 
perspective of the reasonable hearer.262 
To this argument John Henry Wigmore replied that, in special contexts, 
idiosyncratic meanings were often attached to words that, in a more general 
context, would have another very different and sometimes opposite meaning.263 
Wigmore advanced the cipher codes of commercial houses as one example 
among "abundant instances in which not only there is no 'great risk,' but there 
is an absolute necessity, of accepting proof of these private conventions; and 
these instances shatter the whole argument for the rule as a rule."264 Therefore, 
in Wigmore's view, there was no basis in policy or theory for an absolute 
"plain meaning" rule, although the avoidance of extrinsic evidence might 
reflect a general maxim of prudent discretion.265 James Bradley Thayer, a 
contemporary of Wigmore's, was if anything more hostile to plain meaning 
customary profits aprendre. Id. ? 586. 
259. For a modem version of the debate over formalism, see the sources cited supra 
notes 5 and 255. 
260. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 
417 (1899). 
261. Goode v. Riley, 28 N.E. 288, 288 (Mass. 1891); see also Holmes, supra note 260, 
at 420 (citing this case). 
262. Indeed, like the realists, Holmes was apt to stress the importance of context. In 
the first stock-dividend case, Holmes noted that "income" in a revenue act need not mean the 
same thing as "income" in the Sixteenth Amendment: "A word is not a crystal, transparent 
and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content 
according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 
418, 425(1918). 
263. 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW ? 2462, at 199 
(James H. Chadboure rev., 1981). 
264. Id. at 199-200. 
265. Id. at 200. 
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when he scoffed at the "lawyer's Paradise where all words have a fixed, 
precisely ascertained meaning" and argued that "the fatal necessity of looking 
outside the text in order to identify persons and things, tends steadily to destroy 
such illusions and to reveal the essential imperfection of language, whether 
written or spoken."266 
Wigmore took comfort from the fact that the trend was away from plain 
meaning, and in many ways the early work of Thayer and Wigmore anticipated 
the realists' rejection of plain meaning. The realists stressed context as part of 
a program to demystify traditional policies that, in the realists' view, acquired a 
false air of linguistic inevitability.267 Realists and many of their successors do 
not mean to assert that meaning is completely unpredictable; but in the course 
of showing the contingent nature of the rules we use, they rely on the 
inadequacy-or impossibility-of narrow, context-independent interpretation 
of legal materials such as contracts, statutes, and judicial opinions.268 
Formalistic interpretation was, according to the typical realist view, an obstacle 
to honest, sensitive, policy-oriented judging. In the area of contract 
interpretation, the plain meaning rule was one such barrier to a more rational 
approach. Thus, Corbin went even further than Wigmore and asserted the 
impossibility of any rule that depends on the face of an instrument: "[N]o man 
can determine the meaning of written words merely by glueing his eyes within 
the four comers of a square paper;... it is men who give meanings to 
words and... words in themselves have no meaning .... "269 Adherence to 
the plain meaning rule, under which extrinsic evidence will not be admitted 
unless a written agreement is susceptible to more than one reasonable 
266. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE 
COMMON LAW 428-29 (1898). 
267. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 
35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 820, 847 (1935); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A 
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 663 (1958) (arguing against Hart's attempt 
to preserve a core of meaning in legal terms and contending that all interpretation of even the 
seemingly plainest words requires an inquiry into purpose). Philbrick makes a typical attack 
on the determinacy of language: 
First we had better dispose of some superstitions. A primitive notion survives in many parts 
of the world-it is perhaps hardly rational enough to be called a belief-that the connection 
between a word and the thing it stands for is closer than the merely mental connection 
between symbol and object. Most primitive peoples imagine that the word not only stands 
for but in some sense is the thing. 
FREDERICK A. PHILBRICK, LANGUAGE AND THE LAW: THE SEMANTICS OF FORENSIC ENGLISH 
27 (1951). For a fuller discussion of varieties of formalism, see Schauer, Formalism, supra 
note 255. 
268. For a summary of the large body of recent literature denying the possibility of 
acontextual interpretation, see Timothy A.O. Endicott, Linguistic Indeterminacy, 16 OXFORD 
J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 681-87 (1996). Some realists went further than others, embracing an 
extreme nominalism. See L.L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429, 443- 
44 (1934) (expressing reservations about the extreme nominalism of some of the more 
radical realists). 
269. Arthur Linton Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 
50 CORNELL .Q. 161, 164 (1965). 
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interpretation, is said, in the words of Chief Justice Traynor, to reflect "a 
judicial belief in the possibility of perfect verbal expression.... [a] belief 
[that] is a remnant of a primitive faith in the inherent potency and inherent 
meaning of words."270 According to this view, a necessary condition for the 
plain meaning rule to work would be that words have "absolute and constant 
referents"-which they do not.271 This critique has only gathered steam with 
the advent of radical critiques of the determinacy of language.272 And, in a 
variety of fields, the dependency of meaning on context has come to be 
appreciated more than ever.273 
Nevertheless, the critique does miss something, in that interpretation can 
rely more or less on context and can be more or less convention-based and 
predictable.274 Under the definition of "formalism" adopted earlier, an 
expression is more formal the less variance there is, under changes of context, 
in its meaning.275 If this definition is accurate, then formality is a matter of 
degree.276 It is not necessary for a language to be one-hundred percent fool- 
270. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 
643-44 (Cal. 1968). 
271. Id. This position tracks that of realists such as Philbrick. See supra note 267. 
272. Language is not the only possible source for determinacy of legal outcomes, and 
various post-realists have advanced other sources of determinacy. See, e.g., HENRY M. 
HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW 166-67 (1958) ("Underlying every rule and standard, in other words, is 
at the least a policy and in most cases a principle. This principle or policy is always 
available to guide judgment in resolving uncertainties about the arrangement's meaning."); 
Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1060 (1975) (arguing that "judicial 
decisions in civil cases . . characteristically are and should be generated by principle not 
policy" and that resultant ideal rules do determine outcomes). But the nature of language 
continues to form part of the battleground between various types of formalists and 
antiformalists. See, e.g., Andrew Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and 
Dworkin, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 207-08 (1986) (discussing how the ineliminable, open- 
textured nature of language led H.L.A. Hart to recognize indeterminacy in peripheral cases 
and how legal realists saw indeterminacy as deeper and more pervasive). 
273. See, e.g., D.A. CRUSE, MEANING IN LANGUAGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO SEMANTICS 
AND PRAGMATICS (2000); GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 
(1980); GEOFFREY NUNBERG, THE PRAGMATICS OF REFERENCE 90-94 (1978). 
274. See, e.g., NUNBERG, supra note 273, at 107-17. 
275. See, e.g., Heylighen, supra note 106, at 26-28; see also supra notes 17-18 and 
accompanying text. 
276. Some commentators have made the related point that linguistic determinacy in the 
law is partial rather than complete or nonexistent. See, e.g., Clark D. Cunningham., Judith 
N. Levi, Georgia M. Green & Jeffrey P. Kaplan, Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE 
L.J. 1561, 1613 (1994) (book review) (arguing that RICO criteria may not eliminate every 
meaning of a word but does narrow the possible choices down to two); Richard A. Posner, 
The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 831-32 (1988) (characterizing 
formalism in a pejorative way as the overuse of the syllogism and explaining that many legal 
questions are in fact resolved syllogistically, but that these types of questions are rarely 
litigated); Schauer, Formalism, supra note 255, at 525-26 (arguing against the total 
indeterminacy of language propounded by Fuller and others and distinguishing between core 
literal meaning and contextual meaning); Frederick Schauer, The Practice and Problems of 
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proof (or is it clever-person-proof?) in order to form an adequate basis of 
expectations. Put differently, elimination of possibilities of misunderstanding 
will be subject to falling marginal benefits and increasing marginal costs, and 
the goal is to try to equate them, not to eliminate the potential for 
misunderstanding completely. Proponents of plain meaning are not being 
realistic (at least if we take their statements at face value!), and their opponents 
are setting the bar to an irrelevantly high standard. 
More importantly for our purposes, the all-or-nothing approach to the 
determinacy of legal and other language only serves to obscure the degree of 
reliance on context. Some utterances can be interpreted with sufficient (not 
total) accuracy without much inquiry into context, whereas others require a 
great deal of context. This is true of the legal regime as well: The law has 
traditionally applied (and to some extent still does apply) different interpretive 
standards in different contexts. As we would expect, the law imposes 
interpretive standards that tend to eschew context precisely where messages are 
being broadcast to a wide and anonymous audience. This tendency can be seen 
in the interpretation of conveyances, of third-party beneficiary contracts, and of 
public offers and advertisements. 
Before turning to the areas in which contract interpretation most retains the 
formalistic approach, consider the extent to which courts will permit the use of 
evidence of context in ordinary contract interpretation. The story of the 
substantial relaxation of the parol evidence rule is well known. According to 
the traditional plain meaning rule, an integrated agreement was to be 
interpreted by consulting the written documents that the parties designate as 
evidencing the contract; only if the written document (or documents) was 
ambiguous could the court then consult extrinsic evidence (of conversations, 
past dealings, and so on).277 Many courts have disavowed the plain meaning 
rule, as has the second Restatement.278 In perhaps the leading case, Pacific 
Gas & Electric Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., the California 
Supreme Court allowed extrinsic evidence on the question of whether there was 
an ambiguity.279 Even courts that retain the plain meaning rule may be much 
Plain Meaning: A Response to Aleinikoff and Shaw, 45 VAND. L. REV. 715, 737-38 (1992) 
(noting that the indeterminateness of language is a matter of degree); see also Ken Kress, 
Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1989) (arguing that law is only moderately 
indeterminate and that this indeterminacy is not a major problem for the law's legitimacy). 
277. 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS ? 24.7, at 33 & n.88 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 1998) 
(citing cases). 
278. 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ?212 (1981); 5 CORBIN ON 
CONTRACTS, supra note 277, ? 24.7 at 39-53 & nn. 102-51. The second Restatement explains 
how far it has gone and why: "It is sometimes said that extrinsic evidence cannot change the 
plain meaning of a writing, but meaning can almost never be plain except in context. 
Accordingly, the rule stated in Subsection (1) is not limited to cases where it is determined 
that the language used is ambiguous." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra, ? 212 
cmt. b. 
279. 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968). 
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more willing to label an interpretation reasonable, thus finding an ambiguity 
that will open the door to extrinsic evidence. 
Moreover, extrinsic evidence can be used to show that the parties have, in 
Wigmorean fashion, created new and special conventions among themselves 
that may well be at odds with ordinary, everyday meanings of the words. This 
use not only extends to trying to decide the scope of a term like "chicken,"280 
but to situations in which ordinary words are stripped of their usual meanings 
and supplied with new ones by particular people, as where "five" is made to 
mean "ten," or, for that matter, pace Holmes, where "Bunker Hill Monument" 
can be made to signify "Old South Church."281 Parties can make up a code for 
the purposes of a single contract, and courts have enforced contracts using such 
codes, but only if both parties knew or had reason to know of the code. For 
example, the Supreme Court, relying on parol evidence, has interpreted a 
contract according to a code adopted by the parties, in which a series of proper 
names ("Albert," "Alfred," "Alexander," "Amanda," and so on) were used and 
understood as referring to the firm of B.S. Bibb & Co.282 In many of these 
cases, the parties are affirmatively seeking inaccessibility to third parties, which 
presents no externality as long as there is little seepage of this usage out into 
the wider world. In other cases, parties have made oral modifications of this 
type, for example, agreeing that "measured in vehicles" as used in their contract 
should mean "four cubic yards."283 
There are limits to courts' willingness to follow parties' idiosyncratic 
usages, and, as expected, courts are less accommodating when the potential 
audience for the communication becomes more widespread and anonymous. In 
TKO Equipment Co. v. C & G Coal Co., Judge Easterbrook disparagingly 
observed that "[u]nder the prevailing will theory of contract, parties, like 
Humpty Dumpty, may use words as they please. If they wish the symbols 'one 
Caterpillar D9G tractor' to mean '500 railroad cars full of watermelons,' that's 
fine-provided parties share this weird meaning."284 In the TKO case, the 
court refused to follow the interpretation offered by a party, precisely because it 
would work to the disadvantage of a third party who had no reasonable way of 
knowing the true nature of the deal.285 As is the concern with the numerus 
280. Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 117 
(S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
281. 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 277, ? 24.8, at 54-55 & n. 156. 
282. Bibb v. Allen, 149 U.S. 481, 494, 496 (1893). 
283. Ward v. Smith, 86 S.E.2d 539, 542-43 (W. Va. 1955). 
284. TKO Equip. Co. v. C & G Coal Co., 863 F.2d 541, 545 (7th Cir. 1988). 
285. The defendant mechanic had a lien on two of the earthmovers that the plaintiff 
had leased or sold to a now-bankrupt company. The contracting parties (plaintiff and now- 
bankrupt entity) had executed a lease that proclaimed their deal to be a "lease" of 
earthmovers and not a sale and security interest (with a view towards avoiding the automatic 
stay of bankruptcy law). But the parties tried to have it both ways, when the plaintiff 
"lessor" also filed a declaration that it had sold the earthmovers and retained a security 
interest, fulfilling the requirements under the Uniform Commercial Code. Id. at 542-44. 
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clausus principle and the recording acts, subsequent purchasers and lenders 
cannot be expected to share the secret knowledge of the parties. And this 
concern becomes more acute, the broader this third-party audience becomes. 
This concern with third parties is, as we have seen, quite prominent in the 
context of land conveyances, and it is here that formalism has had more staying 
power. First of all, the plain meaning rule has arguably persisted more in cases 
involving deeds and conveyances than in commercial contracts; many of the 
same rules and famously loose canons may apply in both deeds and contracts, 
but deeds have been, and to some extent continue to be, subject to special strict 
rules (or stricter application of common rules) that displace the looser rules or 
canons that apply generally to the interpretation of written instruments.286 The 
late Justice Mosk, who was among the most prominent defenders of the plain 
meaning approach even in commercial contracts,287 noted that adhering to the 
plain meaning approach is especially important in the case of deeds in order to 
give notice to third parties: 
The plaintiff lessor was asking the court to follow its (now bankrupt) contractual partner's 
intent and characterize the transaction as a sale and security interest, especially where this 
would accord with their desire to take a fall-back position in bankruptcy. (Because the 
"lessee" had paid the price for the two tractors that the defendant repaired, the plaintiff 
"lessor" would not have a security interest in them under the lease characterization.) This 
the court refused to do, noting the detriment to strangers to the original deal, like the 
defendant mechanic with a lien, who lack knowledge of the original studied ambiguity the 
parties created. Id. at 545. 
286. See, e.g., Irby v. Roberts, 504 S.E.2d 841, 843 (Va. 1998) ("[W]here the language 
in the deed... is clear, unambiguous and explicit... a court called upon to construe such a 
deed should look no further than the four corers of the instrument under review.") (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted); White Log Jellico Coal Co. v. Zipp, 32 S.W.2d 92, 94 
(Ct. App. Ky. 2000) (finding no ambiguity in deed despite parties retyping error and 
deposition testimony regarding alternate interpretation); Anderson v. Gilliland, 624 S.W.2d 
243, 244-45 (Tex. App. 1981) (in dispute over separate and community estate, construing 
quitclaim deed strictly against the apparent intention of both now deceased grantor husband 
and grantee wife); Bruce M. Kramer, The Sisyphean Task of Interpreting Mineral Deeds and 
Leases.' An Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction, 24 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1 (1993). Also 
interesting is that Justice White, an opponent of the plain meaning approach in constitutional 
law, contrasted constitutions with deeds: 
[T]his Court does not subscribe to the simplistic view that constitutional interpretation can 
possibly be limited to the "plain meaning" of the Constitution's text or to the subjective 
intention of the Framers. The Constitution is not a deed setting forth the precise metes and 
bounds of its subject matter; rather, it is a document announcing fundamental principles in 
value-laden terms that leave ample scope for the exercise of normative judgment by those 
charged with interpreting and applying it. 
Thorburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 789 
(1986) (White, J., dissenting). 
287. Judge Kozinksi has criticized Pacific Gas for "cast[ing] a long shadow of 
uncertainty over all transactions negotiated and executed under the law of California," 
Trident Ctr. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1988) (criticizing Pac. 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968)), and 
Justice Mosk, in an earlier dissent soon after Pacific Gas, voiced similar concerns about 
undermining the parol evidence rule, Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arioto, 446 P.2d 785 (Cal. 
1968) (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
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Nowhere are the foregoing criticisms more telling than in the case of a deed 
giving notice to the world of the boundaries and nature of ownership of a plot 
of land. As stated, a deed may need to provide such notice for centuries, and 
very precise terminology and syntax have been devised for that purpose.288 
Indeed, not only is it unlikely that a subsequent purchaser, for whom the 
recording acts were designed, will have the necessary background knowledge 
to reach the same interpretation as a court using the full extrinsic evidence 
approach, but both the records and instruments like deeds are designed to 
inform the world of ownership.289 This world can include people who never 
come to court. For example, a given instrument may affect downstream 
owners.290 Or a neighbor may be very interested to know the scope of an 
adjacent property owner's easement for light and air against an owner on the 
opposite side.291 One can plan better if one knows the covenants, options, and 
easements granted by one's neighbor. The preamble of the 1640 Massachusetts 
Bay recording statute seems to reflect a desire to provide notice to the world, in 
describing the statute's purpose as "[flor avoyding fraudulent conveyances, and 
that every man may know what estate or interest other men have."292 It may 
well be that the rest of the world, or even the neighbors, should not be able to 
sue owners because they relied on such records of the relevant instruments, but 
reliability and low-cost interpretability to such far-flung audiences is useful. 
In the context of land records, formalism and standardization allow 
simplification and nondefeasible conclusions based on limited search and, more 
generally, structure the search for information, thereby lowering costs. This is 
not to say, however, that past or existing levels of formalism in property law 
are optimal-the formalism traditionally applied in the deed context could be 
288. City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Ct., 914 P.2d 160, 180 (Cal. 1996) (Mosk, J., 
concurring and dissenting); see also Linda Little Carloni, The Use of Extrinsic Evidence to 
Interpret Real Property Conveyances. A Suggested Limitation, 65 CAL. L. REV. 897 (1977). 
For a criticism of the plain meaning approach that boils down to arguing that Justice Mosk 
overstated the lack of ambiguity in the right of way, see Harry G. Prince, Contract 
Interpretation in California: Plain Meaning, Parol Evidence and Use of the "Just Result" 
Principle, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 557, 634-41 (1998). 
289. Carloni, supra note 288, at 916. 
290. See, e.g., Murphy Slough Ass'n v. Avila, 27 Cal. App. 3d 649 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1972); Carloni, supra note 288, at 901, 917 (criticizing use of extrinsic evidence in Murphy 
Slough case to decide whether fee simple or merely an easement had been granted and 
noting potential impact on downstream owners' rights to water). 
291. Carloni, supra note 288, at 917. The many race-notice statutes, which protect 
later purchasers without notice only if they record their own interests, can be seen as an 
attempt to make ownership interests known to all the world. Id. at 916. 
292. Act of Oct. 7, 1640, 1640 Mass. Acts 290, reprinted in 1 RECORDS OF THE 
GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY 306-07 (Nathaniel Bradstreet 
Shurtleff ed., 1853). The English have long been suspicious of recording precisely because 
of families' interests in privacy. See Bostick, supra note 229, at 75-76, 99-100 (noting 
provisions for secrecy in English Land Registration Act of 1925 as by-product of historical 
concern for privacy and arguing for their undesirability in American context). 
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quite hairsplitting, and extended to a special syntax as well as vocabulary293- 
but there is a rationale for maintaining a higher level of formalism in property 
than in other areas of law that have fewer third-party effects. 
One would likewise expect some tendency towards formalism in third- 
party beneficiary contracts. Here, by definition, a third party is involved, but 
quite often it is a definite rather than an anonymous third party, making for a 
case intermediate between the usual personal contractual context and the more 
impersonal property contexts.294 Accordingly, we find that courts take an 
intermediate interpretive approach towards third-party beneficiary contracts. 
Courts basically focus on the parties' intent to benefit the third party, but courts 
also impose a degree of formalism. As one commentator put it: 
[T]hird-party beneficiary contracts create the potential for unfair surprise. 
Third persons, who presumably lack information about private understandings 
between the parties, may rely on the contract's language in planning their own 
affairs. In these circumstances, giving priority to the shared intent of the 
parties poses the risk of substantial hardship. 
As a result, the intentionalism of contemporary contract interpretation is 
relaxed a bit when it comes to third-party beneficiary contracts. Courts do 
attempt to discover, as a general matter, the shared intent of the parties. But 
they also take into account the possibility that the contract's language might 
create expectations on the part of non-parties.295 
Often this more formal approach surfaces in deciding whether a third party is 
an intended beneficiary-a determination that is the ostensible modem test for 
whether a third party can enforce.296 Courts often employ relatively free 
interpretive methods to discover the intent of the contracting parties, but will 
apply a more rigid approach based on reasonable reliance (and eschewing an 
inquiry into party intent) precisely where third parties might rely on the 
contractual language. This can be regarded as more formal, because reliance 
on the literal language of the contract will often be reasonable from the third 
party's point of view, and here the more formal approach allows easier 
enforcement by third parties.297 Pushing further in a more formal direction is 
293. One linguist has provided a detailed analysis of the special syntax that applies to 
language creating vested versus contingent remainders. See Jeffrey P. Kaplan, Syntax in the 
Interpretation of Legal Language: The Vested Versus Contingent Distinction in Property 
Law, 68 AM. SPEECH 58 (1993). 
294. Legal intervention seems to take various forms intermediate between mandatory 
standardization and customizability in bailments, landlord-tenant, security interests, and 
trusts-situations that partake of some but not all of the features of in rem rights. See Merrill 
& Smith, supra note 16, at 777 
295. Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statutes Really "Legislative Bargains"?: The Failure of 
the Contract Analogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1145, 1174-75 (1998). 
296. 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 278, ? 302; see also E. 
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS ? 10.3, at 677-78 & n.l (3d ed. 1999) (documenting 
influence on courts of Restatement Second's intended-beneficiary test). 
297. Some courts even require the "intent to benefit the third party be found in the 
language of the contract itself," which Melvin Eisenberg criticizes as being out of step with 
1186 [Vol. 55:1105 
THE LANGUAGE OF PROPERTY 
the lack of a requirement under the second Restatement's approach that actual 
reliance be proved; potential reasonable reliance is enough.298 The intention- 
to-benefit rule also has the effect of limiting the audience: If only intended but 
not incidental beneficiaries can sue to enforce promises, the degree of 
involvement and background knowledge these third parties have is likely to be 
higher than that of incidental third parties. These third parties with standing 
would be more likely to handle intensive information at reasonable cost than 
would the average potential third-party beneficiary, including an incidental 
third party. Thus, if A contracts with B to pay B's debt to C, the intended 
beneficiary C can sue, and is more likely to be "close to the deal" than is an 
incidental beneficiary like pipe manufacturer C where A agrees with B to use 
C's brand of pipe in constructing B's house. The third-party beneficiary is 
even more likely to have rich background knowledge if, as some courts require, 
both the promisor and the promisee intend to benefit the third party.299 To a 
similar effect is the rule that parties are free to rescind a third-party beneficiary 
contract before the third-party beneficiary is identified, regardless of when a 
beneficiary's rights become vested.300 Thus, the law of third-party 
beneficiaries intervenes where information intensiveness may be excessive for 
a wider audience, but this intervention is mild and selective, as one would 
expect, for a third party fairly close to the creator(s) of the right.301 
Likewise, courts revert to a more objective standard in interpreting offers 
aimed at a large and heterogeneous audience. Partly, this is a result of 
interpreting offers from the point of view of a reasonable offeree. If an offer is 
presented to the public at large, then the reasonable person will not have special 
background knowledge, including that of the offeror.302 Offerors and offerees 
on average share less background knowledge than do obligors and obligees 
current contract doctrines of interpretation. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third-Party 
Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358, 1379 (1992). Other courts allow extrinsic evidence 
on this point. See Harry G. Prince, Perfecting the Third Party Beneficiary Standing Rule 
Under Section 302 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 25 B.C. L. REV. 919, 930 
(1984). 
298. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 278, ? 302 cmt. d ("[I]f the 
beneficiary would be reasonable in relying on the promise as manifesting an intention to 
confer a right on him, he is an intended beneficiary."). Thus, although the use of reliance 
appears to be part of the rise of realism in contract, this provision embraces even 
hypothetical reasonable reliance on manifestations, which has a formalistic effect. 
299. See, e.g., Spires v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 70 A.2d 828, 830-31 (Pa. 1950). 
300. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 296, ? 10.3, at 679 & n.12 (citing as dictum 
Associated Teachers v. Bd. of Educ., 306 N.E.2d 791 (N.Y. 1973)). 
301. The broadening of the class of third-party beneficiaries with standing is closely 
related to the equitable device of the trust. Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the 
Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1145-46 
(1985). On the place of trusts in the present theory, see infra note 318 and accompanying 
text. 
302. Specificity will push in the direction of finding an offer. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. 
Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, Inc., 86 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Minn. 1957). 
Apr. 2003] 1187 
STANFORD LA WREVIEW 
under a contract, and this may be one reason why courts are less inclined to fill 
gaps and inquire into intent in the context of offer and acceptance than in 
contract interpretation generally.303 This greater reluctance to fill in gaps helps 
ensure that the set of offers facing the audience of offerees can be processed at 
lower cost.304 Likewise, courts' greater willingness to interpret a detailed and 
explicit communication as an offer also has the effect of lessening the 
informational burden on third parties.305 Finally, offers to sell real estate have 
to be more explicit than those to sell goods in the normal course of business, 
which makes sense if third parties are on average more interested in knowing 
about offers to sell land (and the resulting contracts) than they are in 
commercial contracts.306 
The present theory also allows us to explain differential formalism across 
time. Merrill and I have argued that a lower cost of communicating will lead to 
a lowering of the optimal degree of standardization.307 And recently, certain 
formalism requirements (e.g., for negotiability) have been relaxed as 
communication has become cheaper.308 To the extent that this makes 
information easier to manage and process, we would expect a decrease in legal 
intervention aimed at reducing the exteralities from information 
extensiveness. On the other hand, if the constraint on processing comes from 
humans' psychological capacity, and the improved technology is only better at 
lowering the cost of transmitting information, we might expect legal 
303. See, e.g., United States v. Braunstein, 75 F. Supp. 137, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) ("It is 
true that there is much room for interpretation once the parties are inside the framework of a 
contract, but it seems that there is less in the field of offer and acceptance."); see also 
Leonard v. Pepsico, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 116, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding a television 
commercial not sufficiently definite to constitute offer); Henry Simons Lumber Co. v. 
Simmons, 44 N.W.2d 726, 730 (Minn. 1950) (failing to find offer and acceptance in an 
exchange of letters about the value of shares); Dictaphone Corp. v. Clemons, 488 P.2d 226, 
228 (Colo. App. 1971) (construing a discrepancy between the employer's retirement plan 
and the summary of the plan sent to the employee against the draftsman and in favor of 
plaintiff employee); 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS ? 2.2, at 107-08 (rev. ed. 1993); FARNSWORTH, 
supra note 296, ? 3.10, at 134. 
304. See Architectural Metal Sys., Inc. v. Consol. Sys., Inc., 58 F.3d 1227, 1229 (7th 
Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.) ("The more willing the courts are to interpolate missing terms, the 
more difficult it is for the recipient of a vague offer to interpret the intentions behind the 
offer."). 
305. 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 303, ? 2.2, at 109. See, e.g., Fairmount 
Glass Works v. Crunden-Martin Wooden Ware Co., 51 S.W. 196 (Ky. 1899) (finding an 
exchange of highly detailed letters and a telegram to be binding). 
306. 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 303, ? 2.2, at 109 n.14 (citing cases). 
Corbin attributes this tendency to the uniqueness of land (as opposed to the replaceability of 
inventory) and the popular knowledge that real estate transactions will eventually take on a 
formal pattern leading to a written contract and closing. Id. 
307. The attentive reader will recall that the 1925 English land legislation both set up 
registries and simplified the system of legal estates. This is not necessarily a 
counterexample, because the reformers widely agreed that English land law was not close to 
the optimal point before the reforms. 
308. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 42. 
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intervention to increase, as it has with laws creating liability for junk faxing and 
giving rights to recipients of telemarketing calls.309 
Interestingly, arguments that formalism (in property law and more 
generally) reflects feudal or otherwise outmoded thinking can be put in 
perspective.310 Ironically, the numerus clausus principle arose in its modem 
form in the wake of the French Revolution as a device to rid the law of 
complicated feudal incidents.311 From the perspective of the informational 
tradeoff, feudal society was based to a far greater extent than later Western 
society on personal relationships.312 In particular, the complicated type of 
rights characteristic of the feudal era needed only to be processed by a few who 
were intensely interested. Although there was a market in land, the buyer and 
seller often were well known to each other. The feudal incidents did not 
conflict with a highly developed, impersonal market, because there hardly was 
one.313 When the advantages of such a market became great, the feudal 
incidents came to be regarded as involving too high a degree of information 
intensiveness for the now more extensive audience. 
Other arguments against formalism focus on their unfairness and on the 
antiformal practice of equity courts. While it is true that formalism, especially 
practiced in the extreme, can lead to absurd and unfair results,314 the activity of 
the equity courts supports the idea of differential formalism based on the 
informational context. First of all, equity courts traditionally obeyed certain 
maxims, one of the chief of which was not to undo the common law (and its 
predictability) with respect to property (principally land in those days).315 
Furthermore, equity sought to do justice as between specific, identified parties. 
Equity jurisdiction itself was in personam; in personam jurisdiction is required 
for the use of an equitable remedy.316 The maxim "equity acts in personam, 
309. See supra note 115. 
310. Compare CURTIS J. BERGER & JOAN C. WILLIAMS, PROPERTY: LAND OWNERSHIP 
AND USZ 211-12 (4th ed. 1997) (stating that the "formalistic, box-like structure" of property 
law reflects a "feudal vision of property relationships designed to channel (force?) people 
into pre-set social relationships"), with Williams, supra note 1, at 290-93 (arguing that a 
nuanced interpretation of the medieval period undermines a formalistic view of feudal 
property). 
311. Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 7 n. 15 (citing literature). 
312. MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 115-16, 145-54 (L.A. Manyon trans., 1961). 
313. The lack of a developed impersonal market in land does not imply inalienability; 
medieval markets in land were quite active. Donald N. McCloskey, The Open Fields of 
England. Rent, Risk and the Rate of Interest, 1300-1815, in MARKETS IN HISTORY: 
ECONOMIC STUDIES OF THE PAST 5, 31-32 (David W. Galenson ed., 1989) (citing related 
literature and explaining that the medieval land market was active as peasants moved in and 
out of villages, although before the plague of the mid-fourteenth century the exchanges were 
mostly small-scale and involved odd acres and plots). 
314. For a classic statement of this problem, see Fuller, supra note 267, at 663. 
315. Charles M. Grey, The Boundaries of the Equitable Function, 20 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 192, 202 (1976). 
316. See Hart v. Sansom, 110 U.S. 151, 154 (1884). 
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not in rem" has informational consequences. And under the original approach 
to equity, if the court's power acted on people and forced them in turn to act, 
this might well have fewer informational consequences than declaring rights 
directly in things or reforming legal instruments at will. This is especially so if 
the ordered action respects the forms prescribed by the common law. This 
caution ensured that equity would tend to exert its highly information-intensive 
power in a nonextensive way. More recently, writers like Walter Wheeler 
Cook have demonstrated that courts of equity do act in rem, in the jurisdictional 
sense.317 Nevertheless, although it goes beyond the scope of this Article, 
courts in equity mode do seem to be reluctant to act in such a way as to make in 
rem rights more informationally intensive. Even the trust, that quintessential 
creation of equity, is designed to hide much informational complication behind 
the trust form where only the settlor, the trustee, and the beneficiary-but not 
potential purchasers and others in the "world" at large have to process the 
complexity.318 
CONCLUSION 
As a system of communication the law must strike a tradeoff between 
intensiveness and extensiveness of information. Information is intensive where 
the ratio of information to delineation cost is high. Information intensiveness 
poses potential externalities where audiences are large, heterogeneous, and 
indefinite. A dramatic case is possession law; there the law intervenes to 
maintain low information intensiveness where the audience is potentially the 
rest of the world. The more that rules of possession do not rely on background 
knowledge about, say, fox-hunting, the less costly will be third parties' 
processing of the information about possessory claims. 
Because the stakes are typically high when it comes to legal relations, the 
law tends to make mandatory the very devices seen in natural language for 
minimizing the processing costs of large, heterogeneous, impersonal audiences 
who do not share much background knowledge with the speaker. These 
include limiting the amount of information, cutting down on the use of context, 
reducing ambiguity, promoting nondefeasibility and structured search, and 
curtailing audience responsibility. Although this theory has potential 
implications for legal interpretation in areas such as statutory interpretation,319 
317. Walter Wheeler Cook, The Powers of Courts of Equity (pt. 2), 15 COLUM. L. REV. 
106 (1915) (exploring the distinction between in rem and in personam jurisdiction). 
318. Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 848-49; see also supra note 214 and 
accompanying text. 
319. Audience design has implications for the interpretation of statutes and regulations 
and for the nature of legal meaning in other contexts. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING 
GOVERNMENT 4-6 (1983) (discussing "comprehension-based illegality on the part of 
officials). A theory based on audience processing could supplement the more producer- 
oriented theories. Suggestive in this regard is Mark Movsesian's observation about third- 
party interests and their impact on statutory versus contract interpretation: Because a statute 
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I have focused here on how these devices are especially used in property and in 
those related areas (even parts of contract law) in which audiences are large and 
indefinite. Although I do not claim that the informational tradeoff is struck 
optimally in current law, there is a variety of potential ways for these 
internalizing devices to make their way into the law. At the least, judges as a 
nonexpert audience themselves will partially align their interests with those of 
extensive audiences. 
Viewed in this way, the choice the law faces is not between a belief in 
airtight, noncontextual language or indeterminate, open-ended interpretation 
across the board; rather, the law faces a tradeoff between the intensiveness and 
extensiveness of information. The law reflects a strategy of differential 
formalism. Where speakers making this informational tradeoff do not face the 
full costs of audience processing, we can expect formalism in law to vary in 
degree according to the nature and size of the audience. Moreover, a wide 
range of institutions face this informational tradeoff, which helps explain how 
the tradeoff makes its way into the law. Setting up a system of legal relations is 
in part a problem of audience design. 
is directed at third persons who require notice of the statute's requirements, fairness requires 
that this cannot include "implicit agreements that fail to appear in the statutory text." 
Movsesian, supra note 295, at 1171-81; see also McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of 
Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 739 (1992) (arguing that 
the difference "between market exchange and legislative exchange" is "less one of kind than 
of quantitative magnitude, for third-party effects or economic exteralities are an explicit 
part of the law governing market transactions"). However, statutes and contracts differ 
along many dimensions, making informational comparisons difficult. 
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